At 0203 the reply to my request arrived in the ship. This confirmed
that there was no relaxation or alteration to the Standing Rules of
Engagement and established an Air defence Space 35 miles wide from
17Deg 10’ (N) south to 16Deg 45’ (N). It also
stated that CTU 77.1.0 had no knowledge of scheduled friendly aircraft
in my area, however to be alert for Airforce strikes and C.A.P.
activity.
This answer in fact did not alter the conditions under which the TU
normally operates under which the TU normally operated when in NVN
water, I interpreted the Air Defence Space as that is in which the
C.A.P., under BOSTON’s control, would operate.
At approximately 0309 a single aircraft was detected on SPS-52 radar,
tracking east from the vicinity of CAP LAY towards TIGER ISLAND The
aircraft did not appear to be showing IFF and was therefore given close
scritiny. This was not unique as during the middle watch several
aircraft had been detected, not showing IFF initially, which did
subsecuently. Also on occasions the C.A.P. aircraft were lost as they
overflew CAP LAY and it took some time to establish their identity as
they recrossed the coast. At this time there was a continuouse residual
ring of IFF responses from units at a radius of 14-15 miles from the
ship. The contact turned to the east of TIGER ISLAND and was indercated
AA (Anti aircraft) control as it was tracked approaching the ship. AA
control alerted lookouts and endevoured to visually identify the
contact using the night observation device.
.  |
At 0313 course 305,
speed 12 knots the ship was struck on the starboard
side admidships by an air launched missile. The missile impact point is
estimated to have been just aft of the forward personnel boat davit;
the expanding rod warhead penetrated 01 deck into the CPO Mess Pantry
and the adjacent passage way. |
 |
Penetrated the screen
into the SPS-52 radar room, and the Missile
Director Control Room and severly damaged the Secondary Conning
Position.
|
 |
The body of the missile
then passed through the outer skin of the after
funnel, damaged both uptakes |
 |
Penetrated the vertical
King posts of UNREP Station 5/6, |
 |
And penetrated the after
screen of the WDE rooms and the forward
funnel |
 |
R.J. BUTTERWORTH
(Photo from Peter MANOEL)
This flying metal killed Ordinary Seaman R.J. Butterworth, R66558 and
wounded ABQMG J.R. Parker, R63307 and ORDWM R.F. Davidson, R66565. |
The explosion was the first indercation that the ship was under attack.
Full ahead and maximum wheel was ordered, Action Stations sounded and
the Task Unit informed. Meanwhile the aircraft, estimated now to be at
450 knots was tracked to the North West until it merged with the coast.
An aircraft presummed to be the same one re-appeared on radar shortly
afterwards, still at high speed heading for the ship. Starboard wheel
was ordered and the ship was on a heading 040, 27 knots when attacked
the second time.
The damage caused by the first hit had rendered SPS-52, the Missile
system and one UHF aerial unserviceable. As fate would have it, SPG-53B
Auto Tracking capabilities had been reported suspect soon after 0300
when the system would not hold track on several small surface contacts
(fishing boats). At 0307 this system was placed on 15 minutes standby
to enable the fault to be rectified and despite all efforts, I was not
able to use this system to engage the aircraft.
All units in the area and the Carrier Groups in the TONKIN GULF were
informed that the ship was under attack. The ship was closing up, but
had not assumed full action stations at the time of the second attack
which proved fortuitous as more casualties would have been sustained
particularly in the after end of the ship. Again the aircraft was not
sighted visually on its approach.
 |
At 0316 more missiles
were fired at the ship from very fine on the starboard quarter from
close range with the aircraft very low over the water.
