SPEECH TO 2 PLATOON A COMPANY 2 RAR (ANZAC)
19 AUGUST 2002 - WOLLONGONG
It is an honour and a privilege to be asked to speak on behalf of 2 Platoon A Company 2 RAR (ANZAC) tonight. For all of us this is a once in a lifetime opportunity to get back together, re-establish old links, and more importantly make sure that the mateship we shared back in 1970/71 is carried on.
Before I start I wish to thank Ian (Cavanough) again for the amount of dedication and effort he has shown in getting this reunion together. He achieved the impossible in getting the platoon as well as two officers in the one place at the one time! During the lead up to this reunion Ian kept us well informed on progress with various documents. The most surprising and gratifying documents were the letters to our platoon from the Prime Minister John Howard, the Leader of the Opposition Simon Crean, and the Mayor of Wollongong George Harrison all wishing us the best for our reunion. The sentiments expressed in those letters whilst a bit late do help to put the record straight.
General Horrie Howard hit the nail on the head at the memorial yesterday when he said people in Australia never got to hear about how well Australians performed or what they did. Since my tour in Vietnam I have served in various countries around the world and seen the standards of troops and to this day none come anywhere near the jungle fighting ability of the Australians in Vietnam.
As you know I joined the platoon as a reinforcement officer. Pat Cameron and I were mates through our training at OCS and when I joined 2 Platoon in the Nui Dat lines I knew I would find a well-trained and well orgainised platoon. I didn't however know how I would be accepted. Almost immediately it was business as usual and we got on with the job. My first impression of 2 Platoon was how readily I was accepted and how well everyone worked together.
There were a number of defining moments for me:
" First. As you all know normally out in the scrub all you could usually see was the bloke in front and the bloke behind. On one particular occasion we moved out of thick jungle into open forest (this may have been an old disused rubber plantation), instead of 5 metre visibility all of a sudden it was 50 metres or more. The sections automatically moved into open formation. There was no sound as the platoon moved like silent shadows, all of a sudden a small branch fell from a tree at some distance. In a millisecond every man was on the deck in a fire position every weapon directed at the sound every trigger on first pressure not a shot fired. I thought to myself then: "Pat you have done a great job these boys are good!"
" Second. There are many anecdotes about ingenuity but one I recall involved Tiny Reilly. . On one occasion back in the Nui Dat lines Tiny had a personal situation he wanted to talk to me about. After a short introductory discussion he said, "Do you feel like a beer skipper?" This was bit strange as we were sitting on a sandbag wall in the lines and booze was not permitted. I said "why not?" at which point Tiny lifted up a sandbag and revealed an esky mounted in the wall with several cold beers on hand. I thought to myself "Aussie ingenuity at its best!"
" Third. On leave in Vung Tau the platoon tended to travel around together to keep an eye on each other. On one occasion we were gathered at a Vietnamese "cultural" dancing exhibition at the Grand Hotel. One of our members who had a few too many decided he could do a better job at dancing on the stage than the local girls, and I have to say he did do a better job! However the Military Police were called by the disgruntled mamasan. As the MPs tried to barge their way in to make an arrest a number of us blocked their entry while the rest of the platoon dressed our phantom stripper and took him to safety out the back way. Whether we were on operations or even during our time off we always looked after each other.
I won't go on with too many anecdotes I am sure there are a lot more to come out during the course of this evening. I actually want to remind everyone about what we actually achieved while in Vietnam. The quote in Prime Minister John Howard's letter hits the nail on the head when he said: "Platoons are the blocks by which all armies are built. Although small in size, Australian platoons have always punched above their weight." In our case in Vietnam nothing truer could be said. For us it was a platoon and section war which most people back in Australia could never really comprehend.
The Australian public has been fed a view of the Australian Vietnam campaign that does not truly reflect what happened. This has not been helped by the media at the time, left wing politicians, and of course the numerous Hollywood movies about the US in Vietnam which certainly do not portray our experiences. The general impression is that all soldiers in Vietnam behaved like the Americans. Most of us have got to the stage where we say nothing rather than argue the point however it is about time that people did realise what the Aussie soldier did, how well and professionally he fought. How many of you have tried to explain what we did, how we lived, how we supported each other, and how professionally we operated in pretty tough conditions?
How do we explain that unlike most American line units who patrolled on roads and tracks, were re-supplied every day (for lunch), rarely stayed out overnight and still managed to get themselves ambushed, whilst we patrolled and ambushed as independent platoons in a company Area of Operations. .
How do we explain to our loved ones, friends, and anyone else who asks that we operated as a small fighting unit and on most occasions we normally operated with about 20 blokes all up?. How do you explain that we lived in the jungle and an operation could last four weeks with the only contact with the outside world being by a military radio or via a maintdem?. Our survival depended on our fire power which hinged on our own three M60 Machine Guns as well as the amount of firepower we could deliver from artillery, naval gunfire, and gunships. How do we explain that once our three machine gunners had their M60s firing, with the claymores detonated and artillery rounds on the ground, an Australian infantry platoon was a formidable force against any odds?
