A Platoon Sergeant's Perspective of The Battle of LONG TAN 18th August 1966

MY COMMENTS TO SOME VIETNAM MYTH's

I start this at 1350 hours Thursday 19 December 1996 after discovering Long Tan: The Other Side of the Hill by Terry Burstall, click here. I believe ANOTHER SIDE OF HIS STORY IS NEEDED.

Burstall has for many years written and made statements that many Veteran's including those at the battle believe to be untrue and blatant lies.

It is not generally known that Terry Burstall never took part in the battle. His section, remained to protect the headquarters when Sabben lead his platoon to rescue my platoon. Then, with the company in the final position, repulsing numerous VC assaults, he missed the opportunity to shoot at the VC. Many others in the area did give fire support to those on the thin blue line, about 15 metres away. Terry had shrine at home, a portrait of Uncle Ho, given to him during a visit to SVN in the 1980's.

I admire Terry for attaining his "Ph D" in Literature for his writing but I believe that the content of his work is basically flawed. Statements, 11 Platoon surrounded, the company ambushed, the battle of Long Tan made no difference to the VC are wrong. He has I feel been overwhelmed and conned by those VC he interviewed and accepted their propaganda.

11 Platoon, was never ambushed, never cut off or surrounded, neither was the company at any time during the battle. I would not withdraw until I believed it was necessary to do so. A number of circumstances influenced my decisions throughout the battle. 11 Platoon had too many casualties to move without assistance. I remained until I was sure that assistance was not coming and we could do nothing else. The enemy assaults from the East and South and VC fire support from the North caused overshoots to our rear restricting movement and withdrawal. Finally, most important to me in the decision making was the fact that artillery supporting fire was not effective. The requirement to destroy and neutralise the enemy being paramount before moving. We did move when the gunners blew the shit out of the VC only 50 metres away. 11 Platoon had no ammunition, shovel, machete and grenades close at hand ready for hand to hand fighting. With visibility 75 to 100 metres, darkness approaching and raining like it only can in the tropics the platoon made a clean break as one group and moved back. Terry Burstall stated that "By this time the trapped 11 platoon had left their position individually and the survivors had been able to get back to 12 platoon." Wrong again Terry! You know the correct events and again using Literary Licence you distort the truth. We have spoken about this, as have many other's who were there, yet, you still get it wrong. WHY?

I have put my story to paper, should I say 'keyboard and the magic box.' I hope to have it published in the coming year 1997. It is my story from when I re-enlisted July 1965, the joys of visiting 1RTB Kapooka, the gruelling training and departure to SVN June 1966, The uncertainty we faced and never spoke of. My memories, sorrows and joys as a platoon sergeant of brave Aussie Diggers', and the return home. My tribute to my Diggers, some seventy passed through 11 Platoon, thirty three being battle casualties, the highest of any platoon. Included are comments and opinions about Vietnam, some included here as an attachment to this letter. In my story I have tried to tell it my way, having been told I tell a great story but that I can not write for shit. Well, fella's, an Infantry Platoon Sergeant gives verbal orders, he has not the time to write them down. That is my excuse, as an Old Geriatric Fart and to protect all Rifle Platoon Sergeants, I am sticking by it.

David Sabben, Burstall's Platoon Commander, gave a presentation to interested veterans at the AWM on 1 November 1996. He spoke about Long Tan and what he believes was the VC's plans and intentions August 1966. David does not believe the VC ambush story, they did not use their own principles on ambushing. The very important matters of why they were there that Burstall failed to press the VC for answers. Terry not trained or familiar with VC tactics or operational methods did not understand, he only became familiar in what it was all about as he researched the books. It being too late by then, he had lost the Australian perspective!

Sabben's presentation will be available on video from the AWM soon. The Long Tan Presentation of the 17 August 1996 at the AWM should also be available. I recommend to those interested in the Battle of Long Tan get a copy of each. The Long Tan story was told by Sabben, Stanley [Kiwi Arty Officer], Grandin [one of the resupply chopper pilots] and myself. It is the only factual story given by four key members at the battle. Many veterans then spoke to us, most said "This is the first time they had heard exactly what happened at Long Tan."

For interesting history and information on Vietnam go to the site:click here a home page I believe constructed by Vietnamese and not the round eyed westerners.

