Reprinted from "Duty First" 1991
On the 18th of August 1966 I was a private soldier in D Company 6RAR when it fought the now well known battle at Long Tan. As one of the participants of the battIe. I was never satisfied with the official analysis that were later recordcd about Long Tan, and the dissatisfaclion was further reinforced as I researched for my book "The Soldiers' Story". That the battle was a testament to the courage of the troops involved is self evident from any perspective and one does not question that aspect. What is questioned are the events leading up to the battle, the intelligence estimates, the enemy intentions, the size of the enemy force, the Australian command response before and during the battle and the signlicance attributed to the outcome.
Between 1986 and 1989 I went back to Vietnam four times working for a film production company and doing private research for my Ph.D. In that time I was able to find and meet some of the key ex VC involved in the battle and recorded their version of the event. Needless to say there are as many discrepancies in their versions as there are in the Australian version and I am sure historians will have some interesting arguments well into the future on some of the statements by the Vietnamese. However, what they had to say makes interesting reading and I believe it should be weighed up and evaluated if only from the fact that this is the first we have recorded their side of the event in some detail.
There were other participants of the battle interviewed, but this article will be restricted to Nguyen Thanh Hong, a staff officer from the VC 5 Division. who was in overall control, Ut Thoi, who is now a Lt General, and was the commander of the 275 Regiment at Long Tan, Ba Du who was his executive officer and Ba Lien who was the political officer of the D445 Battalion. This article in fact is an edited version of 2 chapters from my book ''A Soldier Returns"
The record of these conversations were tape recorded and I made notes of the interviews. As soon as the meetings were finished I then wrote up the interviews using both sources and tapes were retranslated in Australia. For the sake of simplicity what is said is not always in correct sequence and I have interspersed the accounts with findings of my own.
Colonel Hong (nick named Hai), the officer in charge of the Long Tan battle, has now retired from the Army is Director for Transport of Dong .Nai Province. Hai was horn in 1932 near the village ofHoii My in PhuocTuy Province and is married with four children and now lives inHo Chi Minh City.
As the main source of the information about Long Tan was Colonel Hong (Hai) a brief look at his background is worth recording. Hai joined the revolutionary forces in 1947 at the age of 15 and fought with the Viet Minh during the French War. During that lime his mother was arrested twice for quite lengthy periods and his uncle was killed fighting in Phouc Tuy. During the 1954- 1960 period he had remained in the army.
In 1965 Hal went to 5 VC Division headquarters and in 1966 the division suffered a serious blow when the assistant chief of staff of military operations, Le Xuan Chuyep. defected to the Americans. Chuyen went on to become the Vietnamese head of the teared and despised Phoenix program and was captured after the fall of Saigon.
Looking back on the 1965 period when the Americans entered the war with combat troops in March 1965, (the landing of the marines at Da Nang) there had been a broad evaluation of strategy on the VC's part. It was decided there was a need for units to be brought under tighter control and so divisions were formed. 5 Division being officially formed on 23 November 1965.
When the Australians came into Phuoc Tuy in 1966 and established the base at Nui Dat, 5 Division thought that the plan was to form a protection line on highway 2 that ran almost due north from Baria to Xuan Loc. (See Map1).
With forces based at Nui Dat and Xuan Loc it seemed to the VC that the plan was to cut the VC forces from cast to west.There was much apprehension about this at first as the bases of the 274 regiment were in the Hat Dich area to the west of highway 2. and the 275 were in the Nui May Tao area to the east. They thought at that time, when the Australians first moved in, that the unit was to be an independent, highly mobile strike force, operating with its own supporting artillery, armoured personnel carriers and helicopters.
They could also see that the Australiains had situated themselves at Nui Dat with the intention of destroying the forces of the the D445 in Phuoc Tuy. But situating the base where it was, it would be possible to strike out at the local forces in an attempt to cut them off from the people. (As can be seen from the map of Phuoc Tuy the majority of the population was situated in the southern section of the province).
At that time decisions were taken at divisional level as to plans of attack, unless there was something specific requircd from the higher commands. Five Division had moved forces into the Phuoc Tuy area in order to probe the American and Australian units and had been successful in some of these encounters.
I have confrrmed an episode from American documents and in the action spoken of. C company of the 2116th battlion of the American 1st Infantry Division, were badly hit on the night of April 12, 1966. There were 34 Americans killed in this action and 71 wounded from the company and other companies racing to relieve them. VC body count from this action was 42.
The 275 regiment of 5 Division was also in Phuoc Tuy during the initial Australian move into the province in June. Part of the 275 supported D445 Bn and inflicted heavy casualties on the 173rd Airborne brigade in Long Phuoc during Operatlon HARDWOOD. American casualties during that operation were 23 killed and 104 wounded for a VC body Count of 48.
