KILLING GROUND Few Australians have heard of the battle of Bribie. Yet this fierce engagement in February 1967 was the closest Australian forces came to defeat in a major battle in Vietnam. Senior commanders proclaimed an Australian victory. But soldiers in the field maintained they had been soundly beaten. One thing is beyond dispute: the battle marked a turning point in the history of the Australian army. BY ASHLEY EKINS

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In the early hours of February17, 1967, the Australian task force based at Nui Dat learned that Viet Cong forces had attacked a South Vietnamese outpost 15km to the south-east. The communist forces were probably trying to draw out a relief force in order to ambush it - a standard Viet Cong tactic. By mid-morning, the Viet Cong were reported to be withdrawing to the east through a strip of timbered country known to the task force as "the Light Green".

The Australian task force commander, Brigadier Stuart Graham, calculated the enemy would be leaving the battle area in small parties and making for the safety of their jungle bases. He decided on a full battalion reaction by 6th Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment (6RAR), supported by artillery and armoured personnel carriers (APCs), aimed at cutting off the enemy's withdrawal route. The operation was incongruously codenamed Bribie after the peaceful island off the south Queensland coast.

Graham told the commander of 6RAR, Lieutenant Colonel Colin Townsend, that he wanted his battalion back in the base by nightfall due to warnings of a possible enemy attack that night. This demand, combined with delays in mounting the operation, would have unfortunate repercussions.

The reaction force did not leave Nui Dat until the early afternoon, allowing commanders no time for reconnaissance to determine the enemy's strength and dispositions before they committed their troops.

The first wave, led by A Company, 6RAR, descended on the landing zone at 1.45pm. The Australians came under fire within minutes. As they pushed into the surrounding rainforest, the lead platoon was suddenly swept by rifle and machine-gun fire from its front and from snipers in the trees. It charged straight at the enemy positions, returning fire and hurling grenades. In less than a minute, six men were hit and the assault stalled under the weight of enemy fire. The company commander broke contact and pulled his men back to the forest edge.

Something was very wrong. 6RAR had set out to intercept Viet Cong forces believed to be slipping back to their base after an attack on an outpost. They expected the enemy to be avoiding a fight. Instead, the Australians seemed to be walking into the teeth of a well-prepared and determined defence. Meanwhile, the other companies of 6RAR arrived and took up blocking positions around the tree line. Townsend also arrived by helicopter. After conferring with his company commanders, he issued orders for a co-ordinated attack by two companies.

Just after 3.30pm, A and B companies pushed back into the timber. They quickly came under enemy fire. The soldiers of B Company, in the lead, advanced against concealed enemy troops, who were deployed in a wide arc and well dug in. The deeper they penetrated into the enemy position, the more their flanks were exposed to fire.

Dense undergrowth reduced visibility to a few metres. The crescendo of noise made by the clatter of machine-guns, rifles and exploding grenades became deafening, making communication difficult. Soldiers 10m apart could not hear each other shouting. An enemy .50 calibre heavy machine-gun opened up on the left, causing 4 Platoon to fall behind. Major Ian Mackay, commanding B Company, ordered 5 Platoon, now 40m in front and itself receiving machine-gun fire, to halt and go to ground. Mackay attempted to regain the momentum. He ordered 6 Platoon to advance through 4 Platoon, overrun the machine-gun and continue on to link up with 5 Platoon. The two platoons were then to resume the assault. Sergeant "Butch" Brady, acting commander of 6 Platoon, ordered his men to fix bayonets and charge.

Second Lieutenant John O'Halloran, the 21-year-old national serviceman commanding 5 Platoon, heard their yells to the rear as they tried to force their way forward. But 6 Platoon's attack was brought to a halt by further machine-gun fire. They stopped some 50 paces short of O'Halloran's rear section.

The entire B Company assault looked like getting bogged down. Mackay, pressured by Townsend to "push on as fast as you can", decided to switch the weight of the attack back to 5 Platoon. Over the radio he ordered O'Halloran to advance, outflank the machine-gun and silence it if possible.

