- 1965 -
Information Keith White, Bob Coker & Ern Marshall
Sir
Paul Hasluck, Minister for External Affairs
"What
is happening in South East Asia today is not a local, temporary or
isolated situation. It is part of the rivalry of power and the
ideological contest which
is taking place throughout the world. It is part of the stream of
events continuing into
the future. In both of those contests the most significant factor in
Asia is China".
US State Department;
"In Vietnam, a Communist government has set out
deliberately to conquer a sovereign people in a neighboring state..[by
a] carefully
planned program of concealed aggression ... as real as that of an
invading army. The war
in Vietnam is not a spontaneous and local rebellion against the
established
government".
Richard M. Nixon, former US
Vice President;
"It will take two or three more years of intensive activity to win
military victory
over the Viet Cong".
The American Ambassador in
Siagon, Maxwell Taylor
The South Vietnamese government
has "no enthusiasm" for foreign forces
and was
"highly sensitive to criticism that the country was "taken over;
"anti-American sentiments lie just under the surface"
Australia's Ambassador
Anderson Reinforces Taylor's Comments
"Foreign
forces would only heighten Vietnamese xenophobia and encourage them
to leave the fight to the Americans".
Project OMEGA
was started by 
Gen.
Westmoreland as an intelligence, behind the
lines, unit in 1965. As it was designed, it: gathered intelligence on
enemy
positions, called in air strikes, evaluated bombing damage and
conducted special
raids against North Vietnames and Viet Cong forces. Initially, it was
comprised
of 900 Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) Troops and 125 American
(mostly
Special Forces) personnel. It was renamed in 1967 as the Mobile
Guerrilla Force
and then joined the Studies and Observation Group (SOG).
JANUARY
2 January.
A six day battle around the village of
Binh Gia ends with a clear ARVN
defeat. Two hundred of their best troops are killed and three hundred
are wounded. Five
Americans are killed and three are declared missing.
Binh Gia
To prepare for the battle, the Viet Cong 271st and 272nd Regiments were
selected to be placed under the command of the Forward Command
Committee, and conducted training and began moving into the Baria-Long
Khanh region. With North Vietnamese assistance, the Viet Cong built up
their weaponry supplies and was ordered to destroy any ARVN units along
Route 2 and 15.
Leading up to the battle the Viet Cong successfully staged several
ambushes against government troops, with an entire company of South
Vietnamese M-113 armoured personnel carriers destroyed on December 9.
The village of Binh Gia was surrounded by rubber and banana
plantations, located in Phuoc Tuy Province about 67km from Saigon. Most
of the local inhabitants were Catholics who had escaped from North
Vietnam due to Communist persecutions, and the local priest was the
commander of the militia forces. |
8 January
- Two thousand South Korean
troops arrive in South Vietnam.
The AATTV is increased to 100 Officers and Warrant Officers.
11 - 27 January.
Buddhists demonstrate against the government of Tran Van
Huong. The demonstrations continue and intensify until the Armed Forces
Council ousts
Huong.
27 January.
South Vietnamese Generals instigate another coup and
declare Huong incapable of maintaining order and call upon
Khanh to form a new
Government.
FEBURARY
1
- 6 February - The
VC call a "Tet Truce" to mark the Vietnamese New
Year.
3 February -
US National Security Adviser, McGeorge Bundy with a team of experts
arrive in Saigon and quickly conclude that "the situation was as bad as
had been
feared".
7 February - American
Advisor's compound at Pleiku is attacked, killing 8 US soldiers
and wounding 128 others, damaging or destroying 122 aircraft. This was
branded as, "
a provocation that altered the entire course of the war". In
retaliation , 49 US
carrier aircraft from the US Seventh Fleet conduct large scale air
strikes against targets
in North Vietnam. US Ambassador Taylor and McGeorge Bundy urge
President Johnson for a
policy of "sustained reprisal".That same day Coral
Sea's Air Wing 15 and Hancock's
Air Wing 21 conducted Flaming Dart I,
a multiplane attack on Dong Hoi.
Flaming Dart
49 sorties were flown for Flaming Dart I (February 7, 1965) and 99 more
for Flaming Dart II (February 11, 1965). The Vietcong attacked a hotel
billeting U.S. personnel in reaction to Flaming Dart I, prompting the
second air strike. Flaming Dart I targeted North Vietnamese army bases
near Dong Hoi, while the second wave targeted Vietcong logistics and
communications near the Demilitarized Zone. |
7 - -McGeorge
Bundy's Memo to President Johnson.
10 February- The
Viet Cong(VC) destroy a hotel used by US servicemen in
Qui Nhon. Twenty three die. President Johnson immediately approves "a
second series
of reprisals".On the 1Oth, carrier forces were ordered to respond to
yet another
Communist attack, this time the sabotage of the American quarters in
Qui Nhon, which
resulted in 54 casualties. The following day, as the U.S. and South
Vietnamese Air Forces
hit Vu Con, 95 aircraft from Ranger,
Hancock,
and Coral Sea,
in
Flaming Dart II, bombed and strafed enemy barracks at Chanh Hoa. But
even as the Flaming
Dart operations were underway, U.S. leaders decided that continued
Communist resistance
demanded resort to the last stage in the program of military
persuasion, a sustained and
increasingly intensive bombing effort in North Vietnam
16 February 1965.-
Discovery of a 100-ton North Vietnamese trawler
unloading munitions on a beach in South Vietnam's 
Vung
Ro Bay.
17
February
- US President Johnson,
"We have no ambition there
for ourselves.... We seek no wider war..... the US... would persist in
the defence of
freedom".
US asks for Military Staff talks with Australia as a matter of urgency.
19 February.
President Johnson decides on "Operation Rolling
Thunder.... a program of "measured and limited air action" against
military
targets in North Vietnam, south of the 19th Parallel".
Operation Rolling Thunder
Operation Rolling Thunder was a frequently interrupted bombing campaign
that began on 24 February 1965 and lasted until the end of October
1968. During this period U.S. Air Force and Navy aircraft engaged in a
bombing campaign designed to force Ho Chi Minh to abandon his ambition
to take over South Vietnam. The operation began primarily as a
diplomatic signal to impress Hanoi with America’s
determination,
essentially a warning that the violence would escalate until Ho Chi
Minh "blinked," and secondly it was intended to bolster the sagging
morale of the South Vietnamese.
The Johnson administration also imposed strict limits on the targets
that could be attacked, for China and the Soviet Union were seen as
defenders of communism who might intervene if the North Vietnamese
faced defeat. Consequently, the administration tried to punish the
North without provoking the two nations believed to be its protectors. "
|
20 February.
Another coup ousts Khanh and sees a civilian, Phan Huy Quat 
,
as nominal premier.
23
February
- Australian Government cables Washington, agreeing to
military staff talks.
24
February
- The Commanding Officer of the 1st Battalion, Royal Australian
Regiment,(1 RAR) is warned that his unit would be deployed to
"somewhere in South
East Asia".
The first official admission that US airmen are flying combat missions
against the VC in
South Viet Nam(SVN).
26 February -President
Johnson authorized the deployment to Danang of two
Marine battalion landing teams, a medium helicopter squadron, and
headquarters elements of
the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade.