Two missiles struck the ship almost simultaneously, one penetrated the
transom just below the upper deck on the starboard side, passing
through the Gunner’s Store, demolishing that area continued
through the passageway on 2 deck level, penetrating the athwart ships
bulkhead to the Engineers Workshop and it is believed broke up there
without the warhead activating. A large piece penetrated the bulkhead
into the After Seaman’s Mess and 2 Deck was penetrated in
several places. |
 |
The second missile
exploded just aft of the after Personnel Boat davit
in the same general area as the missile in the first attack. The
expanding rod went through the Fan Space, Missile Director Equipment
Room, Director No2 and Tartar Check Room. Some of the warhead also
penetrated the deck into the forward end of the CPO Mess causing much
overhead damage, killing CEWR RH Hunt, R54257 and causing injuries to
several sailors closing up at their action stations. |
 |
The remainder of the
body of the missile penetrated the Fan Space at
the base of the after funnel and struck the deck head of the IKARA
Magazine. |
 |
Part of the missile
penetrated into that magazine and a portion struck
the base of the starboard kingpost of UNREP Station 5/6.
|
(All black and white photos from collection of R57286 LSWM B.I. Aherne)
The aircraft crossed
over the ship and made a tight turn climbing to
starboard and was seen for the first time, being described by two
reliable observers as a swept wing jet fighter.
The aircraft continued on its turn to starboard and appeared to be
turning for a third attack. At an approximate range of 8000 yards,
Mount 51, in local control, fired 5 rounds of VT and the aircraft
turned away to the east and south, fading on the SPS-
10 radar just south of TIGER Island. The Rules of Engagement cannot be
discussed in this document but it should be stated that HOBART would
not have been complying with those rules had she engaged the aircraft
before the first attack. |
 |
In the Operations Room the second hit resulted in a fault in gyro
supply to SPS-10 causing the radar picture on all displays to rotate in
a haphazard manner. Compilation of even a simple functional relative
picture was impossible and the ship was therefore unable to effectively
utilise the C.A.P. aircraft made available by USS BOSTON, to intercept
the attacking aircraft. In addition, this made 5” Gun target
designation virtually impracticable.
 |
Compilers note
John Trevor Polley R62303 wrote
LSRP with ASAC & AIC tickets (anti sub air controller - Air
intercept controller) I served with the first 5 captains on the Hobart,
Griffiths, Shands, Swan, Robinson, and Nicholson.
Ken Shands and Ian Nicholson passed away last year.
When she (Hobart) was hit she lost all electrical power to the Radar,
guns and missile system as well as most of her radio antenna. Systems
power was go at all times, at the time of the incident I was on watch
in the CIC (ops room) we were travelling south with two in company at
just over 20 knots. Tiger Is. was bearing about 200' at a range of just
over 20 miles. Both mounts were out of action as Mt 51 had been scoring
the reject shell cases and there was a danger of an in barrel explosion. |
One of the reasons that there was no bird on the rail at the time of
the attack was that under the rules of engagement we could not "lock
on" or even have a live missile on the rails until the "Boggie" proved
it hostile
After the first hit the only radar we had was the SPS10 surface radar
that aerial was just swanning around with the ships movement.
It was pure coincidence that the F4 was at low level and just happened
to be in the sweep area so that we could recognize part of the
coastline that enabled us to know that it was coming in for the second
run and we could let the bridge / Mt 51 know that it was coming back
for a third run. 52 fired 5 HE rounds as it turned for the third run
and the pilot saw the flashes.
Captain Shands resumes
| The ships continued in a
northeast direction while quick stock of
damage was taken. Efforts had been made to bring up the SPS-40 radar
from standby but the set did not provide an effective picture. At this
time it was confirmed that the ship had only SPS-10 radar and the
5” mounts in local control air/surface sensors and weapons.
It will be recalled that the 5” gun barrel/powder made firing
hazardous and that the guns therefore could only be used in an
emergency. |
 |
It was obviously necessary to retire from the general area to improve
chances of a warning should another attack develop. At about 0330 USS
EDSON reported being fired on by rockets from an aircraft, I ordered
the Task Unit to assume an AA formation, reversing course to the west
briefly to expedite USS CHANDLER joining.
By 0414 this was achieved with EDSON south and CHANDLER to the west,
both at 2500 yards on an easterly course at 25 knots.
At this time orders were received to join USS BOSTON and CTU 70.8.9
embarked in USS BLANDY (DD943)
At 0515 the Task Unit joined BOSTON and together with BLANDY formed a
circular AAW screen around the cruiser on a course of north at 15 knots
towards Yankee Station Forces. Initially in HOBART, repair and
isolation of damage continued and care was given to the wounded. As it
became light, the extensive damage to the superstructure became
apparent.