By August it had been decided that the time was right for an attack on the Australian force. This was not only for military reasons but for political reasons as well. Hai sated that the decision was made at divisional level. For 5 Division there were compelling political reasons for an attack on the Australians. One was the impact a major confrontation with heavy casualties may have on the will of the Australian Government because this may have caused a rethink of Australian policy. The second line of political thought was from their own side. The Australians had declared the village of Long Tan black, and in July had destroyed the town of Long Phuoc, and relocated many poople from the country near Nul Dat base making 8000 refugees. Therefore there was a need to show support for theme people, It was neccuaty to demonstrate to the people that the R£',olutionary Fortes cared about their plight and was ready to avenge them as soon as the opportunity arose.
Hai said it was left to him to plan the attack on the Australians and he decided on what he described as, "the luring of the tiger from the mountain". By using this tactic he said that it would not only test the Australians in battle. but would give him a clue to the "characteristics of the Australian commanders thinking". What he said he meant by this was the reaction that the Task Force would take to provocation by the VC.
The plan was for the three battalions of 275 regiment, (approximately 1,400 men plus around 100 D445) to move close to the Task Force and to mortar the base. This was done on the night of the 16/17 of August 1966 and Hai said that elements of the 275 plus some member of the D445 were responsible for this. Over 100 rounds of mortar fire were fired from widely dispersed positions into the Task Force HQ and the 103 Battery area and 22 Australian soldiers were wounded, one later dying from wounds. The VC command were hoping by this action to draw out a force from the base into the area of Long Tan which had been selected as the killing area. They were hoping to draw the force into the bush area to the north of the plantation where they had their heavy machine guns set up on the feature known as Nul Dat 2 GR 4868. (Telephone cable was found running from the feature the day after the battle. but it was not known whether they were laid prior. or during the battle (From an Australian Source). In correspondence in 1986, former corporal Ross Smith of A Coy. informed me that while on patrol a day or two prior to the battle he had found the cable and followed it, for some hundred metres. He said, I cut this cable in three places and reported the occurence, but found out in 1970 that this action had not been relayed to Coy HQ".)
The VC plan was to leave pieces of equipment from the mortaring so the Australians could pickup some sort of trail, though not too obvious. (A mortar base plate and some blood stains were found by B company on the 18th. B company had been sent to locate the mortar site on the morning of 18th over half the company had gone back to the Task Force to go on leave to Vung Tau. leaving only 32 men to continue the patrol.)
By this time the VC forces were set into position. Hai was in a small deserted hamlet just on the eastern side of the Long Tan plantation called Ap Phuoc Hung 5067. He had with him there the third battalion of the 275 as a reserve element, while the other two battalions were forming a screen to the east and the north of the plantation. Elements of the local D445 battalion were on the south near the deserted village of Long Tan. One small unit of the D445 had been placed on the southwestern edge of the plantation with several rocket launchers hoping to slow down any reinforcements and cut off any Australian retreat. When I asked him why they had been placed there he looked me straight in the eye as if it was a stupid question and said that was the only place armour could cross. He said: "That period was the wet season. The river was very full. Because of the steep banks of (he river the only place tracks could cross was the old disused ford". This statement was entirely correct.
One small feature of Nui Dat 2 GR 4868 were the headquarters of the attacking force of the 275 Regiment under the command of Senior Captain Ut Thoi and (he Executive officer Major Ba Du. At this feature they had several heavy machine guns.
They were hoping to lure the force out of the plantation into the bush area under Nui Dat 2. This would have meant that the Australian force would have been restricted in movement and would have found it difficult to maintain contact. It would have also allowed the machine guns to pour fire into the area from the high ground. However the plantation itself was to be the killing ground if the Australians moved east instead of north.
When I asked why there had been no plan to attempt to neutralise the guns at the Task Force, he said that they had considered there was no need This seemed a strange statement to me as it was the guns that actually turned the course of the battle. But Hai said that at that time their policy was not to let a confrontation develop any longer than two hours. He considered there would be such confusion In the Task Force in the early stages of the battle that they would have the job over and be away from the area by the time the guns could start to do any major damage. What is meant by this is not that they thought the guns would not start firing for two hours but that with the confusion on the ground of the Australian force under close attack the guns would not be directed close to the Australian position for fear of causing Australian casualties. It was tactical doctrine that the VC would suffer losses from artillery in almost every encounter and that is why the 'hugging" tactic was developed.