O'Halloran received this order with apprehension. His platoon was already out in front alone and he was required to attack an enemy who had been strong enough to stop the previous assaults. He knew A Company was covering his left flank but what lay to his right was completely unknown.

But he had faith in the calibre and training of his men. Over the din of the battle, he shouted his instructions to his section commanders. He ordered his men to fix bayonets, although many were not carrying bayonets and some did not even hear the order. O'Halloran remembers: "On my order to assault, the platoon as one arose and ran forward yelling and screaming." Automatic weapons fire immediately cut a swath through the soldiers.

Lance Corporal Kerry Rooney led his left-hand forward section directly at a machine-gun, firing continuously to draw fire away from his men. He threw some grenades and then charged once more at the enemy gun. He was shot dead almost under its barrel. The left flank was now pinned down.

Corporal Robin Jones pressed the assault on the right flank. His section attacked the enemy at close range, inflicting a number of casualties. Then three previously undisclosed enemy machine-guns opened fire. The enfilade killed three Australian soldiers and wounded five more. Of his nine-man section, only Jones remained unwounded.

The platoon attack faltered before the assault line had covered 25m. About half the soldiers in the two forward sections had been hit. The platoon was virtually surrounded by enemy machine-guns. Unable to continue the assault with so many of his men lying dead and wounded, O'Halloran concentrated on getting the remainder of his platoon into a position to repel enemy counter-attacks. This proved difficult as any movement drew enemy fire. His men were pinned down so close to the enemy that they could neither go forward nor pull back.

Artillery began to fall but it was too far in the enemy's rear to be effective. Captain Jim Ryan, B Company's artillery forward observer, while himself under enemy fire from several directions, began calmly "walking in" the fire towards 5 Platoon's front. Exploding shells soon began drawing cries from the enemy.

Five Platoon still desperately needed support and reinforcements. Platoon Sergeant Mervyn McCullough, a dependable veteran of the earlier battle of Long Tan, slipped back to 6 Platoon to get help to evacuate the wounded. He soon returned, bringing a section of 6 Platoon soldiers. Then, just as O'Halloran began to feel that they were in a position to withdraw, a catastrophe occurred.

Two artillery rounds fell short. One landed in the area where the wounded soldiers were gathered with the reinforcements from 6 Platoon. Two more of O'Halloran's men were killed and two were wounded. Six of the reinforcements were also wounded. An enemy rocket-propelled grenade then wounded McCullough. O'Halloran now had six soldiers killed and 17 wounded in his area. Two hours had elapsed since the attack began. They anxiously waited for help to arrive.

The situation was made worse by pressure from task force headquarters as Graham urged Townsend to withdraw his battalion. Mackay was perplexed to learn that, while his company and A Company were locked in a vicious firefight and unable to break off the engagement, the remainder of the battalion and the APCs were actually lining up on the landing zone preparing to return to base.

When it became obvious the two companies could not extricate themselves, a troop of APCs was dispatched to help. After searching the forest for an hour and coming under fire from concealed enemy anti-tank weapons, the APCs finally arrived at 6.15pm and began to take on board casualties. Again, tragedy struck. Enemy recoilless rifle rounds struck the lead APC, killing the driver and wounding several others, including some of the casualties.

With light fading, B Company boarded the APCs - abandoning the damaged vehicle - and withdrew to join the main body now concentrated at the landing zone. The battered platoons arrived back at the clearing with their casualties just as darkness fell. The battle had lasted more than five hours.

The following morning, 6RAR returned to the battleground but there were no contacts. The enemy had slipped away under cover of darkness. As the rifle companies swept the battlefield, they found Lance Corporal Vic Otway of 5 Platoon, miraculously still alive. Otway had been wounded during the platoon's final charge and spent a perilous night alone on the battlefield.

Australian casualties amounted to eight soldiers killed and 27 wounded. Total enemy casualties were difficult to assess as only eight bodies were recovered. The official estimate varied from 50 to more than 100 enemy killed - but most soldiers felt such estimates were grossly inflated. The Australian press reported the battle as an Australian triumph over the Viet Cong. At the same time, Hanoi presented the engagement as a decisive victory for the communist forces.