27.--
Aggression From the North - US State
Dept White Paper on Vietnam
28 February,
Skyraiders and Skyhawks from Coral
Sea carried out
the first such attack with a concentrated strike on Mu Gia Pass 
near
the North
Vietnamese-Laotian border. After an Air Force attack on critical Nape
Pass, early in
March, Hancock
planes again struck Mu Gia. In both operations the logistic routes
were cut at critical points and delayed- action bombs made the areas
difficult for the
enemy to traverse. Still, the North Vietnamese soon managed to repair
the roads, construct
bypasses, and maintain the logistic flow. By 23 March 1965, Seventh
Fleet aircraft had
carried out half of the 43 Barrel Roll missions with 134 strike, 28
flak suppression, 56
combat air patrol, 32 aerial photographic, and 25 escort sorties.
Nonetheless, American
military and civilian leaders concluded that the overriding political
objective of the
campaign, to deter North Vietnamese subversion of South Vietnam and
Laos, had not been
achieved.
29
February
- Australian Minister for Defence, Senator Shane
Paltridge whilst visiting Saigon announces more civil aid for Vietnam
and the addition of
seventeen advisers.
MARCH
By
March
1965, the government and
armed forces of South Vietnam were on
the verge of
collapse under the weight of the enemy's political-military offensive.
Since the year-long
American punitive campaign failed to deter the North Vietnamese, the
Johnson
administration decided that a massive effort was required to strengthen
the South's stand
against its Communist foe. The regular and paramilitary units were
especially in need of
increased American assistance. But in a departure from previous
assumptions, U.S. leaders
concluded that a rebuilding program would succeed only behind a shield
of American
military power. At the same time, they intended to make the cost of
continued military
action increasingly prohibitive for the Communists. In practical terms,
this meant the use
of the American Armed Forces 1) to interdict the infiltration of enemy
supplies and
reinforcements into the South and 2) to destroy Viet Cong and North
Vietnamese units
in-country so that a renewed nation- building effort could proceed and,
it was hoped,
prosper.
2 March
- Operation "Rolling Thunder", the sustained bombing of North
Vietnam, south of the 19th parallel commences.2 March, three weeks
after Flaming
Dart II, the U.S. and South Vietnamese Air Forces opened the Rolling
Thunder campaign with
strikes on Xom Bang and Quang Khe. Because of heavy weather,
international concerns, and
the unstable political situation in South Vietnam, the second operation
was delayed for
another 12 days. Then, on the 15th, the Navy joined the fray when 64
Skyhawks and
Skyraiders and 30 supporting planes from Task Force 77 carriers Hancock
and Ranger
hit the Phu Qui ammunition depot .This has little effect as only two to
four raids were
allowed per week.
 |
(left)
USS HANCOCK
&
(right)
USS RANGER |
 |
The North Vietnamese
respond by building up a comprehensive air defence
system.Throughout the Rolling Thunder campaign, the Navy maintained
units in the Gulf of
Tonkin to retrieve downed fliers from the sea and from North Vietnam
and Laos. Normally,
two destroyers were deployed to the forward, North SAR Station (20N
107E) and another two
to the South SAR Station (19N 106E). To carry out rescues in North
Vietnam's lethal
environment, one UH-2 Sea Sprite helicopter equipped with self-sealing
fuel tanks, machine
guns, and armor was nested on board a ship at each station. Another
four similarly armed
and armored Sikorsky SH-3A Sea Kings (the primary rescue
helicopter)
were based in one of
the Yankee Station carriers.
During major air operations,
one or two
SH-3As orbited over
the destroyers. Each of the other aircraft carriers carried a
detachment of three
unreconfigured UH-2 helicopters devoted to sea rescues. Air Force
Sikorsky HH-3E
helicopters,
Grumman HU-16 amphibian
aircraft, and A-l Skyraider
escorts also operated in
the gulf. To provide the SAR helicopters with enemy ground fire
suppression,
communications, and other support during operations,
the fleet kept
four A-l, A-4, or A-7
attack aircraft airborne and ready for action. Under the overall
control of Commander Task
Force 77, the SAR Coordinator directed the Navy's effort from a North
SAR Station
destroyer. This officer guided the actions of the airborne on-scene
commander and arranged
for additional support when it was needed.
3 to 10 March
- Representatives from MACV, the U.S. Navy, and the South
Vietnamese Navy hammered out details of the establishment of a combined
coastal patrol.
The operation, named Market Time, was intended to complete the cordon
being drawn around
the South Vietnamese battleground. The decision for American forces to
join in combat with
the enemy in South Vietnam was also reached during this period. At
first, ground troops
were considered only as protection for the vital American air and naval
installations at
Danang against Viet Cong and regular North Vietnamese attack
0600
on 8 March
1965, Rear Admiral Donald
W. Wulzen, commander of the
Seventh Fleet's Amphibious Task Force, issued the traditional order to
"land the
landing force." Soon afterward, Vancouver
(LPD 2), Mount McKinley (AGC
7), Henrico
(APA 45), and Union
(AKA 106) began disembarking Marines for the
movement ashore. When the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines crossed the beach
between 0902 and
0918, it became the first battalion-size American ground combat unit
deployed ashore in
the extended Southeast Asian conflict.
 |
 |
Even before the full 9th Marine
Expeditionary
Brigade had been deployed to Danang, American leaders were considering
the use of these
Marine and following Army units in active operations against the Viet
Cong.
15
March - A new direction in
American strategy jelled during a meeting
in Washington on 15 March 1965 of the U.S. foreign policy and military
establishment. The
President authorized the Pacific Command to carry out a systematic
bombing campaign
against North Vietnamese lines of communication, military
installations, and logistic
facilities south of the 20th parallel. Thereafter, the Rolling Thunder
program focused
less on influencing the enemy's will than on hurting his actual
physical capability to
support the military venture in the South. Much the same occurred with
the Yankee Team and
Barrel Roll operations in Laos. The Seventh Fleet's naval air forces
were given somewhat
greater latitude in target, ordnance, and aircraft selection, in
operational control, and
in other tactical considerations.
30 March - Military
staff talks between US, Australia and New Zealand in
Honolulu. US
wants ground forces. Australian
Delegate Air Marshall Scherger
returns to Australia and recommends to the Government that an
Australian Battalion should
be offered as part of the US Forces.
A bomb explodes outside the US Embassy, killing two Americans and
wounding the US Deputy
Ambassador.
General Westmoreland asks the US President for one Division of troops
to combat the
communist threat in the central highlands and two battalions for air
base protection. The
President approves the increase of two battalions but not the division.
US Ambassador
Taylor convinces the President to adopt the 'enclave strategy'. This
involved creating
defensive enclaves around air bases and ports.
The Rolling Thunder bombing campaign and the 34A operation in North
Vietnam, the Yankee
Team and Barrel Roll programs in Laos, the 34A operations, and the
fleet's presence in the
South China Sea would continue for years. By mid-March of 1965,
however, American leaders
concluded that these actions would not compel the North Vietnamese and
the subordinate
Viet Cong and Pathet Lao to forego their drive for control of Southeast
Asia. Indeed, the
enemy attacks on the Desoto Patrol, stepped up Communist activity in
South Vietnam and
Laos, and infiltration of regular North Vietnamese Army (NVA) units
southward revealed
Hanoi's intention to turn up the heat. Having exhausted most of the
options in the
campaign of coercion initiated in early 1964 without achieving the
desired result, the
Johnson administration sought a new strategy in Southeast Asia.
APRIL
The
passive defense mission was shelved on 1 April 1965 when President
Johnson
authorized the Marines at Danang to move out and engage Viet Cong and
North Vietnamese
forces in combat.