Hai's statements on this are supported by the 'Quarterly Report for Feriod, ending 30th April 1966" from 11 (Two) Field Force Vietnam, (US) which states:
'The VC avoid large units such as Brigades and regiments. but seek to attack isolated battalions and companies, using great numerical superiority. In these attacks, they use a hugging tactic as a means of protecting themselves against artillery fire and airstrikes."
The plan was to hit the Australians very close to their base where they would least be expecting it, and move out of the area quickly. Ba Du, on the feature with the two battalions of the 275 regiment GR 4868. said the 34 men from B Company who had split up into small patrols were seen in the plantation on the morning of the 18th, but they were allowed to pass in expectation of a larger group.
D Company met the B Company group on the edge of the plantation at the site where the mortar base plate had been found. After a quick brew and recce by the OC, D Company moved into the rubber plantation. The company moved through to the east in single file at 1500 hrs. They then found the track split in two and the company moved into a formation of two platoons up and one platoon and company headquarters behind. The two forward platoons followed each track and the other platoon and company headquarters was spread out to link them, but back 100 metres. The right hand platoon of the advance had a contact with 6 VC who fled to the east. The platoon on the left, 10 platoon was moving around the edge of the plantation near to Nul Dat 2 and the right hand platoon. 11 platoon. continued to advance to the east in steady pursuit of the fleeing VC with the linking line of 12 platoon and company headquarters still 100 to 150 metres back.
The commander of 275, captain Ut Thoi, initiated the action at that point even though it was in the wrong place. because 11 platoon was heading directly toward the headquarters of Hai, at Ap Phouc Hung (GR 5067).
Once the action had been initiated there was no turning back. The enemy attack against the Australians in the right hand 11 platoon built up very quickly and they were fighting off at least several companies within a matter of 20 minutes. 11 platoon were completely cut off and could not move backward because of heavy attacks from the front. This is when the confusion started for both sides as the rain started to pour down and decreased the visibility to perhaps 100 metres.
The ironic part of the whole battle was that it was the right hand 11 platoon being cut off that saved the day for the Australians. Because of this there was much movement on the part of the rest of the Australian force. First 10 platoon on the left near the edge of the plantation was swung to the right in a hook to relieve the trapped 11 platoon. As they moved to the right to link up they ran into a large group of VC moving around to encircle 11 platoon. They managed to break up this attack but then came under withering fire themselves from VC in the plantation and the guns to their north on Nui Dat 2.
They were stopped in their tracks and eventually withdrew back to the company headquarters position. As they were coming back, the Australian company commander sent 12 platoon off in an attempt to reach the
trapped 11 platoon by a different route. This platoon was also stopped, but happened to be pinned down in a position where another large unit of VC were moving to attack the company headquarters position. They managed to inffict substantial casualties on this group of VC. By this time the trapped 11 platoon had left their position individually and the survivors had been able to get back to 12 platoon. They then managed to get back to the company headquarters position, just after a helicopter had flown in a much needed ammunition resupply.
By the time the company had come together in the one position the two hour time limit for Hai was almost up and the artillery barrages were taking a fearsome toll. From that point on it was a case of Hai (the outward Commander) saying that they had to start the withdrawal and Ut Thoi and the Regimental Commander saying that the Australians were now in the one spot and that all that was needed was a bit more time.
Viet Cong forces then pushed into assault lines and to bear down on the Australian position, being
stopped close to the perimeter each time by small arms fire and the artillery barrage. Hai sent the D445 battalion elements at Long Tan to attempt to close the gate on the Australian position by moving around to the west between the trapped company and the Task Force base.
By then it was almost dark and he knew that there would have to be some sort of relief force on the way. He knew that as soon as a relief force was in sight they would have to break off the assault and begin the withdrawal. The relief force crossed the river at the ford at 1820 hours and found the small group of D445 waiting for them with the rocket launchers. They managed to break through, but then ran into the other Unit of the D445 moving around the back of D company position.
By then the order was given for the VC withdrawal and the units all started to pull back and move into their predetermined withdrawal routes. Hai was very worried about the likelihood of being cut off and Ut Thoi said they had picked up on the radio that American forces were being rushed to the area. Hai's headquarters and the other battalion of the 275 rgiment moved north to the Long Khanh/Phuoc Tuy border to Ap Suio Cat where he said they prepared another ambush in the hope that the Australians would follow them out of gun range. But this did not happen.
Several companies were left at the battle site to retrieve weapons and wounded during the night, but a lot of cleaning up and weapon collection had been going on while the battle was being fought, which was standard operational procedure. The majority of 275 moved out that night, as did the D445 people. The badly wounded from the 275 regiment and the D445 went to the north, some miles to Nui May Tao. Those not so badly wounded had their wounds treated at the many aid posts thai were stationed around the area.