At 0619 the damage situation was sufficiently under control for the
ship to revert to Condition 3.
At 0705 a Helo from USS ENTERPRISE, which I had requested shortly after
the attack, arrived to MEDIVAC the two sailors killed in action, and
ABQMG Parker, ME J Holmes and ABFC Laity, who were considered to
require further treatment in the hospital at DA NANG.
The Ship’s Company commenced cleaning up the debris both
above and below decks. All parts of the missiles which could be located
were collected together for subsequent identification; at this time
items bearing the names of US manufacturers were discovered.
At 0740 COMDESQUAD 2, embarked in BLANDY instructed me to take charge
of the Task Unit and to resume normal operations. As this was clearly
impossible, I instructed EDSON to take charge of CHANDLER and proceed
to an UNREP, which had been scheduled for the TU at 0730. I then
informed CTU 77.1.0 in BOSTON and COMDESQUAD 2 of the state of the ship
and that I considered the ship should proceed to Subic Bay for repairs.
In due course, CTU 77.1.0 approved this proposal and directed EDSON to
assume duties of CTU 77.1.2.
HOBART detached from BOSTON and BLANDY at 1016 and shortly afterwards
rendezvoused with EDSON and CHANDLER which were replenishing from USS
NAVASOTA (AO-106) and USS VIRGO (AE-30).
At 1050 the ship closed EDSON for a highline transfer of CTU 77.1.2
turnover materials, together with as full a brief as possible in the
short time available. The transfer was completed at 1118 and on
detaching, HOBART set course for Subic Bay at 17 knots.
At 1400 the ship was stopped for 2 hours while temporary repairs were
affected on the hole in the stern.
Throughout the passage the Ship’s Company continued trying to
restore the ship and to collect pieces of missile. I had ordered a
thorough investigation of the incident and as more and more Officers
and Sailors were interviewed, and the sequence of events reconstructed,
it became very clear that there had been many cases of calm and
courageous actions, and a minimum of disorder. I was very proud of my
ship’s company.’
Tuesday
18th of June 1968
At 1600 on Tuesday the 18th June, HMS INTREPID (Captain J.A.R. Troup,
DSC RN), flying the flag of Flag Officer, Second in command Far East
Fleet, Rear Admiral E.B. Ashmore CB, DSC, RN with HMS CARPRICE
(Commander T.M. Beven, RN) in company, closed from the North. The two
ships were manoeuvred across HOBART’s bow and down the
Starboard side at a close distance from which the ships damage was
clearly visible, FO2FEF signalled his sympathy for those killed and
wounded before the two ships turned southward enroute to SINGAPORE.
At 1935the ship rendezvoused with the USS HENRY B WILSON (DDG -7) and
the USS COCHRANE (DDG-21). Arrangements had been made for Hobart to
transfer a Missile Director Amplidyne drive motor and coupling to
WILSON and,
At 1945 a highline transfer commenced at Station 1 and 2, as this was
the only replenishment station I considered safe to use. Wilson kindly
provided a large amount of electrical cable which would undoubtedly be
invaluable during the restoration of the ship especially as a fire in
SUBIC BAY had damaged the store containing cable. The transfer
completed at 2045.
During the passage and the days that followed I was moved by the number
of signals received from both RAN and USN ships and authorities
expressing sympathy for the wounded and for their families and the
families of the sailors killed. Such signals were sent by numerous USN
ships with whom the ship had come in contact only briefly and it
confirmed my belief that HOBART is considered very much a part of the
US 7th Fleet.
Wednesday
19th June 1968
 |
SUBIC Bay was entered at
0730 on Wednesday the 19th, and Hobart secured
alongside Rivera Point in the Naval Base at 0815.
At 0830 Rear Admiral MOORE boarded and walked around to inspect the
ship. Rear Admiral MOORE had been directed by COMSEVENTHFLT to inquire
into the incidents off CAP LAY on the nights of the 15/16th and 16/17th
June and had flown from his flagship the USS ST PAUL in JAPAN the
previous evening.
