Submission to EIS Inquiry for the Replacement Nuclear Research Reactor.

Murray Scott 1998 October 12

Outline:

This submission is confined to the following points:

 

Weapons Proliferation.

 

I do not doubt that now and for the forseeable future, ANSTO's operations are 100% civilian. On that premise I believe citizens can engage in dialogue with ANSTO on matters of safety, environment impact and the community's right to operational information. We can expect that its role as a promoter of civilian applications of nuclear science and technology will encourage at least some degree of openness and public cooperation. Following my inquiries to the Minister for example on concerns over fuel reprocessing and "molywaste" handling, I was invited to inspect facilities and frankly discuss problems with senior ANSTO staff (Appendix 1). This, and more, I expect of a civilian organisation and in this context I regard a new reactor, like the old one, as an acceptable hazard to local residents including myself even if it is an unaffordable burden on Australian science.

 

If future international tensions should ever bring about a decision to build nuclear weapons in Australia, I would not be prepared to live near Lucas Heights, mainly through fear of irradiated uranium reprocessing operations. Apart from the obvious threat of hostile attack, eg. Israels's strike destroying an Iraqi research reactor, the environmental and safety record of military nuclear programs worldwide is appalling. Disasters at eg. Chelyabinsk, Windscale and Hanford and the environmental contempt of weapons test programs come as no surprise when national imperatives, urgency and military secrecy override any pretence of community consultation or consideration. Who knows what horrors will eventually emerge from the Chinese, Indian and Pakistani weapons programs. The historical entanglement of military and civil nuclear operations in all the weapons states is well recognised as compromising safety accountability and was I understand a major factor in the Chernobyl disaster. My feelings were exactly expressed by N.Z. Prime Minister David Lange: "We do not wish to be defended by such means."

 

Australian governments mercifully declined to follow the "weapons option" path implicit in the original Atomic Energy Act and openly advocated for example by Sir Phillip Baxter, in favour of emphatic diplomatic support for the non-proliferation treaty. Despite the common half-joking reference by neighbours to the Lucas Heights Research Establishment as "the bomb factory", there was never, to my grapevine knowledge as an AAEC employee between 1967 and 1981, an explicit weapons program at Lucas Heights. With successive reviews of the old Atomic Energy Commission and its eventual replacement by ANSTO, the civilian orientation of the Lucas Heights facility was reaffirmed by successive Governments, thus affording former employees more confidence in commenting upon such delicate issues.

 

For despite such reassurance some ambiguity persists. Replying to my query on a statement by the Chief of the Defence Force Admiral Barrie, the Office of the Minister for Defence offerred no absolute rejection of future nuclear armaments for Australia. The letter of 1998 Sept 4 (Appendix 2), signed by Mr. Peter Jennings stated:

"Given the Government's commitment to and confidence in, the capacity of the Nuclear Non-Proliferatiion regime to reduce the threat to international, regional and Australia's security, it is difficult, as Admiral Barrie noted, to imagine the circumstances in which Australia would consider acquiring nuclear weapons."

Perhaps my imagination is too vivid.

 

Over the years there has been an accumulation of programs and facilities at Lucas Heights which could be seen internationally to have ambiguous potential for weapons development. These have been publically, almost ostentatiously, declared and in most cases shut down. The facilites were exposed (perhaps only after related programs were terminated) to numerous visiting scientists who were presumably, like ANSTO staff (RR. EIS Section 4.2.2), charged with a responsibility to:

"monitor nuclear activities and developments to enable independant assessments of other countries' nuclear program activities, their possible proliferation relevance and their potential economic significance to".. (their home country).

 

Lucas Heights thus received many students and visiting researchers, particularly from Indonesia, Malaysia, Burma, Thailand etc. and also India until that country exploded its first nuclear device. The ambiguous programs were also described in such publications as "Atomic Energy In Australia" and AAEC Annual Reports which are available in public libraries. Curiously, despite such exposure, these programs are airbrushed out of the "History of Nuclear Research Activities in Australia" in Table 3-3 of the Draft Replacement Reactor EIS. If neighbouring governments and the IAEA are fully acquainted with the history of Australia's nuclear weapons options, why not local residents and others concerned with safety and environment impact? The programs in question relate to the two possible avenues for producing bomb-grade fissile material, ie. uranium enrichment and plutonium extraction from reprocessed irradiated uranium.