Graham claimed that the Viet Cong "got a thrashing". He remained convinced that 6RAR had inflicted severe casualties on the Viet Cong forces and "probably rendered them inoperable for some time to come".

Soldiers, on the other hand, were certain that Bribie - with the highest casualties of any engagement since the battle of Long Tan, six months earlier - was no Australian victory. APC crew commander, Trooper David Clifton, reflected the general mood, when he recalled: "We had been soundly thrashed on Operation Bribie."

Similarly, Private Robin Harris of 5 Platoon, who had been wounded in the action, later wrote: "I think that on this occasion Charlie's losses were overstated. It was us who had copped a hiding."

Some survivors were later bitter about the casualties they incurred in carrying out orders given by commanders who they felt were unaware of the realities of their situation. "It would not be for many years that I would realise just how hopeless our position should have been seen to be by our exalted leaders," Harris wrote.

Australian soldiers had unhesitatingly charged with fixed bayonets towards the enemy machine-gun positions. Many believed they were charging to certain death.

"The company commander knew nothing of what we were facing and apparently had decided to ignore the advice of his platoon commander on the spot," wrote Chris Gannon, a machine-gunner with 6 Platoon. At the time, Mackay saw no other option. He was under pressure from his battalion commander, who ordered him to press on.

With the forward platoons of his company pinned under heavy machine-gun fire, Mackay recalled: "I ordered bayonets to be fixed because we were in such close proximity." He was confident that morale was high among his troops: "We were taking casualties but we had reserves." Mackay had been "taught that you just keep going and I expected them [the enemy] to crack".

The two platoon bayonet charges recalled the style of fighting and sacrifice of Australia's earlier wars, notably the heroic but futile bayonet charges at the Nek on Gallipoli, half a century earlier.
The lessons of both actions were clear: the bayonet had long ceased to be a decisive weapon in modern combat. The willingness of soldiers to sacrifice themselves in displays of aggressive spirit was no substitute for tactical ingenuity and concentrated firepower.

The situation in Bribie demanded a deliberate battalion attack with a blocking force, planned artillery support and full use of the APCs. But neither the battalion commander nor the task force commander called for such action. Instead, elements of the battalion were committed piecemeal and the commander of 6RAR was instructed not to become too heavily committed.

Other lessons flowed from the battle. By standing and fighting, the Viet Cong had surprised the Australians, who had under-estimated them. The head-to-head engagement also revealed deficiencies within the under-strength task force, particularly the lack of a third manoeuvre battalion and heavy armour.

Not until eight months later, however, did PM Harold Holt announce the commitment of these desperately needed additional elements. Australian soldiers had to carry on with their limited resources until the third battalion arrived in December and the tanks the following February. Thirty-six years after the battle of Bribie, O'Halloran remains "fiercely proud" of his platoon. In taking the brunt of the savage fight in the Light Green, 5 Platoon 6RAR became one of the most highly decorated Australian platoons of the Vietnam War. Two soldiers were awarded Military Medals and three, including O'Halloran, were mentioned in dispatches, one of them posthumously.

But their losses were heavy. Six of the eight soldiers killed and 12 of the 27 wounded were from O'Halloran's platoon of 28 men. Eight were so badly wounded they were returned to Australia. The losses cast a pall over the survivors. Men who had trained together in Australia and served in Vietnam for eight months had developed strong bonds of comradeship. Some had been recruited from the same towns.

On returning to the base at Nui Dat, one soldier was struck by the absence of his missing mates. "It all seemed such a waste," wrote Gannon. "Healthy, smiling, happy people one minute and nothing the next. Just empty beds, empty tents soon to be filled up by new people to go out and do it again."

Within days, 5 Platoon was brought up to full strength with reinforcements and it was soon ready to resume operations. "Fortunately," O'Halloran reflected, "Bribie was the last time the platoon was engaged in any major action."

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Ashley Ekins is a military historian at the Australian War Memorial, Canberra. This account is based on On the Offensive: The Australian Army in the Vietnam War, January 1967-June 1968 by Ian McNeill and Ashley Ekins, published by Allen & Unwin in association with the AWM. Available in September or order at shop.awm.gov.au

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