3 - 5 April. The first series
of raids against bridges on the road to Hanoi begins. In
the course of this raid,
North Vietnamese MIGS (Russian-built fighter
aircraft) attack US
planes.
Reflecting the desire to concentrate greater resources against the Ho
Chi Minh Trail, on 3
April the southern Laotian Panhandle was separated from the Barrel Roll
operational area
in northeastern Laos and designated Steel Tiger.
6 -
National
Security Action memorandum signed by Bundy to the Secretary of State,
Secretary of Defense
and the Director Central Intelligence Agency
7 April
- Australian
Cabinet agrees to provide a Battalion if and
when requested by the US.
The
decision is welcomed by the US as, "the
sooner the better"..
15 April
- Coupled with this decision was approval during March for U.S.
carrier aircraft to strike enemy forces in South Vietnam. On 15 April
planes from Midway,
Coral Sea,
and Yorktown
(CVS 10) conducted the first such attack against
Viet Cong positions northwest of Saigon. The ships sailed in a new
carrier operating area
southeast of Cam Ranh Bay, at 11N 110E, known as Dixie Station.
An
aircraft carrier was
constantly stationed at Dixie Station between June 1965 and August
1966. Beginning in
April 1965 the fleet created a radar picket station between the
Communist mainland and
Task Force 77 sailing in Tonkin Gulf. Normally, two destroyers stayed
on alert at this
forward station. In July of the following year, this deployment was
formalized with
establishment of PIRAZ (positive identification radar advisory zone),
which entailed
locating and tracking all planes over the eastern regions of North
Vietnam and the gulf by
a positioned surface ship equipped with advanced radar and
communications. The unit also
vectored naval aircraft to and from their targets and warned them of
approaching MiGs.
20
April
- Under tight security Operation Plan
"Trimdon", codename for the dispatch of the Australian battalion is
sent to top
levels in the Army. It includes a cover story explaining 1 RAR as
simply being
"exercised".
A conference is held in Honolulu between US Ambassador Taylor and
senior US government and
military officials where they agree that an increase of US combat
troops(9 battalions) to
Vietnam is needed and that they should solicit help from other
countries, notably
Australia, New Zealand and South Korea.
21 April.
Dr
Phan Huy Quat, leader of the RVN government, is
reluctant to see the introduction of foreign combat troops. It is only
after some
persuasion by the US that Dr Quat agrees and the Quat government
further agrees to state
publicly that the battalion had been committed "at its request". The
announcement of the committment by the Australia is delayed awaiting
the
"appropriately worded" request from the Siagon government. The
Australian
government did not want to announce the committment until it could say
that is was acting
"at the request of the RVN Government".
Dean Rusk, "American Foreign
Policy and International Law:South Vietnam's Right of Self Defense,
April 23, 1965
The American Ambassador in
Saigon, Maxwell Taylor
The South Vietnamese government has "no enthusiasm" for foreign forces
and was
"highly sensitive to criticism that the country was "taken over;
"anti-American sentiments lie just under the surface".
Australia's
Ambassador Anderson Reinforces Taylor's Comments
"Foreign
forces would only heighten Vietnamese xenophobia and encourage them
to leave the fight to the Americans".
28
April
- Australian Ambassador in Saigon David Anderson obtains
the formal agreement from the Republic of South Vietnam(RVN) Government
.
29
April, 8 pm - Prime Minister Menzies Announces,
"Australia was 'in receipt of a request' from the South Vietnamese
Government to
provide assistance".
A decision that had been decided "weeks and weeks" before. Menzies also
announces the commitment of an Australian infantry battalion of 778
men, and
states,"The takeover of South Vietnam would be a direct military threat
to Australia
and South-East Asia".
The Self-Interested Truth
President Johnson warmly
welcomed Australia's Commitment
"This action proves again the
deep ties between our countries in the cause of
world peace".
Part of the Chief of Staff
Directive to the Commander, Australian Force Vietnam
"As a result of a request of the
Republic of Vietnam the Australian Government
had "agreed" to provide it military assistance to defeat
"Communist-inspired insurgency and aggression".
1965 Editorials - After the
Announcement that Australia would commit troops to Vietnam
April 30 - The
Australian Age - New Tasks in
Vietnam
"The
decision by the Australian government to send a battalion to South
Vietnam is a grave one and commits Australia to a more direct role in
this cockpit of war
where the conflict for power between Communist China and the West in
South East Asia has
been joined... These are inescapable obligations which fall on us
because of our
geographical position, our treaty commitments and our friendships...
There is clearly a
United States call to share, even in a small way, more of the
burdens..There was no
alternative but to respond as we have".
April
30 - The Australian - The War
That Can't be Won
"The Menzies Government has made
a reckless decision on Vietnam which this nation
may live to regret. It has decided to send Australian soldiers into a
savage,
revolutionary war in which the Americans are grievously involved - so
that America may
share a tiny part of her embarrassment. Their decision is wrong, at
this time, whichever
way we look at it. It is wrong because Australia's contingent can have
only insignificant
military value, because it will be purely a political pawn in a
situation for which
Australia has no responsibility whatsoever.
It is wrong because it deliberately and coldly runs counter to the
mounting wave
international anxiety about the of the Vietnam war and the
justification and perils of
America's military escalation...Neither of the Pacific Defence treaties
to which Australia
subscribes can honestly be invoked to justify the Menzies Government
decision".
"ANZUS cannot apply, because the United States is not under attack.
SEATO, more
worthless than ever, certainly doesn't apply...
But Australia has lined up her generations against the hatred and
contempt of resurgent
Asian peoples - without adding one iota of confidence or strength to
the tragically
embroiled American nation. It could be that our historians will recall
this day with
tears".
30 April.
The Canberra Times conducts
a survey of late night
shoppers and finds that out of 44 people, 26 had no idea of what was
happening in Vietnam,
including fifteen who had not heard of the decision to send troops to
Vietnam.
MAY
May 1 -
The West Australian - Australia
Faces Up To Reality
"The Federal government has made a grave decision in committing 800
Australian troops
to fight in South Vietnam. Yet, however much Australians might abhor
the prospect of
becoming physically embroiled in the conflict in Vietnam, the
government could not shirk
its responsibilities there. The decision gives expression to the
fundamentals of our
policy in South East Asia. For the United States, the task of halting
Communism aggression
involves mainly the principles of freedom and peace. For Australians,
in Borneo and
Vietnam, our own security also is at stake, both now and in the future.
The United States
wants to negotiated settlement in Vietnam. Its stepped-up campaign is
designed only to
convince the Communists that they cannot take what they want by force.
If the Americans
lose militarily or diplomatically, so do we".
May
1 - The Courier Mail - We Are
At War
"This is a grim week-end for
every Australian. we are now at war, a war which
will touch every one of us far more than most people, even today, will
realize. Australia
is to fight on the Asian mainland to aid the United States in stopping
the advance of
Communism, which threatens us directly. We are going with a token, but
nonetheless
committed and lethal force to support the South Vietnamese Government
against the
aggression of North Vietnam, backed by communist China".
Our Government has made the decision in our name, and that is its duty.
The nation now has
to support that... For us, the cost will not be light. Brave men will
die in jungles
without even seeing the other side's soldiers; many others will be
wounded. At home we
will have to commit a great deal of our manpower and our economy to the
fight. The easy
days ended with the Prime Minister's announcement on Thursday.
2
May
- Australian Military Planning Team arrive in Siagon.