On the enrichment path there were at Lucas Heights ostensibly for commercial purposes, a fluorine plant [A.A. in A Vol 20 #3 July 1977]], a UF6 synthesis plant [AAEC Annual Report 1975-76 p50 ], a laser enrichment project [op cit. p48 ] and the centrifuge cascade development [op cit. p43]. I do not know whether the potential production rate of weapons grade 235U through these facilities constitutes a significant proliferation risk or not.

 

On the alternative plutonium path, which appears more easily accessible at Lucas Heights, there are fuel irradiation facilities in HIFAR and hotcells in B54 in current use for chemical extraction of components from the irradiated uranium. These facilities have been developed for production of 99Mo medical radioisotopes but differ from a "reprocessing" plant only in respect of the types of chemicals and column materials used to extract specific elements from the dissolved irradiated uranium. The resulting intermediate level radioactive liquid waste is clearly the most dangerous material stored at Lucas Heights and is now belatedly being solidified. The scale of this operation is currently larger than that for the reprocessing of HIFAR's spent fuel, as noted below, and with the replacement reactor could grow fourfold.

 

Whichever path were taken to produce fissile material, the design of an explosive device or a reactor core is highly specific to the purity of the fissile and structural material available. Despite extensive theory, data and computer calculation "codes" maintained worldwide including at Lucas Heights, it would be necessary in achieving military reliability to test particular configurations for "reactivity" without risking an actual nuclear explosion or criticality incident (cf. accident reports in RR EIS 11.4.6). In 1972 Prime Minister William McMahon opened at Lucas Heights a Split Table Critical Facility explicitly intended for this purpose [Atomic Energy In Australia Vol. 15 Nos. 3 and 4]. It was ostensibly built for a proposed fast power reactor development program that was never funded.

 

The concrete containment building for this massive and expensive machine was subsequently employed as the beamline hall for the ANTARES tandem accelerator, currently used for carbon dating research inter alia. Far from disqualifying this building from housing a refurbished critical facility, the proximity of the tandem accelerator would offer a convenient pulsed neutron source, as commonly used for reactivity measurements. Contrary to the statement in the Draft EIS # 6.2.2 that "cyclotrons are not a source of neutrons", any accelerator of more than ~0.4MeV beam energy can produce neutrons using a variety of eg. (d,n) and (p,n) reactions, though not at the flux level available from a reactor. During the brief experimental program actually conducted on the critical facility, a small "neutron generator" accelerator was thus employed. The potential conjunction of the much more powerful tandem accelerator and critical facility in B53 is eerily reminiscent of the setup ~20 years previously in B22 where a beamline from the 3MeV Van der Graaf accelerator was extended into the reflector of the Moata reactor, and into a number of special BeO moderated and thorium metal reactor core mockups for similar reactivity or "neutron die away" measurements. One might almost think the tandem accelerator installation was designed with this in mind.

 

These ambiguous programs were published and, with the exception of 99Mo production, shut down and the equipment mothballed. As with any once-hi-tech equipment, the practicability of refurbishing these facilities is uncertain and perhaps the potential timescale for thus producing even one weapon impractically long. I hope so, but to my understanding these relics remain in storage and now, in considering a 30 to 40 year extension of reactor operation at the site, I believe we are entitled to know why. Much that is "difficult to imagine" could happen over that time. It could be suspected that in ANSTO's interpretation of the "national interest", the existance of these things at Lucas Heights is one reason that no other site was considered for HIFAR's replacement.

 

The community is entitled to know the facts concerning these relic facilities:

Fluorine plant

SF6 plant

Centrifuge enrichment cascade (B 64)

Critical Facility (B 53)

Only when these questions are answered can we sensibly address the safety and environment impact of a continued civilian program involving the proposed replacement reactor.

