A Introduction to Sigs in Vietnam

..The concept of Task Force Signals was only developed in the Australian Army in the early 1960's. Before this, Divisional Signals was designed to support a division and really nothing smaller. 103 Signal Squadron was raised from 1 Signal Regiment manpower and equipment in December 1965 to be the first task force signal squadron for service in South Vietnam. 104 Signal Squadron was raised just before in November 1965 and had little to prepare for service in South Vietnam after 103 Signal Squadron's tour was. completed.

At this time, the Australian Army signals equipment was the old British design radio systems (C11/R21O and C42/C45) and the Army used British signal procedures. In fact, 103 Signal Squadron only received its new US radio equipment (AN/PRC-25, AN/PRC-47 and AN/GRC-106) about a month before departing for Soutb Vietnam in early May 1966.

The training program was hectic and it was becoming apparent that the role would be larger then the original concept for a task force signals unit. Time ran out and although it was scheduled for all unit members to attend jungle warfare training at Canungra, only the units dozen or so National Servicemen got the pleasure.

Already in South Vietnam at the time of the Task Force deployment was the Royal Australian Corps of Signals 709 and 527 Signal Troops, maintaining communications for the IRAR Group and the rear communications to Australia. At about, this time the two troops were absorbed into the newly arrived 145 Signal Squadron to expand the Force Signals role in South Vietnam, the subject of an article on its own. Force signals established at Vung Tau quickly in preparation for the arrival of 1 Australian Task Force (1ATF) and the supporting logistics units. The Task. Force occupied what was known as the Back Beach at Vung Tau. Although 103 Signal Squadron had its communication centre fully operational it was also tasked with deployment of some radio detachments. The squadron became acclimatised and familiar with their very new radios and the US Army signal procedures.

After about a month on Back Beach the Task Force moved up to Nui Dat in central Phuoc Thy Province in June 1966. Some of the squadron went in their unit vehicles but most deployed by Chinook -landing on what was soon to be known as Kangaroo Pad immediately in front of the squadron's lines. The Squadron and its successors were to guard and patrol this area for years to come.

Nui Dat was a small hill. A pimple on a large flat area, it offered excellent very high frequency (VHF) radio communications over the area of operations of the Task Force. Radios were set up on this feature and remotely controlled from the HQ via more than a kilometer of cable. The squadron immediately established the VHF voice command net, and the high frequency (HF) radio telegraph net, essentially as envisaged by the unit establishment. The linesmen became possibly the hardest worked men in the squadron (most likely the whole Task Force) and by June the switchboard "ebony"

Vehicle special delivery service (SDS) began with four runs a day as soon as 1ATF occupied Nui Dat. Each run took two Dispatch Riders (DR), because the area was not completely secure and one had to ride 'shotgun'. There was also a DR commitment to the aerial dispatch service (ADS). At the time the two DRs were stretched rather thin and the two bicycles did not fully cope with the requirement. In fact, even at this early stage it was apparent that the unit could not cope with its authorised manning and extra personnel were sourced.

The shelter telegraph terminal AN/MGC-17, did not prove to be' as useful as was hoped. Both telegraph machines and crypto machines had a high fault rate and the confined space did not allow for a technician to repair some equipment while an operator was using other equipment. Also the AN/MGC-17 did not have the capability or the facilities which quickly became necessary so the equipment was dismounted and set up in a tent.

The first two of the many non-standard radio facilities were needed immediately. One was to the US Army advisors at Baria. The other was to alert the casualty evacuation helicopters (Callsign 'Dust Off') at night when they were withdrawn to Vung Tau. In later years, 104 Signal Squadron would have up to ten non-standard radio systems deployed over the Province.

The US procedures and field codes were new to the squadron but were adopted for interoperability. Monthly Signal Operating Instructions (SOl) were issued to give the necessary information to operate the various signals facilities in lATF The US operations code and their numerical authentication code were also adopted. All radio operators and other users suddenly found they were not using voice procedure as in Signal Training All Arms Pamphlet 7 but instead used ACP 125.

Over the first few months in Nui Dat, IATF operations were aimed at gaining dominance of the TAOR (Tactical Area of Responsibility) so radio communications were mostly over ranges of only five or six kilometres, presenting no difficulties to 103 Signal Squadron. A requirement had arisen to retransmit using AN/PRC-25 radio and this worked well except for a high fault rate in the interconnecting cable, a problem that continued for a long time.

...,. The first major Task Force contact occurred near Long Tan on August 18, 1966. The base at Nui Dat received some 60 mortar rounds in the early hours of the morning and that day and the next, company size patrols of 6 RAR patrolled and searched for the enemy. D Company bumped a force thought to be on its way to attack the base camp. It consisted of a VC battalion, a North Vietnamese battalion and another VC battalion nearby but not in the firefight. The enemy dead totaled 245 whilst D Company 6 RAR suffered 18 dead and 25 wounded. Throughout the battle, comms on the Task Force, 6 RAR and artillery nets were good allowing the guns to give very close fire support and control reinforcements for Delta Coy -vital to the success of the battle

Unbeknown to many Australian veterans a Special Signal Unit (547 Signal Troop) at Nui Dat was tracking the enemy for 14 days to the Long Tan battle site but that's a story for another article.

