13
The US Joint Chiefs of
Staff urge President Kennedy to authorise the deployment
of troops to Vietnam to prevent 'Vietnam's loss'.
13 January 1962
It must be recognized that the
fall of South Vietnam
to Communist control would mean the eventual Communist domination of
all of the
Southeast Asian mainland. . . . Of equal importance to the immediate
losses are
the eventualities which could follow the loss of the Southeast Asian
mainland.
All of the Indonesian archipelago could come under the domination and
control of
the USSR and would become a Communist base posing a threat against
Australia and
New Zealand. The Sino-Soviet Bloc would have control of the eastern
access to
the Indian Ocean. The Philippines and Japan could be pressured to
assume, at
best, a neutralist role, thus eliminating two of our major bases of
defense in
the Western Pacific. Our lines of defense then would be pulled north to
Korea,
Okinawa and Taiwan resulting in the subsequent overtaxing of our lines
of
communications in a limited war. India's ability to remain neutral
would be
jeopardized and, as the Bloc meets success, its concurrent stepped-up
activities
to move into and control Africa can be expected. . . . It is, in fact,
a planned
phase in the Communist timetable for world domination.

--US Gen. Lyman
Lemnitzer, Chairman, US Joint Chiefs of Staff
FEBUARY
3
- The "Strategic Hamlet"
program begins in South Vietnam. Australia
provided very large quantities of barbed wire, corrugated iron and
generators for lighting. The program failed because of lack of interest
by villagers in maintaining the defenses."
The Strategic Hamlet
In 1962, the Strategic Hamlet program was introduced in Vietnam, based
on a British counterinsurgency program used in Malaya from 1948 to
1960. In a dismal attempt to prevent the National Liberation Front from
“influencing” peasants in South Vietnam, the United
States turned villages into concentration camps—they erected
stockade walls and patrolled the villages with armed guards. According
to figures compiled by the United States, 39 percent of the South
Vietnamese population was housed in these restrictive hamlets (4,077
strategic hamlets were completed out of a projected total of 11,182). |
5
- Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara reports: " The actions which the
South Vietnamese Government has taken to counter the very serious
threat of subversion and aggression, covert aggression, in that nation,
are beginning to be effective...'.
7
- American military strength in South Vietnam reaches 4,000, with the
arrival of
two additional Army aviation units.
19
US Admiral George W. Anderson,
the Chief of Naval Operations,
authorized establishment of another type of unit designed to counter
Communist insurgencies through civic action programs. The 13-man Seabee
Technical Assistance Teams (STAT), formed to help win the support of
indigenous populations for their governments, also constructed
traditional military posts for American and friendly forces.
27
- President Diem escapes injury when two South Vietnamese aircraft
attack the Presidential Palace.
Seeking to verify any Communist infiltration of arms and supplies from
Cambodia into the
Ca Mau Peninsula and adjacent areas, U.S.
and South
Vietnamese naval forces mounted a similar effort in the Gulf of Siam.
Training the Vietnamese Navy in blue-water surveillance operations also
became a goal in this area. Destroyer escorts Wiseman (DE 667) and
Walton (DE 361) initiated the combined patrol when they steamed into
the gulf on 27 February 1962. For the next three months, U.S. ships'
radar vectored South Vietnamese ships toward suspicious contacts for
boarding and search. Nonetheless, the gulf's shallow waters precluded
combined operations by U.S. and Vietnamese ships, thus allowing little
opportunity for training. At the same time, the forces found no
appreciable infiltration. Accordingly, U.S. participation in the gulf
patrol was ended on 21 May, when the ships of Escort Division 72
departed South Vietnamese waters for their scheduled return to the
United States.
MARCH
31
- President Diem writes to Australian Prime Minister Menzies, drawing
his attention to, "the grave threat to peace in Vietnam".
Australian
Prime Minister Robert Gordon
Menzies, Born 20
December 1894.
Died 15 May 1978.