 

ANSTO without a reactor.

 

Several submissions, including my own, to the Research Reactor Review 1993 questioned ANSTO's assertion that its future was inextricably linked to continued operation of a nuclear reactor. Although I am less familiar now with the pattern of research at Lucas Heights, I believe that my comments (Appendix 3) are still relevant and I would be surprised if the fraction of ANSTO's work which actually depended on the output of the reactor facility (as opposed to overheads required to maintain that facility) exceeded ~1/3. Overstatement of ANSTO's reactor-dependance persists in the Draft EIS. For example the claim in #4.2.3 (which I find incredible) that "15 percent of PhD candidates in the physical sciences and engineering in Australian universities have used HIFAR in the course of their research" should be compared with its restatement in #4.4.4 ( which sounds more plausible) where the word "HIFAR" has been replaced by "ANSTO's facilities". It is revealing that these two terms are used synonymously, dismissing the contribution for example of the ANTARES and 3MeV accelerator facilities which are independant of HIFAR. Such imprecision rather undermines the credibility of the student usage data. If true, these figures are more indicative of the level of funding available through AINSE compared with shrinking budgets elsewhere in university departments and suggest a disturbing imbalance in Australian postgraduate research.

 

I have no doubt that many of the 99Tc medical diagnostic procedures are valuable and justified, but I know that one was not. My daughter was referred for a 99Tc test for rheumatoid arthritis which confirmed that certain joints were inflamed, a fact of which she was already painfully aware. Objective confirmation of reported symptoms in such cases, which could also have been performed using thermal imaging or a simple thermometer, appears to be more relevant to the insurance industry than to medicine and as such represents a highly inappropriate allocation of health care resources.

 

Irradiated Fuel Processing.

 

In an election statement by our local MHR Dana Vale, (St.George and Sutherland Shire Leader, 98Oct1, p3) she claims "Another win for Hughes was my determined fight against the proposal to establish a nuclear waste reprocessing plant at Lucas Heights". Despite conveying my inquiries on this subject to the Minister, and receiving my follow-up letter (Appendix 4), Ms.Vale along with many opponents of the replacement reactor, appears not to recognise the significance of Mr. McGauran's reply (Hansard, Reps 1997 May 15 p3757) that:

 

"The statement that reprocessing the spent fuel rods would involve significantly lower levels of radioactivity than those already associated with ANSTO's current radio-pharmaceutical production is based on calculations by ANSTO that radiopharmaceutical production on site involves processing 30kg of irradiated uranium containing 1e17 Becquerels of radioactivity per year, while reprocessing one hundred spent fuel rods a year would involve only some 14kg of irradiated uranium and about fifty times less radioactivity".

 

The reality is that, to my surprise, there was already a substantial irradiated uranium processing operation at Lucas Heights with all the hazards that implies, including the storage of intermediate level liquid radiactive waste in ammonium nitrate solution which carries the risk of chemical explosion. I have since received from ANSTO a copy of ANSTO/E728, ANSTO's Radioactive Waste Management Policy, Preliminary Environmental Review. Section 4.1.5 p41 states :

"The presence in the intermediate level waste of varying concentrations of ammonium nitrate in combination with nitric acid and other potential sensitising agents (such as metal nitrates) has led to concerns of an explosion hazard during the boiling/solidification processes. An external review of the proposed process by ICI Engineering confirmed the potential safety hazard and outlined various strategies required to overcome the problem".

It should be understood that a chemical explosion involving this material would release dangerous quantities of airborne fission products. On the "other side" of the cold-war panic of the 1950's such an explosion at Chelyabinsk devastated several towns, lakes, streams and a vast swathe of land near the Ural mountains.

 

I understand that the solidification process now being implemented includes de-ammoniation of the liquid waste, and it is intended that the 99Mo production process will in future be modified to separate the ammonia-rich condensate. Nevertheless I believe that the irradiated uranium processing operation constitutes a major part of the hazard associated with operations at Lucas Heights, arguably greater than the reactor itself. It differs from spent fuel reprocessing only in respect of the chemistry for separating particular elements from the dissolved uranium. Despite the relocation of charcoal filters from B54, a fire in these filters would remain a significant airborne contamination hazard.