How do we explain that each man in the platoon carried over 100 pounds of gear as a matter of course?. Everything we needed to survive was carried on our backs. This included personal weapon, loaded magazines, spare ammunition and extra for the M60s, water (8 water bottles = 20 pounds), basic sleeping gear, and webbing. Split out amongst the platoon were Claymore mines, radios, spare radio batteries, M66 rocket launchers, M79 grenade launchers and ammunition, medical kits, Heli marker panels. I don't know about you but carrying this and covering ground during our patrolling was second nature. I wouldn't like to try it now!
People I have spoken to find it hard to comprehend that we navigated for weeks at a time in dense jungle as well as open rubber, rugged mountains, swamp and rice paddies. Navigation was by dead reckoning. It is always a good joke to talk about second lieutenants and getting lost, but as a platoon we always knew our location and our navigation was spot on. The reason? Because we were all competent jungle navigators and we navigated independently (Section Commanders, MFC or FO ack) and worked together as a team. Every hour we stopped for our locstat to confirm our location. This was important because once a contact occurred we wanted our artillery support on target accurately and quickly.
How do we explain that unlike the Americans we patrolled in the jungle for extended periods without having to yell and scream at each other. We were at home in the jungle and used it to our advantage. We searched for the Vietcong by using search techniques that included cross-graining which meant that instead of following the natural slope of a ridgeline you cut across the ridges to pick up enemy tracks. A large track/road or open space was an 'obstacle' and to be avoided as a likely place of ambush. The work was tough for the forward section in particular. In close country three men worked as a close team the scout, section commander, and machine gunner. The scout would carry his weapon in one hand and seceteurs in the other. The seceteurs were used to quietly cut the tangle of vines and "wait a while" that had to be penetrated without a sound or without the moving of branches. The section commander carried his weapon in one hand and compass in the other to check general direction (the rear sections would do the detailed check navigation) the machine gunner was close at hand to lay down withering fire in the event of a contact to allow the scout and section commander to pull back. Visibility in these situations was down to 5 metres and a contact could occur with the enemy at ranges as close as 10 to 20 metres. For every minute of a patrol particularly as lead section nerves were taught and adrenaline high. Whilst we were well trained and prepared for this type of warfare many Vietnam vets were not given the opportunity to defuse from this situation when they were whisked directly away from the bush to Mascot airport.
How do we explain that we lived on the ground like animals. At night we either harboured up or if we found a suitable track to set up an ambush. The harbour was carried out as a drill we would break track and circle back to cover our own track in the event that we were being shadowed. The drill included scouting patrols out to make sure the area was clear, posting of sentries, machine guns manned, stand to, where we waited and listened and then into our night routine. This included radio watch and manning of the three machine gun posts all night. The night would be a combination of sentry duty and light sleep waking every time the gun posts changed and all would be awake at the slightest noise. In the morning we would return to day routine and prepare for our next days patrolling. Many still have similar sleeping habits to this day.
How do we tell people that we were actually bloody good at what we did? The Australians had developed ambushing down to a fine art. The Vietcong hated travelling through our province because they always got hammered. They preferred the American areas where there were a lot more soldiers and firepower but no one actually out where it counts. The ambush would be set up covering a track or approach where the enemy was expected to move (particularly at night). It was triangular with a machine gun at each corner of the triangle. The beauty of this was that the guns could interlock on any approach whether the killing ground at the front or possible enemy flanking movements on either side. Claymore mines which contained steel balls were set up in banks of about ten connected with instantaneous detonation cord. Artillery targets were registered on the most likely enemy advance and withdrawal.
Because we spent so much time living in the scrub our senses were sharpened. Generally one of the scouts would know instinctively if there were enemy around, or if we were approaching a bunker system, or there was impending danger.
There was one occasion when we found a track and decided that it was a good place for an ambush. We all knew from the sign and the track use that there must be Vietcong using it. It was a perfect ambush site so we set up and waited all night. Nothing happened. In the morning I requested that we remain in ambush to wait for the enemy. I was instructed to pack up and keep moving. Grudgingly we packed up and commenced to have breakfast in situ. The next thing the M60s opened up and it was on!. The VC had walked through our ambush while we were having breakfast! This is an indication of the discipline and training of our platoon that whilst in the process of packing up the VC could not detect our presence. There were four VC killed in that ambush. If this had of been a poorly disciplined unit the opposite would have happened. The VC would have smelt the cooking, heard the noise from the transistor radios and talking, and immediately called in a mortar attack or counter ambush.
The worst place to ambush was the rubber plantations (particularly when the leaves were sparse and by night with strong moonlight in particular, we all stood out like dogs balls). The big problem was the rubber tappers and kids who would watch us move and inform the VC. Ambushing in rubber was never very successful.