CH 1951, Kt cr 1963,
QC. Educated University of
Melbourne (LLM). Victorian Bar and High Court of Australia 1918, KC
1929, MLC for East Yarra 1928-29, MLA for Nunawading 1929-34, MHR for
Kooyong 1934-46, Member Advisory War Council 1941-44, Prime Minister of
Australia 1939-41 and 1949-66, Leader Federal Opposition 1943-49,
Minister for External Affairs 1960-62, KC 1929, Privy Councillor 1937.
Chief Commander, Legion of Merit (US) 1950, Fellow of the Australian
Academy of Science 1958, Fellow of the Royal Society 1965. [Portrait
photo]
APRIL
7
The following considerations influence our thinking on Vietnam: 1. We
have a growing military commitment. This could expand step by step into
a major, long-drawn out indecisive military involvement. 2. We are
backing a weak and, on the record, ineffectual government and a leader
who as a politician may be beyond the point of no return. 3. There is
consequent danger we shall replace the French as the colonial forces in
the area and bleed as the French did.(7) --John Kenneth Galbraith
Australian
Army Colonel Ted
Serong and future Commanding Officer of the
Australian Training Team Vietnam(AATTV) visits Vietnam and concludes
"Vietnam was one of restrained optimism".
MAY
ANZUS
Council meeting in
Canberra.
US Secretary of State Dean Rusk
states
that the US wants more support in Vietnam from its allies and asks Sir
Garfield Barwick, Australian Minister for External Affairs for a
contribution of instructors.
Dean
Rusk
6
-
Phoumi Nosavan having refused to co-operate in forming a coalition
cabinet in Laos masses troops on China's border area. North Vietnamese
troops invade Laos. 5,000 defenders flee in panic. Nosavan agrees on a
coalition goverment with Pathet Lao and rightist elements, headed by
Souvanna Phouma. The North Vietnameses now have protection on the Ho
Chi Minh Trail, the main supply route into Vietnam.

Determined
to preserve the status quo and at the same time reassure
American allies, President Kennedy again ordered the Seventh Fleet into
the South China Sea. The Hancock (CVA 19) carrier group and the
Bennington submarine hunter-killer group steamed to a position off
Danang, and the fleet's Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) carried the Marine
Special Landing Force (SLF) into the Gulf of Siam. Then, in mid-May,
U.S. ground, air, and naval forces deployed to Thailand. On the 17th,
the Amphibious Ready Group landed a Marine ground-air team, which
quickly moved forward to Udorn on the Thai-Laotian border. Other units,
including elements of Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 10, joined
this force in succeeding days to form the 3d Marine Expeditionary
Brigade. With the forces in the area now more in balance, political
compromise was possible.
10
: Eisenhower dwelt at length on the danger to South Vietnam and
Thailand as both will be outflanked if Laos is in Communist hands and
concluded that such a situation would be so critical to Southeast Asia
and so important to the U.S. that most extreme measures, including the
commitment of U.S. forces to combat in Laos, were justified. . . .
Finally Eisenhower warned of the consequences of losing Southeast Asia,
pointing out that if it is lost, nothing would stop the southward
movement of Communism through Indonesia and this would have the effect
of cutting the world in half. --John McCone
15
-
Australian Cabinet resolves that military assitance to South Vietnam
can only be undertaken at the request of the Republic of Vietnam(RVN),
but should such a request be made, Australia was willing to send a
small force of advisers and instructors.
23
- Australian Government announces that the No 79 Squadron RAAF,
equipped with Sabre Jet fighters
is to be stationed in Ubon, Thailand.
Thailand, a member
of SEATO became concerned about North Vietnamese troops movements near
it's border.
24
-
Australian Minister for Defence, Athol Townley announces that 30 Army
Instructors are to be sent to Vietnam and states; "If the communists
were to achieve their aims in Vietnam, this would gravely affect the
security of the whole of Southeast Asia and ultimately Australia".
JUNE
NATIONAL
SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 162, June 19, 1962