 

In the RR Draft EIS #11.2.3 the dissolved uranium is dismissed in Table 11.3 as "small quantities" and subsequently rates only 7 lines consideration with no attempt at comparison with the "reference accident" for the reactor. I believe this is a gross distortion of the actual balance of hazards.

 

The location of the hot cells (B54) , liquid storage (B57) and solidification plant (B41) appears far from ideal, involving outdoor road transport of irradiated fuel and liquid waste. This transport is currently restricted to fine weather to improve the security of leak detection. What assurance do we have that these inconvenient precautions would be maintained under the stress of extended wet weather or urgent logistic difficulties?

 

If these irradiated uranium processing facilities were ever to be adapted for weapons plutonium extraction as canvassed above, the significant differences (apart from haste, secrecy and an overriding of safety considerations) would include a generally higher burden of medium half-life fission products and higher specific activity of the solutions. This would introduce the truly horrific prospect of self-boiling solutions requiring active cooling, failure of which would lead to dryout and almost certain chemical explosion with consequences already referred to.

 

I found no consideration in Chapter 6 of the Draft EIS of the alternative reactor-based route to 99Mo production, which involves irradiation of natural molybdenum. This alternative process was previously studied at Lucas Heights and rejected in favour of the more dangerous fission product route. I assume this was on account of lower achievable specific activity but the practicality of the neutron capture route should now be reassessed in the light of the increased neutron flux available from the proposed replacement reactor.

 

In would feel much more relaxed about the prospect of a replacement reactor if it did not involve irradiated uranium solution processing.


Yours faithfully,

Murray Scott

APPENDIX 1.

Visit to ANSTO for Molywaste inspection, 1997 August 29.

Murray Scott.

 

ANSTO staff present:

John Mulcair, Pat Bull, Des Levins, Ross Miller

 

Purpose :

The visit was arranged by John Mulcair as a result of my letter to Minister McGauran seeking information on the relative quantities and levels of radioactivity for "molywaste" from medical isotope production compared with HIFAR spent fuel rods. I had subsequently expressed concern to the Minister that the existing liquid molywaste, being equivalent to fuel reprocessing waste, presented a more urgent hazard than the dry-stored spent fuel rods and should take priority in any SYNROC immobilisation process.

 

Itinerary:

As I arrived late at Lucas Heights only one site was visited, the molywaste solidification hotcell in Building 41 adjacent to HIFAR. ANSTO staff answered my questions for over an hour

 

Observations:

The process I was shown in B41 is designed to concentrate liquid molywaste by evaporation, decompose the ammonium nitrate component by acidification and further concentrate the remainder to a solid comprising mostly uranium nitrate hexahydrate, as described in ANSTO/E728 page 41. This solid salt, enclosed in thick stainless steel vessels each of a few litres capacity will also contain the radioactive fission products and actinides. It is considered a medium term interim waste storage form and could eventually be further treated for incorporporation into SYNROC. If that route were eventually chosen for disposal of fresh arisings of intermediate liquid molywaste however, Dr. Levins suggested that concentrated liquid would be fed directly into the SYNROC mixing process, bypassing the interim salt solidification step. Such a SYNROC process, if eventually installed, would occupy an adjacent hotcell roughly 4m square and would utilise smaller pellets, presses and furnaces than the demonstration unit in B3.

 

Many points were discussed, my recollection and interpretation of which is as follows:

 

1.Although undergoing different prior processing to recover Mo99 on one hand and possibly enriched uranium on the other, the intermediate level liquid wastes arising from medical isotope production and spent HIFAR fuel reprocessing would be essentially similar regarding radioactive liquid handling procedures and suitability for SYNROC immobilisation. Neither category of waste exhibits the hazardous complication of significant radioactive self-heating. The accumulation rate of "cooled" waste arising from isotope production exceeds that of spent fuel, so the scale of a SYNROC plant designed for the existing molywaste liquid could also accommodate proposed spent fuel solutions with little additional cost or hazard. It has been subsequently announced however that no reprocessing of the fuel rods will be conducted at Lucas Heights.