3 May
- US Army 173rd Airborne arrives in
South Vietnam. The Australian
battalion is to be integrated into this unit.
1965 : 173rd Airborne Brigade ordered
to
South Vietnam
The Joint Chiefs of Staff order the deployment of the 173rd Airborne
Brigade from Okinawa to South Vietnam. The 173rd arrived in Vietnam in
May 1965 and was the first major U.S. Army ground combat unit committed
to the war.
Headquartered at Bien Hoa Air Base near Saigon from May 1965 to October
1967, the brigade conducted combat operations in the region surrounding
Saigon. In November 1967, the brigade fought a major battle with North
Vietnamese Army forces at Dak To in the Central Highlands, winning the
Presidential Union Citation for bravery in action. After more than six
years in South Vietnam, the 173rd was withdrawn from Vietnam in August
1971 as part of President Richard Nixon's troop withdrawal program.
During combat service in Vietnam, 12 troopers of the 173rd Airborne
Brigade won the Medal of Honor for conspicuous bravery; 1,606 were
killed in action; and 8,435 were wounded in action. |
5 May
- The Daily Mirror - Troops for Vietnam
The decision of the Menzies
Government to dispatch troops to South Vietnam is opposed
by many Australians.
- To send troops at this time is wrong because it flies deliberately in
the face of
increasing international pressure for negotiation.
- It is wrong because it is not justified under either of our two
Pacific pacts. SEATO and
ANZUS.
- It is wrong because our future is in South East Asia, and further
commitment in Vietnam
could irreparably poison our relations with our neighbors.
Early May.
A Morgan Gallup Poll seeks reaction to the decision to send
troops and finds 52% support, 37% oppose and 11% are undecided. 53%
support and 29% oppose
the bombing military targets in North Vietnam. 64% favoured and 20%
opposed American
forces staying in Vietnam. 64% to 16% believed Thailand and Malaysia
would be taken over
by other countries if the United States left Vietnam. 72% to 16%
believed that Australia
would eventually be in danger from China if the US pulled out of
Vietnam.
11 May
. The VC launched their wet season offensive by attacking the town
of Song Be, north of Bien Hoa.
13 May
- Save Our Sons(SOS)
founded in Sydney and oppose conscription.
Save Our Sons (SOS)
An anti-conscription group, initiated by Joyce Golgerth and Pat
Ashcroft at a a meeting in Sydney on 5 June 1965. The organisation was
called Save Our Sons (SOS) and consisted of `mothers joining together
to voice their opposition to the conscription of their sons for the
slaughter in Vietnam. Similar groups were formed not long afterwards in
Melbourne, Brisbane, Perth, Newcastle and Adelaide. |
The US suspends air raids on North Vietnam, hoping for a peaceful
overture from the North
Vietnamese. At the same time, the US launches a diplomatic offensive.
19 May .When
the North Vietnamese fail to respond to the US peace
initiative and suspension of bombing, President Johnson orders that the
raids be resumed.
Raids are conducted against North Vietnamese oil storage tanks.
Australian airlines -
QANTAS is called upon to
provide aircraft to ferry
troops to Vietnam. QANTAS bauks at providing aircraft even though they
were aware that
they had obligations in such a defence role.The airline cites
"disruption to normal
commercial operations" as the excuse. The Government is unsympathetic
and
QANTAS
provides charter services to Vietnam, followed by a regular
weekly service from
March 1968 until operations ceased on 26 February 1972.
B Company of The
First
Battalion, The Royal Australian
Regiment(1 RAR) and support troops(347 officers and ORs) including
stores and equipment
depart Sydney, Australia on HMAS Sydney,
escorted by the Destroyer 
HMAS
Duchess.
Plan "Trimdon" is put into effect, (the protection by RAN and RAAF of
the
Australian Force on its deployment to Vietnam). With the force is a
troop of APCs from the
Prince of Wales Light Horse(PWLH). The remainder of the force depart
shortly after by
charter aircraft and a RAAF Hercules
Manning Details -
Australian Army Forces Vietnam(AAFV) - 1965.
1. Headquarters Australian Army Forces
Vietnam(HQ AAFV) - Stationed at
Siagon. 12 officers and 22 other ranks. Total 34.
2. 1 RAR(including re-inforcements) 37
officers and 766 other ranks.
Total 803.
3. 1st Australian Logistics
Company(1ALSC) - 9 officers and 124
other ranks. Total 133.
4. 709 Signal Troop - 2
officers and 48 other ranks. Total 50.
5. Australian Army Training Team
Vietnam(AATTV) - already in situ. 15
Officers and 85 other ranks. Total 100
Initial Strength of AAFV - 1965 - 75 Officers and 1045 other ranks.
Total strength = 1120
US strength now at 82,000.
JUNE
The
'enclave strategy' is abandoned and the US President authorizes
General Westmoreland
to engage in 'counter insurgency combat operations'. ARVN losses are
high and General
Westmoreland asks for a further 34 US battalions and 10 battalions from
other countries.
He believes without substantial numbers of US combat troops South
Vietnam will fall.
Westmoreland is given approval by the US President to use American
forces in any situation
in which he deems necessary. Plans are drawn up to conduct a raid into
War Zone D, a
communist sanctuary near the Bien Hoa airbase. The 173rd Airborne
Brigade of which 1 RAR
will form part of, is chosen to lead the assault.
Nguyen Cao Ky becomes head of the Saigon Government.
7 June - US General
Westmoreland reports that
North Vietnamese troops are
infiltrating South Vietnam(SVN) and ARVN forces are reluctant to assume
the offensive and
in some cases their steadfastness under fire is coming into doubt.
He
asks for another
41,000 combat troops now and another 52,000 later. He also states;
"Studies must
continue and plans developed to deploy even greater forces, if and when
required".
1st -
The Commanding Officer, 1 RAR and a party of troops depart Richmond
Air Force base in Sydney, bound for Siagon. He is followed by a
succession of flights,
ferrying the remainder of troops.
8 June -
Though the RAN did not become operationally involved in the Vietnam
conflict until 1965, HMA Ships VAMPIRE and QUICKMATCH were the first
ships in the area when they made a goodwill visit to Saigon in 1962.
They were followed the next year by the Q Class destroyers HMA Ships
QUIBERON and QUEENBOROUGH . These were not operational visits: but
designed to show Australian government support for the government in
Saigon, and members of the ships company visited the Vietnamese Special
Forces training centre and carried out other `flag showing' activities.
During the 1963 visit the small Vietnamese naval vessel KY-HOA
accidently rammed and holed QUIBERON whilst coming alongside her. "
|
5.30 am - HMAS Sydney
with B Company,
The 1st Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment(1 RAR) arrives at Vung
Tau.
The remainder
of 1 RAR and supporting arms, establish at Bien Hoa with the
US 173rd Airborne and
operate as its 3rd Infantry Battalion.
Vung Tau
Vung Tau is a resort town in the province of Dong Nai 125 km from
Saigon. The town is a long strip approximately 14 km long and 6 km
wide. Where the southern tip of town meets the ocean stand two famous
mountains Nui Lon (Truong Ky) and Nui Nho (Tao Phung) or Large mountain
and Small mountain. Historically, Vung Tau used to be part of Bien Hoa.