Whilst we all felt pretty confident in the jungle none of us liked patrolling in rubber plantations and village areas where you could not avoid tracks or mines. The VC planted mines in rubber plantations as a matter of course. APCs moved through the rubber but had to move in the natural lanes caused by the rows of trees. The VC could gauge where the tracks would have to pass and plant mines accordingly. The local villagers and rubber tappers knew where the mines would be planted and could avoid them. Mines were an insidious weapon and are more difficult to avoid in open rubber or populated village areas. As we know from our own experience these had devastating results.
How can you possibly explain what it is like to be in a contact? When any contact occurred with the enemy there were immediate and instinctive responses that all members of the platoon carried out. The hours and hours of contact drills paid off in an environment where milliseconds counted. The radio operator and FO ack would immediately call "contact wait out". Gun lines would prepare the guns for firing on pre-designated targets, casevac helicopters airborne, gunships and any other available air support would be alerted. Radio communications were the platoon's lifeline to the fire support needed and to evacuate any wounded. The VC knew this and would try and take the people and communications responsible for this.
I have gone through some of the activities we carried out as a platoon in Vietnam because I think it is easy for us to forget how lethal and effective our small team operating in a hostile environment against huge potential odds could be. We operated, as a close knit team depending on each other and knowing when the chips were down we would trust our lives to each other.
Australians who were not directly involved as infantrymen in Vietnam will never really know what a great job was done by such a small team as a platoon. We have all seen the American experience over and over again. A good friend of mine Gary McKay ( a Nasho officer) wrote a book "In Good Company" out of frustration to try and give the Australian story of a typical infantry platoon. He incidentally returned to Vietnam on a number of occasions and met up with some of the senior generals from D445 and North Vietnamese regiments. On one occasion they were sitting around a table in a VC RSL drinking rice white wine when the VC general worked out that they were both in the same battle (Long Hais) at the same time. The general took off his shirt and pointed to bullet wounds and said "you must have shot me here!" Gary pointed to his forehead and said: "no I would of shot you here". Gary then took off his shirt and showed his bullet wounds from the same battle. The point here is that whilst the Vietnamese still basically despise the Americans they respect the Australians for their fighting spirit, courage, and discipline.
Do people really understand how proud they should be of the Aussie soldier in Vietnam? In all the years I have been associated with the regular army since Vietnam I have never heard of a single incident where any Australian combat soldier behaved in a barbaric or inhumane way. The Aussies always had a spirit of fair play. One example in our platoon was after a contact in the Nui Dinhs we followed up on a blood trail. The next day the forward section reported (by field signal) that they had located a badly wounded VC what did I want to do? By the time I got up to where the VC was lying the blokes were gathered around giving him water and smokes. As he had a sucking chest wound the smokes were not a good idea, however the Doc patched him up with plastic from a radio battery and he was medivaced by chopper using a jungle penetrator to an Australian hospital.
No one can really appreciate the degree of trust and bonds that were forged in the platoon. We all lived together in the bush and we all relied on each other to do their job. If you wanted to have a crap you went out in front of the platoon harbour position between the gun position and the sentry. You can't get any more personal than that! What is important for everyone in this room to realise is that we as a platoon, as a unit, and as a nation performed in Vietnam with courage and honour.
Many people and organisations have tried to take this away from us for political reasons. The National Servicemen who were called up did so because they believed they could make a contribution to the freedom of their country.
Regardless of rank or whether we were regulars or national servicemen we all worked together as a unique team. Each of you contributed and put your life on the line for our country. No one can ever take that away from you.
I remember speaking to Killer Kowalski at his weapon pit late one night only a few nights before he was killed. I asked him how he felt about being a Nasho, he told me that he was a first generation Aussie, and that his family was very proud that he was contributing to their new home country. He said that his mates were now important to him and that he was happy being a member of the platoon. Killer was killed a few days later. The tragedy of this was not only dealing with the loss of a platoon member in such circumstances, but the real tragedy I felt for his parents friends and family who were being told by our politicians and the media of the time that we should not be there and that the Vietcong were now good guys. That is what has made the loss of a good mate and the non-recognition of our platoon efforts hard to reconcile.
To add to all this, once the nashos in particular returned to Australia there was little recognition of what we had actually achieved. With the passage of time the attitudes have changed and people now recognise generally what has been done. It was particularly tough for the nashos who were literally plucked out of the bush and sent straight home without any form of recognition, support or counselling. I think each of us in this room has gone through his own private and more difficult battles since the Vietnam experience. All of our wives and families deserve credit in sticking by us without probably actually realising what the real problems were or really appreciating what each of us had experienced.
Now is the time to recognise that all those who fought in Vietnam should be given due credit regardless of whether or not we should have been there in the first place. You should be proud that you did your duty and did it well, as much as any soldier who has fought in any war. As General Horrie Howard pointed out the other day, during our whole time in Vietnam we were never defeated in battle, and we never left behind our dead or wounded to the enemy. Now is the time for us to get together as mates with that common experience and help each other as need be like we did 31 years ago.
Terry O'Neill
Platoon Commander
2 Platoon A Company 2nd Battalion
Royal Australian Regiment (ANZAC)
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