 

2.The production of Mo99 for radiopharmaceuticals represents one of the most hazardous aspects of operating HIFAR or its replacement. Apart from a risk of radioactive contamination by molywaste liquid spillage, minimised by catch tanks and monitoring, there are chemical hazards arising from the strong oxidising potential of ammonium nitrate in the solution. If allowed to dry and mix with reducing agents such as oils or organic solvents, this solution could potentially form explosive compounds, detonation of which would release significant radioactive contamination to the atmosphere. The de-ammoniation and salt solidification process is designed to minimise this hazard.

 

3.ANSTO see the interim salt solidification of molywaste liquid as entirely independant of any SYNROC development and on a more immediate timescale. Despite the similarity of waste compositions, there are no plans to integrate processing of the intermediate level waste streams arising from HIFAR fuel and molywaste through a common SYNROC facility.

4.Contrary to my previous impression, the corrosion of old spent HIFAR fuel rods is a real concern. A few rods are already deemed unacceptable for reprocessing in the U.S., although the reasons for this are obscure and may change.

 

5.My impression remains that SYNROC conversion of intermediate level liquid molywaste would have been attractive from both technological and safety viewpoints. I can see however that after many years of procrastination on solidification, any additional delay to integrate these developments is seen by ANSTO as an unwanted complication. Such delay would also be undesirable in terms of neighbourhood safety.

 

6.The location of facilities for Mo99 production and waste handling at Lucas Heights seem far from optimal, apparently the result of ad-hoc decisions over many years. The irradiated fuel "rocket" is transported from HIFAR to B54 (~400m) where the liquefaction and most highly radioactive handling takes place. The liquid is stored there temporarily in 50 l flasks for a year before transfer to B57 (~400m) for storage in larger tanks. After storage for many years this liquid is to be transferred ~600m back to B41 for solidification. Transfers between these buildings are conducted outdoors by road and restricted to fine weather for protection against leakage. This arrangement is inconvenient, less than optimally safe and therefore unsuitable for continued isotope production as proposed with a new reactor. Replacement and decontamination of these facilities will inevitably impose additional costs for a new reactor program.

 

7.Once the intended program for salt solidification of molywaste is completed, any immediate safety argument for SYNROC immobilisation facilities at Lucas Heights loses force. If justified for the purpose of SYNROC demonstration such a plant could be built elsewhere, solid radwaste from Lucas Heights being transportable to it, much as fuel rods are currently shipped overseas.

 

I would like to thank ANSTO for the courtesy and time afforded to my visit.

 

Murray Scott

 


APPENDIX 2.

Appendix 3.

REVIEW OF THE ANSTO NEW REACTOR PROPOSAL,

Submission by Murray Scott. 1993 February 15.

 

Summary:

I oppose the construction of a new nuclear reactor by ANSTO on the following grounds:

 

 

 

 

 

Discussion:

 

Safety and cost:

As a former employee of the old AAEC then CSIRO, I have worked with radiation around

MOATA and occasionally HIFAR for 25 years. I understand that the risks of operating such facilities an manageable providing that unstinted funding is assured for routine and contingency maintenance over an indefinite period.

 

Foremost in these expenses is the continued recruitment and training of operators, safety staff, scientists, engineers and craftworkers whose skill and experience is difficult to maintain without a vigorous program of related development, Stagnation and flagging morale is dangerous, The recurrent new-reactor proposals for Lucas Heights can be.seen as a manifestation of this imperative for continued growth.

 

The presently unresolved questions of storage or disposal of spent HIFAR fuel rods and of a National radioactive waste repository are examples of the open ended cost commitment blithely incurred in the 1950's with the establishment of the AAEC. However awkward, both questions must be resolved now before any new reactor is built because the present spent fuel store is full and decommissioning of HIFAR will generate significant quantities of medium and low level waste.