The first settlements in this area occurred during the reign of King
Gia Long. During this period, there were many Malay bandits in this
region.
 |
They
often enter the area through Song Be entrance from the ocean. This
created a threat for merchants in the Gia Dinh area. King Gia Long sent
three garrisons of troops to the area to quell the disturbance and to
clear this area for settlement. A few years later, the bandits were
driven away and in 1822, King Ming Mang rewarded the three officers who
led the army to this region. The soldiers were allowed to retire and
brought their families to this area to make a living. The first three
successful settlements in this area were under the leadership of the
three officers who originally led the troops here. |
Thang Nhat (first
win) township, Thang Nhi (second win) township and Thang Tam (third
win) township were led by Mr. Pham Van Dinh, Mr. Le Van Loc, and Mr.
Ngo Van Huyen respectively. Ever since then, this area is known as Tam
Thang or Three Wins. The name Vung Tau came about because the geography
in this area also forms a natural bay where many merchant ships would
stop to seek shelter. In time, this area became known as Vung (puddle)
Tau (ships). Another name for this area is Cap Saint Jacques or Au Cap
in French. |
1 RAR is entirely made up
of Regular Soldiers and supporting
arms, totaling 1100 men.
1 RAR is accompanied by an APC troop, a signals detachment and a
Logistics Support Coy."
establish at Bien Hoa with the US 173rd Airborne and operate as its 3rd
Infantry Battalion. "Provincial town of 60,00 and major US airfield it
lies 30 klms north-east of Siagon.
Bien
Hoa means "land of peaceful
frontiers". "
10
June
- The last flights ferrying troops arrives at
Saigon. The battalion is paraded at Bein Hoa and officially welcomed by
General Nguyen Van
Thieu,
Minister of Defence, Republic of Vietnam (RVN). 1 RAR then
conduct daily clearing
patrols, essential training and acclimatization.
A five day battle in Phuoc Long province, 60 klms north of
Bien Hoa between ARVN and
VC main force units causes heavy casualties to both sides including 13
US advisers killed
and ten wounded.
17 June.
The first B-52 raids are launched against Viet Cong targets in
South Vietnam.
20
June
1 RAR takes responsibility for a
Tactical Area of Responsibility(TAOR), an area extending 4000 metres to
the Dong Nai River
as was approximately 3500 metres from east to west. 1 RAR is
directed to:
1. (a) secure 1 RAR battalion defensive position - (b) secure assigned
sectors and
airfield defence - (c) secure and defend the intermediate extended
zone, and (d) patrol
the TAOR.
2. Conduct patrols and offensive operations to secure the Bien Hoa
airbase and prevent
enemy massing for a surprise attack on Bien Hoa.
3. Conduct search and destroy operations.
1
RAR Operation 1/65
Formations/units:
1 RAR, with in direct support 3/319th Arty
(US) less one battery,
in support E/17th Cav (US). Description: The battalion shake-down
operation on joining
173d Abn Bde (Sep) (173d Bde) at Bien Hoa air base, in the form of a
battalion
search-and-destroy operation in an AO between the convergence of
Routes 1 and 15 on Bien Hoa.
The AO, of 24
square kilometres, lay astride a likely VC line of approach to attack
the air base.
Undulating terrain covered mainly in jungle. The operation was designed
to clear a base
area for the incoming 2d Bde Ist Inf Div(US). Deployment by helicopter.
Location: West
central Bien Hoa province, eleven kilometres SE of Bien Hoa air base.
Results: Two platoon-size VC camps located, VC documents and books
captured.
Remarks: The accidental detonation of a grenade on return from the
operation killed three
Australians and one US soldier, with a further soldier dying of wounds;
eleven soldiers
were injured including two US soldiers.
26-6-65 Bourke M.A. Pte 37867 1RAR
C/7 19 RAIN F F /NBCAS Shrap wds from Carroll's grenade.
26-6-65 Carroll W.T. Pte 37010 1RAR
C/7 21 RAIN F F /NBCAS Grenade caught in webbing on side of truck.
29-6-65
Van Valen A. Pte 54320 1RAR C/7 21RAINF DOW/NBCAS At 3FDHOSP T.S.N.
from Carroll's grenade on 26.06.65.
29-30 June 1965 1 RAR
Operation 2/65
Formations/units:
1 RAR, with in direct support one battery 3/319th
Arty (US).
Description: A brigade search-and-destroy operation, 1 RAR being the
security element for
the 173d Bde FSPB in a brigade AO north of Tan Uyen, in the western
area of War Zone D.
The battalion AO covered 37 square kilometres. Undulating terrain
covered mainly in jungle
and brushwood. The operation was intended to prevent a build-up of the
VC threat to Bien
Hoa air base. Insertion by helicopter, extraction by APC. Location:
Northern Bien Hoa
province, nineteen kilometres north of Bien Hoa air base.
Results: Casualties: own: WIA 4. Remarks: The first combined US-RVN
combat operation of
the war and the then largest heliborne troop-lift including the ARVN
Abn Bde. 173d Bde
reported VC: KIA 25 and the destruction or capture of more than 200
tonnes of rice and
food, as well as three trucks. U.S.
Department of State FRUS, Vol. II, 1964-68, Vietnam, January-June 1965
Office of the
Historian
JULY
General
Westmoreland attempts to bring the role of 1 RAR into line with
the US
operations by including 1 RAR as part of a general reserve required to
carry out tasks
anywhere in Vietnam. Fearing heavy casualties, Australia's
response is, "
1 RAR can best be employed, and make its most effective and valuable
contribution to the
operations in South Vietnam by continuing on its present role and tasks
in the Bien Hoa
area".
1
RAR OP
3/65- Operational Dates: 6-9 July 1965.
Formations/units: 1 RAR, with in direct support one battery 3/319th
Arty (US).
Description: A brigade search-and-destroy operation, 1 RAR being a
manoeuvre element of
173d Bde, in a brigade AO east and NE of Tan Uyen, part of the SW area
of War Zone D. The
battalion AO was generally rectangular, extending north from the Song
Dong Nai some six
kilometres, and approximately three to four kilometres wide. Hilly
terrain mainly covered
in jungle. Enemy forces anticipated by the brigade were from squad to
regimental size.
Deployment by helicopter.
Location: North-central Bien Hoa province, twelve kilometres NNE of
Bien Hoa air base.
Results:
Casualties: own: DOW 1, WIA 3; VC: KIA 2, wounded/escaped 7.
Six camps and one old ambush position for 200-300 personnel located,
also one tonne of
rice.
Remarks: 48th Inf Regt (RVN) blocked VC escape routes to the west of
the brigade AO. 173d
Bde reported own: KIA 10, WIA 46, with VC: KIA 51, possible KIA 350,
PW 28, and more than
300 VC buildings destroyed, with 100 tons of rice destroyed or
recovered, also one tonne
of documents, 30 weapons and five radios captured.
8-7-65
Nalder W.L. Pte 2412151 1RAR D/12 19RAINF DOW At 173rd CCS from sniper
GSW to chest that day.
11
July. US and Australian
officials meet in Saigon where the US is
advised that Australia wishes are that 1 RAR continue in its present
role of security at
Bien Hoa. Later, the 30-35 klm restriction put on 1 RAR operations was
lifted and extended
to include the whole of III CTZ.
XT 161
Bty, RNZA (Kenning’s Bty
13Jun65-13Jun66) firebase set
here when it arrived in VN. "Single Gun
Ready"
15Jul65. 18Aug65, it was 6 km N of Bien Hoa at XT 99-21, on 27 Aug65 it
was 2.5 km N of
Bien Hoa. Bien Hoa Prov, III Corps.