Hai concluded that part of the discussion by saying. "The plan at Long Tan was flexible and when we could not destroy the Australian troops in the required time frame and beyond, we decided to withdraw. The artillery was hitting us hard and we knew reinforcements would be arriving and we did not have the strength to stop them. We were disappointed that we could not have over run your troops in the rubber, but the weather was a factor that created many problems with our communications. We were hoping you would follow us to Ap Suol Cat where you would have been out of artillery range, but it seems you were not prepared to fight unless you had the advantage."
The ironic part of this was that the relief force Hal had been nervously awaiting had only been eight armoured personnel carriers and one infantry company of around 110 men. He HAD the forces to stop them if only he had known at the time. Fortunately for us and unfortunately for him, he assumed that the force would be much larger and so ordered the withdrawal before it could be ascertained what the force consisted of.
The other ironic part of the aftermath was the statement that Brigadier Jackson made to me in an interview on 19 February 1988. He said.
"I can still hear Cohn Townsend (CO 6RAR) on that radio to me. 'May I proceed'. 1 said; 'Yes, one thousand metres only'. Because I was very worried, not about what we had been fighting, but the others. They could have been sitting at the back of us just a few thousand metres away. Just waiting for us, and they knew where our guns were. All they had to do was pick a fight out of gun range and if we were stupid enough to go into it we were in real trouble; real trouble."
A fact little known in Australia about this action was that at the time of the battle at Long Tan the Americans were conducting a large operation named TOLEDO in northern 'Phuoc Tuy. Long Khanh and Binh Tuy provinces. The records from II Field Force Vietnam report that the concept of the operation changed with the battle at Long Tan and the American units tried to make contact with the VC 275 regiment on its move north. without success.
Some of the observations on the battle were rather contradictory but all VC officers did admit that the Long Tan battle was not good for them militarily because they did not achieve their aim of wiping out the Australian unit. However it was a good political victory in that it gained them much support from the people of Phuoc Tuy. especially the people of the displaced villages. They felt that it made the Australian military leaders look at the Australian position in a ditferent light, but all were amazed that Australians could look on the battle as a victory. As Hai summed up: "How can you claim a victory when you allowed yourselves to walk into a trap that we had' set. Admittedly we did not finish the job. but that was only because time beat us and your reinforcements arrived. I mean you did not even attempt to follow us up. I low can you claim a significant victory from that sort of behaviour?"
An interesting point to come from the talks was the Australian interpretation after the battle. If what the Vietnamese said was correct about the planning and the lead up to the battle, then the only one who got the interpretation of events right was subsequently told that he was wrong. The commander of B Company 6 RAR who went in to the rubber on the first patrol before D company wrote his interpretation in his after action report. In that report Major N.E. Ford wrote.
a. Enemy Intentions. Despite that statements by VCC, (Viet Cong Captured) it is thought that the enemy plan was'.
1. A mortar and recoiless Rifle attack from east and west.
2. An attack on IATF forces following up the trail of the withdrawing Mortar and Recoiless rifle detachment.
b. Evidence and opinions to support this view are:
1. It seems unlikely that VC would alert IATF with a mortar and recoilless rifle attack before an infantry assault. 1 ATF could be expected to call in all forces (as it did with 5 RAR) and to look to its defence.
2. A fairly clear trail was left, leading to the "trap' sprung by D Coy. This trail was admittedly broken for about 500 yards. but the VC could expect that it would be found in a fairly short time.
3. A 445 Bn POW stated tht his unit was in long Tan on 18 August and that his orders were to march to the "sound of the shooting". This sounds like part a plan to close a trap.
This interpretation by Major Ford is the scenario explained by Hai. It is also virtually the same as was told to the Battalion Intelligence officer by a VC defector on the 20th of February 1967. According to an intelligence debriefing of a prisoner dated 23 February 1967 the scenario outlined to me by Hai in 1987 was given to the Task Force in 1967. The record of the interview with the returnee states:
a. The version of the Long Tan battle that he knows is as follows. D445 minus heavy weapons and a smaII protective element, were ordered out of the area and went into the vicinity of Grid Reference Y S 5668 Both 5 and 9 Divisions came into the area and the plan was to mortar the 1ATF base and lure a battalion out into their area. They would then annihilate this battalion. The mortaring took place but the plan did not eventuate as conceived. (It is the writers opinion [Captain Wickens, 6 RAR Intelligence Officer) that the Austalian force were to have been led past the area of Long Tan and engaged out of gun range. The enemy force at Long Tan being used to cut off any retreat).
b. The reasons for not attacking the Australian base were they they would lose too many men in capturing it. When they had done this the Americans would surround them and they would be trapped.