 

There may be a temptation to "solve" present waste disposal problems through overseas deals linked to supply of a new reactor or its fuel. Such a deal would compound the problem, disguising the real costs with future encumbrance. That would be unacceptable since current debt and economic trends offer no reassurance that resources will be available in the future to meet such commitments. The perilous state of soviet and Eastern European reactors stands at a warning to us of the consequences of blind faith in economic growth or foreign aid to fix

pollution problems. We must not commit our children's safety to anything which they will not be able to manage by themselves.

 

Nuclear Reactors are not essential for Lucas Heights Research Laboratories.

 

 

Despite public perception of the Lucas Heights Research Laboratories as "the reactor", HIFAR and MOATA are irrelevant to the bulk of research at the site. About 30% of this work is managed by CSIRO and is completely independent of reactor facilities.

 

Of the remaining "nuclear" research, the ANSTO "Program Of Research 1992-1993" document lists 17 projects under 4 main Program headings. From the subsequent project descriptions it appears that the HIFAR and MOATA reactors are involved in only 8 projects. Two reactor applications mentioned in Dr. Cook's foreward, the silicon irradiation and neutron diffraction related to lead batteries are not listed under the programs and I have guessed where they fit. The fraction of the effort in each project, measured in person.years (p.yr), which depends on nuclear reactors is by my estimate:

 

Project: Reactor use: Related effort/total(p.yr.)

 

Bioconjugates for Monoclonal antibodies 99mTc, reprocessed fuel or Mo irradiation 12 / 12 Molecular Radiopharmaceuticals - (all from cyclotron) 0 / 6.3 reactor and cyclotron radionuclides guess ~50% 5 / 8.5 Supercomputer applications in biomedicine - 0 / 4.7 Environmental chemistry - 0 /19 Environmental physics - 0 / 20 Coastal and marine processes tracer isotopes? guess- 10% of work 2 / 18 Chemical and waste engineering isotope measurement system? guess 10% 2 / 17 Radioanatytical Applications HIFAR activation irradiation 9 / 9 Accelerator applications - 0 / 12 Accelerator mass spectrometry - 0 / 9 Neutron scattering (including batteries) HIFAR neutron beams 9/ 9 Waste conditioning-Synroc - 0 /31 Waste conditioning-cement waste forms - 0 / 2.7 Advanced ceramics possible n diffraction, guess < 10% 2 / 13.8 Surface modification technologies - 0 / 3.5 Materials assessment MOATA radiography, guess -10% 2 / 18 (exclude HIFAR work; service to not from reactor)

silicon irradiation in HIFAR guess 2 / 2

 

Estimated total reactor dependent effort 45 / 215.5

Reactor dependent proportion of ANSTO project effort 21%

 

Reactor dependence of estimated CSIRO project effort 0 /~100

Estimated reactor dependent proportion of LHRC project effort ~14%

 

The radiophamaceutical effort which had until the advent of the cyclotron been based entirely on HIFAR, mainly 99mTc, is now diversifying to isotopes and techniques more typical of practice elsewhere in the world. The cost of neutron rich isotopes such as 99Mo which may have to he imported in the absence of HIFAR should be compared with that of proton-rich isotopes which were imported prior to the cyclotron.

 

Though HIFAR has become indispensable to the people involved eg. in neutron diffraction and activation analysis it has commanded resources which would have supported considerably more researchers in closely parallel fields such as x-ray diffraction and atomic absorption analysis.

 

Nuclear Science: a low priority for Australian research and development,

 

It is unneccessary to list the urgent demands on Australian science funding, or the economic importance of targeting technological support to industries which can use it efficiently to rebuild Australia's welfare, ecological sustainability, solvency and autonomy. In my view the areas of science and technology which surround the uranium fuel cycle have extremely poor prospects of delivering such benefits.

 

Part of the argument for a new reactor is to stimulate a fresh round of recruitment to nuclear science and engineering, both as ANSTO staff and through AINSE as research students on academic projects related to the new facility. This follows the old AAEC rationale of maintaining a pool of nuclear expertise for unspecified future contingencies.