A large amount of documentary evidence and some photographs were given
to the Admiral’s Staff, and my officers and I discussed the
attack on HOBART. He was offered the missile pieces which had been
picked up onboard and, these he passed onto the Naval Magazine SUBIC
foe analysis. |
Rear Admiral MOORE addressed the Ships Company and expressed his
regrets at the incident before he departed for VIETNAM at 1150 to
continue his investigation. Representatives of the Ships Repair
Facility also boarded during the forenoon and examined the damage in
detail.
At 1400 I was represented by my Weapons Electrical Officer, Commander
F.O. ELIASON and the Engineering Officer Lieutenant Commander D.G.
HOLTHOUSE at a meeting with the SRF Planning Officers and Section Heads.
The SRF presented two interim estimates for the repair of the ship; a
‘patch’ of 12 days and a ‘Mint’
of 6 weeks. The former would have restored the watertight integrity of
the ship and one Missile System and the latter as the name implies a
complete restoration.
The advantages of the shorter estimate, particularly the moral benefits
of returning to the Line in the shortest possible time seemed at the
time to be the better solution.
Meanwhile Dockyard workmen commenced cutting away damaged areas
preparatory to renewal work.
At 1545 hours CINPACFLT,
Admiral J.J. HYLAND, USN. Accompanied by
COMNAVBASE SUBIC, Rear Admiral F.B. GILKESON, USN arrived onboard from
MANILA to inspect the damage. At this stage the Ships Company have been
informed that the missiles had been of US origin; probably SPARROW 3.
Admiral HYLAND in his address to the Ship’s Company informed
them that it had now begun to emerge that the missile had been fired by
a US aircraft and he was genuinely moved when expressing his sorrow for
the incident. The Admiral also stated that the US would ensure the ship
would be made as new.
|
 |
At 1630 the ship was turned by tugs and re-berthed starboard side to
the wharf to facilitate repairs.
Thursday
20th of June 1968
At 0800 on Thursday 20th, colours were half masted in all ships in
honour of CPO HUNT and ORD BUTTERWORTH. At 0930 lower deck was cleared
and a Memorial Service, conducted by Chaplain Mc MAHON and Chaplin
RILEY was held on Mount 52 Deck.
With more data at my disposal I called a meeting of my officers to
discuss the merits of the two repair estimates as the SRF required an
immediate indication of what would be required. The merits of having
the short and incomplete repair affected, the remainder to be followed
at some later stage by the requirement for a further 6 weeks in
dockyard hands was still attractive from the moral point of view.
However from every other aspect it was abundantly clear that the ship
should be fully operational at the earliest date and, therefore the
‘Mint Job’ was required now.
At 1115 accompanied by my Technical Departmental Heads I attended a
meeting with Captain D.H. Jackson USN, the Commanding Officer of the
SRF, and his staff. Captain Jackson was clearly relieved to hear my
decision and in anticipation of your concurrence, I authorized this
work to commence.
Work on the ship continued at an extraordinary rate. Two shifts each of
12 hours worked continuously with an enthusiasm the like of which I
have never seen in a dockyard. The ship shut down the steam plants and
reverted to shore power.
Friday
21st June 1968
At 1000 on Friday 21st accompanied by two of my Officers I visited the
Naval Magazine, SUBIC. All parts of the missile located onboard had
been transferred to the NAVMAG earlier in the week and after careful
scrutiny the experts there were able to identify them as portions of at
least two SPARROW 3 Missiles which had been supplied to the 7th Air
Force at UBON in THAILAND in May.
At 1645 the same day welcomed onboard the Commander in Chief, PACIFIC,
Admiral Ulysses Grant Sharp, USN accompanied by The Commander, US 7th
Fleet, Vice Admiral W.F. Bringle USN. Commander Task Force 77, Rear
Admiral R.W. Cousin, USN; and COMNAVBASE SUBIC Rear Admiral F.B.
Gilkeson, USN.