Of course this information cannot be relied on but it does give food for though.
The commanding officer of 6RAR completely discarded the analysis of Major Ford by saying:
'I do not agree at all with OC B Coy's interpretation (Major Ford) of enemy intentions (mainly for reasons given in para. 3). His evidence to support them are very weak. Why the enemy bombarded 1 ATF on the night 16/17 August is notyct clear but it is most unlikely to have been part of a trap. Major Ford states in para 7B (3) "A 445 POW stated that this unit was in Long Tan on 18 August and that its orders were to march to the sound of the shooting" etc. This is true but the POW also stated that this order was given, not as an anticipatory order, but after the battle began."
It could be a matter of lively debate trying to decide who has the best supporting arguments. the colonel or the major. but it can be seen the ambush, opposed to the unwitting contact as the VC moved to attack the Task Force scenario, has long and deep roots.
According to all the Vietnamese interviewed over a two year period from widely scattered locations, there was never any plan to attack the Australian base. For the VC in 1966, the war had entered a new era of military tactics and, according to them, they saw no value in attacking defended positions if they ran the likelihood of bemg trapped by the mobile American forces. That was why Hai's plan had been to lure the Australians from their base and; "hit them under the heart where they were at least expecting it". It was to be so close to the heart that there would be confusion at all levels initially. hence the two hour time limit.
There were several significant after effects of the battle from the VC point of view. One was that 5 Division forced the Australians always to be aware of the securiry of their base area. In that way they were restricted geographically, and Long Tan did inflict a substantial number of casualties on the Australian force. (When told that the Australian casualty figure had been 18 killed and 26 wounded Hai did not dispute the fact with me, but obviously did not believe the figure. He thought the casualties were higher and would have caused a rethinking of the Vietnam commitment in Australia.)
Another was that it brought their troops directly up against the Australians for the first time and gave them confidence and experience. Hai said this was not only applied against the Australians at that time, but the Americans as well. The VC wanted to test the tactics of the Americans and the Allied forces to see how they would respond to different scenarios. He said. "You must remeinber, this was a new era of military tactics and both sides were still experimenting with which was the correct line to follow".
The impact the battle had on the civilian population was also significant as it showed the people of Long Phuoc and Long Tan that the revolutionary forces cared about their plight and would not let the destruction of the villages and the dispossession of the people go unavenged. Ba Lian the political officer from D445, although not directly involved in the battle, said that he moved around the province telling people all about the big battle in the rubber plantation. He realised that the war could not be won without the support of the people and endeavoured to bring his forces close to them by remaining in touch as much as possible. After every large action it was his policy to move into the villages and tell the people about the battles.
Of the lessons learned from the battle, all felt the first was that they knew the characteristics of the Australian command. It appeared to them that the Australians were willing to respond to provocation without looking at the political motivation as well as the military. Therefore they were easy targets to be drawn into situations of advantage for the VC.
The second lesson from the Long Tan battle was that they had a better understanding of the Australian tactics and made plans to counter them. The third lesson was the timings on large ambush positions initiated by them. The timings set had to be adhered to as time limits on attacking forces was crucial. The last lesson was probably the most important and was the co-operation between the main force units and the local force D445. This very good experience for both the Division and the local force in Co-operation at divisional level.
Ba Du had no hesitation in saying that after the Long Tan battle they came to realise that the Australians were a more difficult opponent than the Americans. He thought the Australian fighting spirit was very high, even though they had no real reason to fight in Vietnam. He said that in discussions after the battle they said the Australians would be a formidable foe if they were fighting for their own country and families. It was thought the Australians could withstand more hardship than the Americans and were more like the Vietnamese in this respect
.
Ba Du also said his men had noticed and respected the way the Australians supported each other. It seemed during the battle in the Long Tan rubber plantation, that whenever an Australian was wounded there was always another who tried to help him, sometimes at great personal risk. He said that when they had withdrawn from the battle they had a greater understanding of Australian tactics; and a greater respect.
All stressed the point the Phuoc Tuy was not an important area and was the responsibility of the D445 Battalion whose area of operations was Dong Nai which included parts of Long Khanh and Bien Hoa Provinces. 5 Division was a mobile unit and went as far west as Tay Ninh and Phuoc Long and later into Cambodia. Because of their mobility and the greater importance of the western areas they only came into the province and contact with the Australians when there was a job to be done. Some of the significant actions involving the 275 or the 5 Division from recollections were.
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