161 Bty, RNZA, comprised 140 men and was located at Bien Hoa as part of
the United States
173rd Airborne Brigade. 161 Battery, RNZA, was based at Bien Hoa for
one year, providing
close fire support for the Brigade's three infantry battalions and for
the 1st Battalion,
Royal Australian Regiment, which had joined the Brigade in June 1965.
L-5
Howitzer - The 105mm Pack
Howitzer used by 161 Bty RNZA when it 1st
deployed to SVN in 1965.
 |
(left)The 105mm Pack Howitzer
used by 161 Bty RNZA
(right) US M2A2 105mm Howitzer, |
 |
It was replaced by the
loner-ranged,
more
durable but heavier US
M2A2 105mm Howitzer, 2Jul66. Until the arrival of Chinook helicopters
in large numbers,
the New Zealander’s L-5 was the only howitzer deployable by
UH-1.
1
RAR Op
4/65 - Operational Dates: 17 July 1965
Formations/units: 1 RAR (less C and D Coys on base patrol and support
tasks) with under
command 1 APC Tp (PWLH). Description: A battalion search operation to
destroy VC using
portion of the 173d Bde TAOR for movement, conducted as a sweep from NW
to SE into a stop
position. The AO was approximately two square kilometres. Terrain-a
generally gently
sloping ridge line, rising from NW to SE, covered mainly in jungle.
Deployment on foot, by
APC. Location: Central Bien Hoa province, six kilometres NE of Bien Hoa
air base.
Results: Nil.
20 - Robert
McNamara's Memo to President Johnson
24 July. Ground to air missiles
fire at four US Phantoms over Vietnam,
shooting
down
one and damaging three. This marks the first time that US planes are
attacked by surface
to air missiles (SAM).
26 July - President Johnson
writes to Prime Minister seeking a further Australian
contribution . Australia's Continuing Commitment
.
28 July - Lyndon Johnson. In
response to Westmoreland's request for more troops.
"I have today ordered to Vietnam
the Airmobile Division and certain other forces
which will raise our fighting strength from 75,000 to 125,000 men
almost immediately.
Additional forces will be sent as requested...... We do not want an
expanding struggle
with consequences that no one can foresee, nor will we bluster or bully
or flaunt our
power. But we will not surrender and we will not retreat".
29 July
- The Australian Defence Committee recommends additional
Australian forces.
1
RAR OP
5/65- Operational Dates:
29
July-3 Aug 1965.
Formations/units:
Under operational control of HQ 2d Inf Bde (US): 1
RAR, with under
command 1 APC Tp (PWLH), in direct support 161 Fd Bty (NZ).
Description: A battalion
patrolling operation in both 1 RAR and 2/503d Inf (US) TAOR of 173d Bde
TAOR, to provide
warning for and defence of Bien Hoa air base during the
brigade operation in Phuoc
Tuy province. The AO, comprising the combined battalions' TAOR, was
roughly rectangular,
of 30 square kilometres. Undulating to flat terrain with rice, rubber
plantations,
vegetable farms and jungle. Deployment on foot, by APC for particular
tasks. Location:
Central Bien Hoa province, six kilometres NE of Bien Hoa air base.
Results: Two old VC
camps located. Remarks: The first operation recorded as involving 161
Fd Bty(NZ)
supporting 1 RAR.
US
strength at 81,400. US KIA
509.
AUGUST
1
- 3 August.
A senior Australian Army Officer goes to Vietnam for
reconnaissance and discussions on a further Australian commitment.
1
RAR OP
6/65- Operational Dates: 7-11 August 1965
.
Formations/units: 1 RAR, with under command D/16th Armor (US), 1 APC Tp
(PWLH), in direct
support Btry B 3/319th Arty(US). Description: A battalion
search-and-destroy operation in
the SW area of War Zone D in an AO generally square in shape of 30
square kilometres.
Hilly terrain, mainly covered in jungle. The enemy force was All Main
Force Regt, with a
local force screen. Insertion by trucks and APC, extraction by
helicopter. Location:
North-central Bien Hoa province, thirteen kilometres north of Bien Hoa
air base.
Results: Casualties: own: WIA 3; VC: KIA 3,wounded/escaped 5. Ten camps
and two tonne of
rice located. 1 RAR OP 7/65- Operational Dates: 12 August-8 September
1965
Formations/units: 1 RAR, with under command D/16th Armor (US), 1 APC Tp
(PWLH), in direct
support 161 Fd Bty(NZ), in support Btry B 3/319th Arty (US).
Description: A battalion
patrolling operation in both 1 RAR and 2/503d Inf (US) TAOR of 173d Bde
TAOR, to provide
warning for and defence of Bien Hoa air base, during the brigade
operation in the area of
Pleiku in II CTZ.The AO, comprising the combined battalions' TAOR, was
roughly
rectangular, of 30 square kilometres. Undulating to flat terrain, with
rice, rubber
plantations, vegetable farms and jungle. Deployment on foot. Location:
Central Bien Hoa
province, six kilometres NE of Bien Hoa air base. Results: Nil.
1
RAR
Op 8/65 - Operational Date: 18 August 1965
Formations/units: Task Force
'Lander' comprising, under command, C Coy 1 RAR, D/16th Armor
(US), 1 APC Tp (PWLH), with in direct support 161 Fd Bty (NZ), in
support Btry B 1/7th
Arty (US). Description: An 'artillery raid', in which the guns of 161
Fd Bty (NZ) were
established in a temporary gun position,forward in the TAOR on the
southern side of the
Song Dong Nai. From this advanced position they surprised the VC by
firing on a target in
depth-a suspected VC regimental sized assembly area NW of Tan Uyen. The
AO was the
immediate vicinity of the gun position, to provide for its close-in
protection, and
northwards one kilometre to the banks of the Song Dong Nai. Flat
terrain with rice,
grassland and cultivation. Deployment by APC. Location: North-central
Bien Hoa province,
eight kilometres north of Bien Hoa air base.
Results: No indications of casualties to VC forces.
Remarks: For the first time the L5 howitzers of 161 Fd Bty (NZ) were
deployed inside the
APCs for
concealment to achieve surprise.
XT 161 Bty, RNZA
(Kenning’s Bty 13Jun65-13Jun66) .
18Aug65, it was 6
km N of Bien Hoa at XT 99-21, Bien Hoa Prov, III Corps.
17 August
- The Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee of the
Australian Cabinet approve the additional increment of 350 men. The
Increment of the
Australian forces will consist of a field artillery battery(105 Fd
Bty), a troops of
engineers, a reconnaissance flight
(Sioux Helicopters), a signals
troop
and additions to
the existing headquarters and logistics support company.
21 August.
Operation Starlite, the first major action fought by only US
forces, takes place. US marines numbering 5,500 destroy a Viet Cong
base area near Van
Tuong. The attack is preceded by a massive artillery and air assault.
US forces
successfully capture the Vietcong positions and rout the Communist
forces. The US marines
lose 45 and claim to kill 668 Viet Cong.
24 August.
The Bien Hoa airbase is bombarded by 300 enemy shells which
includes mountain guns , mortars and 75mm RCLs. Eleven US aircraft are
damaged with 29
personnel wounded.