Admiral Sharp was in the area in conjunction with a civil function in
MANILA and I was very pleased that he could find time to visit HOBART
to view the damage. The admiral indicated that he had directed that the
inquiry into the CAP LAY incidents being conducted by Rear Admiral
Moore was to be upgraded to a Joint Service levels which he said would
provide a more meaningful conclusion. The party left the ship at 1725.
Saturday
22nd June 1968
At 0030, Saturday the 22nd, Captain M.P. Reed, RAN your Chief Staff
Officer (Technical), accompanied by Lieutenant Commander I.F. Holmes,
RAN, and Mr. J. Lee arrived onboard having travelled by air to MANILA
thence by car from MANILA that evening . During the next four days the
Officers studied the damage to the ship and conferred with
Ship’s Officers and authorities ashore. Captain Reed flew
onto DA NANG to become associated with the inquiry on the morning of
the 25th, at which time LCDR Holmes and Mr. Lee returned to MANILA for
passage to AUSTRALIA.
Sunday the
23rd June 1968
At 0800 on Saturday 23rd, by kind arrangement of VADM Bringle, a P3
Orion aircraft was made available to fly me, accompanied by the medical
Officer, Surgeon Lieutenant G.R. Erwin, RAN and three sailors to
VIETNAM; the sailors were particular friends of the three of
HOBART’s crew hospitalized there. On arrival in DA NANG we
proceeded to the Military Hospital and I was pleased that Able Seaman
Laity was sufficiently recovered to join us. The P3 was used again to
fly onto SAIGON, where a C1A was provided for the short hop to VUNG TAU.
At the Australian Military Hospital, Able Seaman Parker and ME Holmes
were visited and provided with mail, their pay, and news of the ship.
Accommodations had been arranged at VUNG TAU and
Monday the 24th June 1968
The following morning the party flew back to SAIGON where I called on
the Commander, Australian Forces Vietnam; Major General S.M. Macdonald
at the CHOLOON Head Quarters. After a thoroughly interesting and
worthwhile visit I returned to SUBIC arriving at 1400 on Monday 24th.
Thursday
27th June 1968
On Thursday the 27th the ship was listed 5 degrees to port and the
suspect Mark 18 Mod 3 barrels replaced with Mod 1 barrels by the staff
of USS PIEDMONT.
Saturday
29th June 1968
On Saturday the 29th I exchanged calls with the Captain of USS FALGOUT
(DER-
324) Lieutenant Commander J. Hamrick, USN who kindly offered to take
mail to BRISBANE the following Monday.
At 1130 hours. Major General R.F. WORLEY, USAF, the Vice Commander
United States 7th Air Force called onboard. The General delivered a
personal note from the Commander of the 7th Air Force General William.W
Momyer expressing sympathy and alluding to an ‘operational
error’ on the 17th. General Worley viewed the areas of the
ship where damage had occurred although by this time much of the damage
had been replaced or was in the process of repair. After lunching in
the Wardroom, General Worley departed at 1340.
Killed in action were two members of Hobart’s crew
R66558 Butterworth, R.J. Ordinary Seaman Quartermaster Gunner, 18 years
old, single of Risdon Vale, Hobart, TASMANIA.
And
R54257 Hunt, R.H. Chief Electrical Weapons Radar, 27 years old, of
GERALDTON, Western Australia.
Wounded were
R66565 Davidson, R.F. Ord Seaman weapons mechanic
R93110 Holmes, J. Engineering mechanic
R64209 Laity, K.R. Able Seaman fire control
R57684 Mieszkuc, W. Leading Seaman Clearance diver
R63307 Parker, J.R. Able Seaman QM gunner
R41784 Raymond, D.T.J. Petty Officer engineering mech
R65336 Scully, G.H. Engineering mechanic
Compilers note.
End of extract Hobart Friendly fire.
To read more on John's efforts and how he came to copile this dossier go click
here
The concept of the ‘Vietnam Service Dossier’ is
copyright. I have compiled the facts from the public domain, released
files from the Australian War Memorial, and highlighted the text with
original comments and photos from shipmates. Where ever possible all
submitted material is suitably credited and acknowledged.