A number of statements made and published on what we did in Phuoc Tuy Province from 1966 to 1972 need to be answered. The grumbling's about the moving of the locals from the villages of Long Phuoc and Long Tan. At the Battle of Long Tan and battlefield clearance, and other incidents and outcomes need clarification. Covered in greater detail in the book, I mention some of those activities previous stated or commented about. I was in country and served with many others who came after 1966, for twenty years I wore the uniform of An Australian Soldier. I'll always say "The Aussie Digger did it right." Myth's generated from poetic licence, and sensationalism, has stained all of us. There are writers of books and feature writers of newspapers with the code of conduct, "If sounds exciting or looks sensational, say it and print it!" Statements that many of us know to be Bullshit.

During Corps Training in 1959 an AMBUSH was a surprised attack by a stationary group on a group that was moving. This attack would engage the moving group from the left, right or both sides. It would be planned usually because the moving group was expected to use a particular route at an expected time. The other, a chance encounter when one group (a patrol usually of section of 10 or so) observes the enemy and can move into a position to set an ambush. An immediate ambush generally occurs in close country like jungle.

A well-planned ambush engages the moving group when the whole group is inside the ambush or when the majority of the moving group is in the killing ground. The rule is

Ambushes involving a platoon or more are planned, a detailed plan and meticulous preparation is required for an ambush to be successful. Factors to be considered include cut off parties, fire plans for heavy support weapons, communications, mines or booby traps to restrict escape and at times additional ambushes, sited to engage relief forces.. All of the ambushing force should have some form of protection from possible artillery or aircraft fire. The ambushing force would move out of these protected emplacements to clear the battle field or withdraw due to counter attack or some other unplanned situation.

None of the above principles for an ambush was ever evident at Long Tan.

After the contact, during the follow up the enemy fired on the left flank of 11 Platoon with a couple of light machine-guns. The enemy was to our left front about 75 to 100 metres away. Twenty minutes into the battle we had been attacked from the area of the LMG's and repulsing a company plus assault from the east. This was not an ambush but a chance encounter for both sides. Because of the enemy actions, I must come to the decision that, 11 Platoon and D. Company was NOT AMBUSHED.

The Viet Cong Commander's have said that they had planned an ambush and it was very successful. Good on them! It was the worst ambush ever conducted and if a Corporal produced such an ambush in the Australian Army, even if he was a clerk he would be busted to Private.

Some authors and producers of video have accepted the Viet Cong smoke screen on Long Tan. They too have said that we were ambushed. one author was at the battle. All I can say to that is that he was ambushed by the VC when interviewing them for their story.

The National Liberation Front will always follow the party line and we must consider it being Bullshit at its worst and suspect at its best. One must always look at the explanations from both sides and when one side gives information clouded by political or ideological interests then greater care is needed before making any statement. Being on the ground at the time and the rank I held gives me that advantage of knowing exactly what happened. Was I asked for my opinion by those authors and producers? NO! The academic and ideologue has a separate way of looking at the world than I do. What does an unqualified soldier know of such intricate and detailed matters?

KILLING OF WOUNDED VIET CONG.

Another veteran, Terry Burstall remembered mostly the devastation after the battle, when the Australians went back into recover their dead and wounded. At that stage, as many as 17 wounded enemy soldiers were executed. "There must have been 20 blokes alive there when we went through them in the morning. I'd say we killed about 17, murdered those poor bastards and then we started to clean up." he said.

What I have written in my book is how it really happened, Dr. Terry Burstall and The Age never explained the quoted statement of the 18th August 1986. It was the classic freedom of the press and literary licence at it's worst. There was some killing of wounded, trained as we were never to take a chance some VC never did surrender. With weapons close by they looked at the advancing Australians without having their hands in the air. Burstall quotes in his first book of the shooting of 2 Viet Cong that he was involved with, the other in A Company and the APCs. I killed a wounded out of pity for the poor bastard, being terribly wounded in the gut and nearly half his head blasted away. There were no others that I know of and I was in the area all the time.