1 RAR Op
9/65 - Operational Date: 27 August 1965
Formations/units:
Task Force'Tattam' comprising, under command C Coy 1
RAR: 1 APC Tp
(PWLH), element D/16th Armor (US) with in direct support 161 Fd Bty
(NZ), in support Btry
B 1/7th Arty (US). Description: An 'artillery raid' in which the guns
of 161 Fd Bty (NZ)
were established in a temporary gun position, forward in the TAOR on
the southern bank of
the Song Dong Nai. This advanced position allowed them to surprise the
VC by firing on
targets in depth-VC activity in an area of War Zone D immediately north
of the
TAOR. The
AO was the immediate vicinity of the gun position, to provide for its
close-in protection.
Undulating terrain mainly rubber plantation and jungle. Deployment on
foot and by APC (161
Fd Bty (NZ)). Location: North-central Bien Hoa province, five
kilometres NE of Bien Hoa
air base.
Results: No indication of casualties to VC forces.
XT 161 Bty, RNZA
(Kenning’s Bty 13Jun65-13Jun66) . On 27 Aug65 it
was 2.5 km N of Bien Hoa. Bien Hoa Prov, III Corps.
SEPTEMBER
Formation/Units/nits:
1 RAR less C Coy, with under
command 1APC Tp (PWLH),
element D/16th Armor (US), in direct support 161 Fd Bty (NZ) and Btry A
1/7th Arty (US),
in support 1/7th Arty (US) less Btry A. Description: An 'artillery
raid' in which the guns
of 161 Fd Bty (NZ) and Btry C 1/7th Arty (US) were established in a
temporary gun
position, forward of the TAOR on the eastern flank. This advanced
position allowed them to
engage elements of All Main Force Regt. The AO protecting the
gun-position was 46 square
kilometres. Undulating terrain, covered mainly in jungle,
rice, and clear forest.
Deployment by truck, APC and helicopter. Location: North-central Bien
Hoa province, 14
kilometres east of Bien Hoa air base.
Results: No indications of casualties to VC forces; one VC suspect
captured.Remarks: Btry
C 1/7th Arty (US) was under command 161 Fd Bty (NZ) for the operation.
FSB Bien Cat - XT 78-32
161 Bty, RNZA (Kenning’s Bty 13Jun65-13Jun66)
firebase set here 4-16Sep65 and 19-23Feb66. Was also 2 km NW of city
16- 18Sep65, 10 km N
of city 18-23Sep65 and 6 km S of city 8- 14Oct65. Binh Duong Prov, III
Corps.
10-9-65
Sgt(T/WO2) Scott R.A. AATTV KIA by Sniper in Quang Tri Prov.
14-9-65
Don A.J.S. Sgt RNZA KIA when Vehicle hit command detonated mine at Ben
Cat.
Morgan Gallop Poll in Australia indicates: 56% of Australians are in
favor of involvement
in Vietnam, 28% in favor of withdrawal, 10% were undecided.
14-9-65 White R. Bdr KIA when Land Rover towing trailer with ammo' hit
cmd det mine.
14 September
- The additional Australian force departs Australia on HMAS Sydney
and arrives at Vung Tau on the 28 Sep65.
1
RAR Op
11/65 'Ben CAT 1' - Operational Dates: 14-27
September 1965.
Formations/units: 1 RAR,with under command 1 APC Tp (PWLH), in direct
support 161 Fd Bty
(NZ). Description: A brigade search-and-destroy operation, 1 RAR being
a manoeuvre element
of 173d Bde and the brigade AO being north and NW of Bien Cat. A pro-VC
area, it lay
between the VC routes east-west between War Zone C and War Zone D and
the Iron Triangle SW
of Bien Cat; Summary of operations, 1965-1966 441 was a potential
concentration area for
more than one VC main force division. The brigade AO was roughly
oval-shaped on an
east-west line, of approximately 275 square km; the battalion was
assigned A0s
successively in a line from SW to NE within the brigade AO. Generally
undulating terrain,
mainly jungle in the SW, mainly clear forest in the centre, and a
mixture of vegetation in
the NE. Deployment by APC and helicopter. Location: NW Binh Duong
province, 40 kilometres
NW of Bien Hoa air base.
Results: Casualties: own: KIA 1,WIA 5; VC: KIA 12, wounded/escaped 5,
PW 4, 20 camps or
defensive positions located-some destroyed, one homemade plant for
making ammunition
destroyed, three weapons captured. Remarks: 173d Bde results were: VC.
KIA 46, PW 80, 9000
documents and half a tonne of medical supplies recovered, 23 camps
destroyed or marked for
later airstrikes.
FSB Ap Bau Bang - XT Appx
26 km NNE of Ben Cat. 161 Bty, RNZA (Kenning’s
Bty 13Jun65-13Jun66) firebase set here 23-27Sep65. Binh Duong Prov, III
Corps.
FSB Lai Khe
- XT 77-38 161 Bty, RNZA (Kenning’s Bty 13Jun65-13Jun66)
firebase set here 27-28Sep65. Binh Duong Prov, III Corps.
21-9-65 Smith F.J. Cpl 1RAR A/3 KIA by GSW to chest by sniper at Ben
Cat.
28 September
- The Additional Australian force land at Vung Tau and
proceed to Bien Hoa where the engineers and Recce Flight come under
command 1 RAR. 105 Fd
Bty comes under operational control of the US 3rd Artillery Battalion,
319 Artillery.
Morgan Gallop Poll in Australia indicates: 56% of Australians are in
favor of involvement
in Vietnam, 28% in favor of withdrawal, 10% were undecided.
1 RAR and supporting units have established a strong defensive position
at Bien Hoa with
effective logistics and administrative support and have achieved
dominance of their TAOR.
OCTOBER
South Korean combat division lands in South Vietnam.
1
RAR Op 12/65 'IRON TRIANGLE'. Operational Dates: 8-14
October 1965
Formations/units: 1 RAR,with under command 1 APC Tp (PWLH), D/16th
Armor (US), in direct
support 161 Fd Bty(NZ). Description: A brigade search-and-destroy
operation, 1 RAR being a
manoeuvre element of 173d Bde. The brigade AO was immediately south and
west of Ben
Cat,
covering the 'Iron Triangle', a VC headquarters, transit camp and
supply installations
area.
The first 1 RAR AO was some
fourteen sq km of the NE section of
the brigade AO
immediately SW of Ben Cat; the second, of ten sq km, was to the east
of the brigade AO
between the Song Thi Tinh and Route 13. Flat to undulating terrain,
traversed by the Song
Thi Tinh, with jungle,rubber, grassland, and rice areas adjoining the
river. Insertion by
APC and truck, extraction by the same means and by helicopter.
Location: West-central Binh
Duong province, 29 km WNW of Bien Hoa air base. Results: Casualties:
own: KIA 2 including
one US attached,WIA 37; VC: KIA 8, wounded/escaped 1, PW 2. Four small
defensive positions
and three camps/VC villages were located, including one of 5000 sq m.,
comprising tunnels,
weapon pits, trench lines and huts.
Remarks: 1 RAR search area was significant for booby traps (five
detonations accounting
for most of the WIA) and several adapted and VC-initiated mines.173d
Bde reported VC KIA
106, possible KIA 4, PW 115; recovered or destroyed a small number of
weapons and
munitions, more than one tonne of rice, six camps, 212 huts, seven
sampans.
1
RAR OP 13/65- Operational Dates: 23-26 October 1965.
Formations/units: 1 RAR, with under command 1 APC Tp (PWLH) and 3 Fd
Tp, in direct support
105 Fd Bty and 161 Fd Bty (NZ), in support E/17th Cav (US). 161 (Indep)
Recce Fit.