 

A measure of the futility of this "pool of nuclear expertise" approach was revealed by the Jervis Bay Power Reactor project. A decade and a half of AABC research experience was climaxed by merely looking over the shoulder of the overseas consultants, Bechtel Pacific, who were engaged to assess the overseas tenders. So much for developing an independent Australian nuclear industry. Fortunately the project was dropped in any case, the poor prospects for nuclear power in Australia having since been recognized in the replacement of the AAEC by ANSTO.

 

For the uranium mining industry there has been a uranium assay service provided by the MOATA reactor, continuation of which will presumably be unaffected by HIFAR decommissioning or a new reactor. Apart from this ANSTO' s involvement with uranium mining now appears limited to the Environneneal Science program which makes minimal use of the present reactors or associated science and engineering.

 

Much is made of Australia's scientific contribution to international nuclear safeguards. A few detectors for enriched uranium were assembled from standard imported instruments under contract to the IAEA. This ANSTO contribution, while apparently competent, is irrelevant to the diplomatic issues of combating proliferation or related in any way to safeguarding Austral exports of uranium ore.

 

Probably the most promising nuclear related development at Lucas Heights is the SYNROC waste immobilization system but it is difficult to see how this will ever directly benefit Australia. Even if, like the Interscan aircraft landing system, it is recognized internationally as superior to competing methods we are still too far from the action and do not have the industrial muscle to capture a significant part of the economic returns. If ANSTO were tempted to bargain by offering burial of treated overseas waste in Australia it would ignite a popular revolution.

 

The Big-Science Concept a costly import.

 

Big Science so stridently proclaims its association with economic and cultural development that to question that proposition is to risk the charge of heresy. I hope that the Review Committee pursues a more independent concern for Australia's future.

 

We are not dealing here with the science of big ideas, the origin of the universe or the meaning of life which soar above economic concerns. The more modest form of Big Science represented by the proposed new reactor is not intended per se to roll back any frontiers, simply to make available in Australia a set of established tools for strategic science, teaching and industrial support. Often and especially in this case the tools are too expensive and unwieldy to serve this threefold purpose and would continue to drain students, research effort and money away from more productive fields for many decades.

 

Having referred above to the limited value to Australia of strategic science in the nuclear power and fuel cycle fields, I consider now the teaching and industrial rationale:

 

Post Graduate Teaching:

 

I worked at the 3MV accelerator facility at Lucas Heights and briefly at HIFAR assisting a succession of bright, enthusiastic PhD students who slaved day and night to assemble obstinate equipment and churn out results. I am convinced that most of this work was of marginal scientific or technological significance, dotting i's and crossing t's on nuclear models and data tables already accepted as adequate for engineering nuclear power reactors. This was deemed quite justifiable by supervisors as an exercise in using complex theory and apparatus, supposedly to winnow or equip students for future academic or industrial challenges. Such thesis projects are inappropriate because the more ponderous the facility the less scope is afforded for student initiative, curiosity and innovation. I find it ironic that those academics most shrill in defending "fundamental" research and rejecting "relevance" constaints submit complacently to the arbitrary blinkers imposed on their own and students' imagination by projects contrived chiefly to utilize and support a major facility. This tunnel vision tends to be perpetuated as the students in turn become supervisors and promote their own little corner of whatever field they were herded into.

 

Industrial support programs:

 

Big science, particularly physics,fails industrially in Australia because programs tend to imitate overseas facilities funded through military or industrial programs having no counterpart in Australia. Typically promoted by enthusiasts returning from postings at such facilities overseas, projects become an exercise in acclimatizing an exotic technology severed from its symbiotic supplier and client industries. Spending on these facilities has no local multiplier effect

because equipment purchase and most of the ancillary business flows back to the industries which surround the copied facility overseas. This also limits the technical spin off to local industries.