To make the statement "That at least 17 were executed and murdered!" is a blatant lie. There was too much discipline in the Diggers to do that sort of thing. Commanders at all levels would not permit such an action. David Sabben has asked The Age and Burstall to qualify the printed words of the 18th August 1986. There has been no reply from either of them. They must have been hoping that what they printed would have forgotten by now, the public have forgotten, but those of us there have not. It has been a stain on all of those who served in Vietnam. I saw Burstall in 1996 and confronted him with the article in The Age, he did admitted to saying that what was printed. He claims it was said in general discussion and the author had no right to use it. He, Burstall, has never issued a statement explaining why he said it in the first place and the warriors of the company have never received an explanation. To me this is a classic example of a lie that became a myth.

D COMPANY WAS SURROUNDED AND ATTACKED ON ALL SIDES.

During the Long Tan battle the company was never surrounded or attacked on all sides. 11 Platoon was not surrounded, the small arms fire covered the area to our rear did restrict movement and the opportunities to withdraw. These overshoots can not be classified as effective fire but could cause casualties. We were attacked from two sides the east and the south with the enemy dug in around Nui Dat to our north. There was no enemy behind to prevent us making the break, we went back when the time and the situation best suited me and the pressure of the VC attacks eased allowing us to move.

In the final defensive position the company was attacked in an arc from north east through the east and around to the south, where Ten and Twelve Platoon covered our perimeter. CHQ and 11 Platoon on the south west, west and the north west never saw a Viet Cong in their area. Based on these facts, D. Company was not surrounded by any stretch of the imagination.

The statement, "D. Company was surrounded and the APCs with A. Company forced the Viet Cong to withdraw." Is only partly true. The relief force certainly forced D445Battalion to pull back and leave the battlefield. D445 was about 750 metres to the south of D. Company and cannot be considered to be in the battle that distance from their objective. Only the facts at that time and at that place must be considered when making findings and statements.

THE BATTLE of LONG TAN MADE NO DIFFERENCE IN PHUOC TUY.

The Nation Liberation Front, the Viet Cong, stated that the battle on the 18th August 1966 made no difference to their plans and the overall situation in the province. I disagree with what they said and I will try to explain why! I say that the battle was the turning point in the province, both in the military and politically planning for the Viet Cong!

Before the Australians established and occupied the Nui Dat base the Viet Cong would roam all over the province going where and when they wanted to. They could move in large groups of a company, 80 to 100 but generally in smaller section and platoon size groups of 10 to 30. A number of actions by 5RAR and 6RAR caught a few of the Viet Cong groups doing just that. These contacts with small groups were common before Long Tan but not after, within artillery range, about 7,000 metres from Nui Dat the Viet Cong became like 'Hens Teeth' impossible to find. Captured documentation by the 1ATF showed that the Viet Cong worried by our presence in the province and after Long Tan they could not do a thing about it.

We had a battle with the Main Force Viet Cong, the best they had in the province and they suffered up to 600 casualties if not more. Twenty five percent of the highly trained and battle hardened 275 Regiment of the 5th Viet Cong Division knocked about in the first encounter with the Australians'. Our enemy came to realise that the situation in the province was never to be the same, they have never admitted it. They of course won the battle, they have been boasting about for 30 years in the local history. We know the truth!

For the rest of our time in Phuoc Tuy Province the 5th Viet Cong Division never ever took on the Aussies in any planned action like Long Tan. They knocked us around (B. Company 6RAR) on Operation BRIBIE, February 1967. They again took heavy casualties during TET the Vietnamese New Year 1968 and assaulting Fire Support Bases. We never completely eliminated the Viet Cong from the province but he was not a force to be alarmed about.

This situation improved to such a degree that as time went on the TF could not find any Viet Cong to engage in the province. Except for small groups of D445 hiding, the Main Force Viet Cong, the 5th Viet Cong Division had moved to the neighbouring provinces and the mountain area called Nui May Tao. A long, long way away from the Australians, along the borders of the province and closer to the US Forces and ARVN Forces than to the Australian's.

Politically the Viet Cong gained nothing from Long Tan, no prisoners to parade around, no equipment captured, they had nothing to show for the propaganda that they spread around. I seem to remember that a lot of the locals appeared to be friendlier towards us after Long Tan. The battle had made a huge difference to the future operations and the security of the Australian's at Nui Dat. The Viet Cong never ever recovered completely from that three hour battle to the status they had prior to the 18th August 1966.

THE DISPLACEMENT OF THE LOCALS.