Description: A battalion search-and-destroy operation to extend the
173d Bde area of
influence beyond and to the NE of its TAOR based on the Bien Hoa air
base. The AO was 38
sq km, most of which was within the VC base area War Zone D. Generally
hilly terrain,
covered mainly in jungle. Deployment by APC and truck. Location: NE
Bien Hoa province,
eighteen km NE of Bien Hoa air base.
Results: Casualties: own: KIA 1; VC: KIA 2, wounded/escaped 5. A number
of civilians were
detained for questioning and later released.
10 - 14 October.
The US 1st Cavalry Division joins the South Vietnamese
in an attack in the Central Highlands
9-10-65
Field R.E. Pte 1RAR A/2 KIA When Shot in throat by sniper near Ben Cat.
12-10-65 Ross T. LCpl 1RAR A/1 KIA By a booby trap in Iron Triangle.
22 October
- 
Anti
war demonstration in Pitt St, Sydney.
25-10-65
Hansen A.R. Pte 1RAR C/8 KIA At Tan Dien. Bien Hoa Prov.
NOVEMBER
1
RAR Op
14/65 "HUMP".Operational Dates: 5-9 November 1965
Results: Casualties own: KIA 1, MIA believed dead 1, WIA 6; VC: KIA 6,
wounded/escaped 1,
PW 1 and 4 children from a VC hamlet. Five VC hamlets,one camp and one
heavily-defended
company position located. Remarks: 173d Bde reported losing KIA 40, WIA
51 from 1/503d
Inf(US) and claimed 403 VC KIA inflicted by that battalion in one major
action.
2 MIA....Both presumed killed in action ( KIA)
during the Battle of the Hump in Bien Hoa Province on November 8, 1965.
Attempts were made
to recover their bodies but due to intense enemy resistance and further
loss of life in
the attempts, their bodies were never recovered from the battle field.
1 RAR requested a
special operation to attempt a recovery but this was denied by the US
Commander.
 |
Parker and Gillson
remains at Richmond Air
Base NSW in July 2007 |
 |
The Bodies were eventually recovered in 2007 by a team of dedicated
retired Vietnam Veterans in 2007
1
RAR OP 15/65 - Cancelled.
Guy Fawkes Night
- A New Zealand celebration first held 5Nov65 (and each
5Nov), when 161 Bty, RNZA fired 240 rounds of illum, smoke and HE into
the air above War
Zone D. The puzzled US command ignorant of the significance of the
event urgently queried
to the nature of the contact, then told the higher US HQ that "the
Kiwis are
celebrating some Guy named Fox."
Letters
to the Southern Communists
8-11-65
Parker R.H.J. LCpl 1RAR A/1 KIA/BNR Multiple GSW to body on Hill 82 at
the Hump.
8-11-65 Gillson P.R. Pte 1RAR A/3 KIA/BNR Multiple GSW to body on Hill
82 at the Hump.
13-11-65 Swanton R.J. Sgt(T/WO2) AATTV KIA GSW. In contact at Tra Bong.
Body recovered 14.11.65.
29-11-65 Hillier R.H. Cpl 1RAR B/4 KIA GSW to chest.
1
RAR Op 16/65 'NEW LIFE'. Operational Dates: 21 November-16
8 VC
killed and 86 prisoners taken. 134 tons of rice is removed and
destroyed.
December
1965
Formations/units: 1 RAR, with under command 1 APC Tp (PWLH), 3 Fd Tp,
and in direct
support 161 Fd Bty (NZ). Description: An operation, as a manoeuvre
element of 173d
Bde, to
clear, develop and maintain a key section of road within the brigade
AO, together with the
conduct of associated search, control and destroy operations; four AOs,
of successively
82, 42, 44 and 43 sq km, were assigned to 1 RAR. This was within the
the overall strategy
of denial of VC access to the rice harvest, and restoring to government
control an area
generally under VC domination since late 1964. The brigade AO was
centred on the rice
growing areas of the La Nga Valley, in the vicinity of Vo Dat and Vo
Xu. Generally flat
terrain, with mainly swamp and rice, and some jungle. Deployment by
helicopter. Location:
NW Binh Tuy province,80 km ENE of Bien Hoa air base.
Results: Casualties: own: DOW 1, WIA 1; VC: KIA 8,wounded/escaped 8, PW
86. 134 tonne of
rice removed or destroyed where removal impracticable.
Remarks: 173d Bde was augmented by two infantry battalions, with
supporting artillery,
from lst Inf Div (US).
1
RAR - The Attack on
Chin Duch/Duc Hanh
FSB Vo Dat
- YT 60-33 80 km ENE of Bien Hoa and 35 km NE of Xuan Loc. 161
Bty, RNZA (Kenning’s Bty 13Jun65-13Jun66) firebase set here
21- 25Nov65, and
25-29Nov65, they were 6 km NW of Vo Dat at Chinh Duc. III Corps.
FSB Chinh Duc
- XT? Appx 6 km NW of Vo Dat. 161 Bty, RNZA (Kenning’s
Bty 13Jun65-13Jun66) firebase set here 25-29Nov65. III Corps
FSB Vo Xu
- 81-38 161 Bty, RNZA (Kenning’s Bty 13Jun65-13Jun66)
firebase set here 29Nov65-13Dec66. III Corps.
DECEMBER
9-12-65
Simpson T. Gnr 36205 1
F
DREGT 105Bty 27 RAA DOD At 93EVAC L.B. from cerebral malaria.
8 - 9 December. In
one of the
heaviest raids of the war, US aircraft raid 115 points
in North Vietnam to interdict supply lines.
1
RAR Op
17/65 'SMASH': Operational Dates: 17-21 December 1965
Formations/Units: 1 RAR, with
under command 3 Fd Tp (minus), in direct
support 161 Fd Bty
(NZ). Description: A brigade search-and-destroy operation, 1 RAR being
a manoeuvre element
of 173d Bde. The brigade AO was centred 23 km SW of Xuan Loc and west
of the Courtenay
rubber plantation,between Route 2 and the more distant Route 15 to the
west. The objective
was a possible VC concentration area for attacks being planned for the
holiday season
against targets in the general area Xuan Loc-Ham Tan-Ba Ria. The 1 RAR
AO was roughly
rectangular, 59 sq km,in the SW of Long Khanh province. Hilly to
undulating terrain,
covered mainly in jungle.Deployment by helicopter, and directly from
Operation 16/65 'NEW
LIFE' via Xuan Loc. Location: In the vicinity of the junction of the
boundaries of the
provinces of Bien Hoa,Long Khanh and Phuoc Tuy, 43 km SE of Bien Hoa
air base.
Results: Casualties: own:WIA 1; VC: KIA 2. One small village and two
camps located.
Remarks: 2d Inf Bde (US) AO was to the immediate west of the brigade
AO, operations being
co-ordinated.
17-12-65 Fotheringham A.H.T. Cpl
36543 1RAR Sp 28 RAIN F F /BCAS Defusing grenade at Vo Xu.
24
December.
The
United States halts the bombing of North Vietnam. During the halt,
the US engages in a massive peace offensive aimed at finding a
diplomatic settlement to
the war. The North Vietnamese do not recipricate and, after 37 days,
President Johnson
announces that the bombing will resume.
Lyndon Johnson;"Vietnam
is like the Alamo"
31
December.
US
strength now at 184,300. US KIA 1,594
U.S. Department of State FRUS, Vol. III, 1964-68, Vietnam,
June-December
1965 Office of the Historian
Next
1966
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