 

At LHRL I worked in a group attempting to interest industry in material analysis by ion-beam

induced nuclear reactions using the 3MV accelerator, eventually diversifying into modification of surfaces by ion beams using a special small accelerator. Although modest by world standards these facilities were sufficiently imposing to rigidly confine the scope of our work. Although "problems" were sought to exploit the unique strengths of available ion beam techniques, it invariably became apparent upon familiarization with the target industry that a different approach with more common tools would produce a similar or better result. Such lateral thinking was however outside our brief. Though several such projects were undertaken with partial (reluctant) industry support, none as far as I know led to continuing economic applications. Projects descendant from these are still current in the ANSTO Program of Research with I expect, a similar chance of economic success.

 

The only "successful" industrial applications I am aware of involving the present reactors are neutron radiography and uranium assay on MOATA, radiopharmaceuticals and silicon irradiation at HIFAR. In each case it was not an existing private company but ANSTO which developed the entire operation in-house from engineering to marketing. The demand for such services is however too elastic to permit full commercial recovery of overhead costs eg. for disposal of spent fuel rods. Such projects are best seen as salvaging some benefit from an underutilized resource, not justification for renewed investment.

 

Ah this is typical of the "solution looking for a probleml" syndrome inherent in the Big Science model in which "research and development is underpinned by the facilities" as stated in Dr. Cook's foreword to the ANSTO Program document He is not alone in this fixation for as long as I can remember facilities, not ideas or problems, have been the basis of research "initiatives" in Austalian physics. Telescopes, high energy accelerators, synchrotron light sources, the list goes on. The proposed HIFAR replacement is simply the latest and most expensive of these.

 

The Small Science alternative:

 

An alternative model for technological research is represented by the programs at Lucas Heights which have diverged from dependence on mega-facilities. ANSTO Divisions such as Environmental Science and Advanced Materials, and CSIRO Divisions of Energy Technology and Mineral Processing have a problem oriented outlook and interaction with existing Australian companies. They offer an industry interface involving teams familiar with a variety of theoretical and experimental techniques which can be matched to the needs and resources of a client. Any technique which is developed can be implemented by the firm in a dedicated installation on-site with instruments and machines commercially available within the means of industrial companies. This model for supporting industrial innovation is much more versatile than dependence on a few very large facilities which quickly become obsolete. It incidentally provides for staff an intellectual challenge just as stimulating as any facility-constrained "basic" research.

 

 

 

Submitted by Murray Scott

4 Electra Street Heathcote 2233

(02) 520 0750 (h)

(02) 413 7755, 7022, 7708 (w)

 

APPENDIX 4.

4 Electra Street

Heathcote NSW 2233

9520 0750 (h)

9413 7755 (w)

97 July 23

Dana Vale

MHR for Hughes

 

I enclose for your information a letter I received from the Minister on the subject of Hifar fuel reprocessing, with Hansard answers to your questions on my behalf. Note particularly the reference to 6 cubic metres of molywaste liquid, with a generation rate of 1017 bequerels per year.

 

I would appreciate ANSTO's perspective on these figures, but the amount of this molywaste dismays me and overturns my previous concerns and arguments against SYNROC conversion. I am not at all happy to have reprocessing proceed at Lucas Heights, but ANSTO have already committed us to the most hazardous aspect of it: the molywaste is already liquid. From here, as I understand it, they have two solidification options: to dry it as powder for SYNROC conversion or to cast it wet, as cement. Wet cast cement is safer in the short term but likely to eventually break up into dust. SYNROC conversion requires a brief but dangerous dust step, compensated we trust by reliable long-term stability. We need to press ANSTO for the facts on these and other options, but my instinctive preference would be for the long-term option. The sooner this mess is converted to SYNROC the better, for there is no safe way to move it from Lucas Heights in its present liquid form.

 

I am inclined to withdraw my objection to a SYNROC conversion plant and DEMAND that they solidify the molywaste liquid before adding to it by dissolving any of the HIFAR fuel rods. We do have the option of shipping those out for conversion elsewhere.

 

I would further suggest that the level of radioactive waste generated by radioisotope production, seriously undermines the economic and health rationale for this operation, being significantly greater than that of the reactor itself and in a much more dangerous form. I was not fully aware of this fact and neither I suspect were many others. It seems to me a powerful argument against building a new reactor.

 

Regards,

Murray Scott