Those Vietnamese moved from the hamlets of Long Tan and Long Phuoc are VICTIMS of the war, it was nothing like Bosnia in the 1990s. DR. Burstall wrote of such matters and in such a manner so as to blame the Australians of not respecting their rights and possessions and forcing them to move. The Vietnamese Government moved them before Nui Dat was occupied, we cleared Long Phuoc and razed it during ENOGGERA.

Without understanding Counter Revolutionary Warfare (the Australian method used in Vietnam) he did not know that these actions were part of our method of combating the Viet Cong. He also appears to have a jaundice eye because those hamlets were accepted by the Viet Cong as home for D445. We could not allow such a force to have a home only 3,000 metres from our front door. They were not friendly neighbours! Maybe his solution would have been to have peace talks during happy hour on Friday or an agreement between them and us at a barbecue on Sunday. We will only shoot at each other only on the negotiated days and times.

Those people moved were resentful and showed hostility towards us. It was because 80 percent of those in Long Phuoc were hard core enemy and solid sympathisers. No matter where they lived they would never ask us in for a cup of tea or coffee unless it was to do us harm. They had the photograph of Ho Chi Minh in the house before some students in Australia had even heard of his name. 20 years after the war I have information that there is one Vietnam Returned Digger that does have a photograph as a shrine of Uncle Ho in his lounge. No doubt presented to him by Viet Cong friends during his frequent visits to Vietnam meeting old friends and doing research.

STOPPING THE LOCALS FROM RAISING CROPS AND FARMING.

Over the years, exposed in books sympathetic towards the Vietnamese and Viet Cong, writers have displayed a lack of any knowledge and understanding of the situation and the CRW concept.

For the Australians to be successful in CRW the control of the population is a must. Contact with the guerrilla minimised, ideally severed all together. To achieved this, the control of the food supply and other essentials of life is paramount. The aim is to starve the guerrilla of his resupply and support, then eliminate all of the areas of gardens and localities were food is grown including fish traps, etc. By following this concept the Australian's had the Viet Cong dispirited and his food supply had dwindled to starvation rations. Practically nothing was getting through to about 200 of them out in the bush, some VC were reported to be on starvation rations during 1969-70. That was CRW working at its best! After two years the enemy's effectiveness reduced to the 'local guerilla' wanting to surrender.

Those who have written negatively and accused the manner and methods used to achieved this result have never been corrected. Never challenged to explain why or how their findings are relevant to the situation confronting the Australian's in Phuoc Tuy Province. Literary licence is responsible for everything and authors get away with being untruthful. After 1969 and due to the non effectiveness of the Viet Cong, rice planting and growing food and fishing steadily increased. Without the need to supply the Viet Cong, products could be exported to other places in the country for the first time in many years.

When you read and study books written and published in 1986, 14 years after we left Vietnam a few explained the whole picture. Research of the information to give a balanced picture and comment was readily available to all, why then did Terry Burstall not give a balanced view in the first book? The question I keep asking is, "What was the purpose of such publications and articles, showing only the down side of war?" I can find only one answer! Those authors must have a Cyclopic Eye and a jaundice view of the world around them!

WE LOST THE WAR.

This statement has promoted more discussion than any other myth. Members of the Defence Forces know that The North Vietnamese and National Liberation Front did win in 1975 and the South surrendered, but The Aussie's won their war in Phouc Tuy. It cannot be said that WE LOST THE WAR.

This conflict like the Korean War was against communist's regimes, and was totally different to the First and Second World Wars. Those two world wars fought and won with the military victory was all that mattered. Vietnam and Korea there was the political conflict to win as well, that is what we lost.

The National Liberation Front to my knowledge never ever succeeded on the battlefield, he certainly held his own at times but suffered greater casualties than the Allied Forces. This was not always the case with the ARVN Forces who lost battalion size groups at times. The Viet Cong became very wary of the Aussie's and he would have prefer to take on the others before tackling us, my fellow warriors felt the same.

I hope that I have been able to show that the Aussie's in Phuoc Tuy with the CRW methods had all but neutralised the Viet Cong after 2 to 3 years. Had we continued the CRW instead of being pressured by the US Command, to operate out of the province, Phuoc Tuy could have been the only province 100 percent under Government Controlled by 1969-70. I ponder on the final outcome of Vietnam had the US Command a similar concept as the Aussie's for this type of warfare. A history lesson for those Planners, Politicians and Commanders and one I hope they will never forget.

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