Late in 1966 during a cordon and search operation at Hoa Long, between Nui Dat and Baria a few kilometres to the south, it was decided that IATF would deploy a tactical headquarters for the first time. 103 Signal Squadron had only to provide a radio detachment the short distance to Nui Dat and there where no difficulties. This was the start of a new phase of communications for the squadron, a phase that had been concerning Signals Officers because the squadron was almost fully committed in the base and there was little fat to provide for a main Task Force Headquarters away from Nui Dat

104 Signal Squadron replaced 103 Signal Squadron as the Task Force signal unit in May 1967 and 110 Signal Squadron replaced 145 Signal Squadron as Force Signals about the same time. Communications suffered as almost all ranks were replaced at the one time leaving the new inexperienced crew no time to come to grips with some complex communications problems and interface with other units (including ARVN and the US Military).

Fortunately operations imposed no special strains on 104 Signal Squadron at the time. But a lesson was learned and it was the last occasion that the Signal Squadron was relieved as a unit.

104 and 110 Signal Squadron also became interwoven as the Task Force moved away from Nui Dat to engage the enemy. Soon many 110 Signal Squadron signalers felt more at home with the Task Force signals instead of their own force signals unit.

CORAL 1968  Operations by l ATF increased in size and in distance from Nui Dat during 1967. Then during the period 24 January - 2 March 1968, Op Coburg was conducted in Bien Boa Province some 50 kms from Nui Dat.
Coburg was the most extensive operation independently undertaken by lATF since its arrival in Vietnam and it involved the main headquarters of lATF being away from its base longer than on any previous occasion.
The lessons learned by 104 Signal Squadron from this operation were put to good use in Operation Toan Thang in April- June 1968 which was bigger and further away from Nui Dat (80 kilometres) than Coburg.
Initially 1.ATF operated with two battalions about 15 kilometres east of Long Binh on Highway One in Long Khan Province and one battalion in the Nui Dat area in Phuoc Thy Province.
HQ lATF (Main) was established at the US Army base Bearcat while the battalions worked the Provinces.

On May 12, 1968 major elements of lATF were airlifted into an area north of Saigon eventually to be known as Fire Support Patrol Base (FSPB) Coral. The movement was to intercept 7 NVA Division which was heading to Saigon and cut off its withdrawal.

The advance party of HQ IATF included the OC of 104 Signal Squadron and: five other ranks tasked with establishing signals in the headquarters area. The 104 party was dropped 1500 metres from the proposed headquarters location and had to manpack its equipment which was to provide a substation on the Task Force command net. The haul was tough work as the equipment included an RT-524 radio (the receiver/transmitter of the vehicular home AN/VRC-12 series VHF equipment), 150 amp hour batteries, 300 watt charger, RC-292 antenna, AN/GRA-39 remote control unit and an AN/PRC-25 radio.

The hard work was soon to prove very worthwhile.

Early on the morning of 13 May 1968 the base came under attack from enemy mortar, rocket and small arms fire as the NVA made its opening assault on the Fire Support Base.
The NVA fire caused casualties to both men and equipment (including the RC-292 antenna). Temporary repairs enabled the radio station to remain operational and it was the means by which Spooky (DC3 aircraft equipped with illumination and six miniguns) and helicopter gunships (Light Fire Teams) were called in to support the units under attack.
During the battle, FSPB Coral was partly over-run by the enemy infantry and sappers assaulting the base. One Signalman was WIA during the fighting.

The main body of 1ATF arrived later on that day (13 May) bringing the strength of the signals group to 51 including detachments from 547 Signal Troop, 110 Signal Squadron plus an detachment from the US Army 53 Signal) Battalion. There were also men from 104 Signal Squadron radio detachments operating with the Task Force main units including the two battalions.
Now at full strength, the signalers began building their radio facilities and digging in a bulldozer was called in to dig two metre deep holes for the signal centre and VHF radio bunker provide maximum protection from the enemy's indirect fire. The next day a heavy storm flooded the radio bunker swamping most of the radio equipment. After draining out the water, the Sigs were surprised that all of the gear still worked satisfactorily. The signal centre was also flooded but not so badly.
The flooding was just a prelude to the storm that would soon break over the Coral Sigs. At 0240 hours on 16 May 1968 an NVA regimental attack was launched against the Fire Support Base.
May 1968 an NVA regimental attack was launched against the fire support base
The attack started with 50 minutes of mortar and rocket barrage which fell within the FSPB included the signals area and was followed up by determined infantry and engineer assaults.
During the battle the enemy came within 50 metres of the signals perimeter which was directly protecting the Task Force Command Post the signalers prepared to resist the attack with their weapons as well as directing fire on their radios - not something HQ troops do every day. The enemy finally broke contact at 0645 hours after four hours of intense combat. The Sigs paid a price, Signalman Young was Killed In Action (KIA) and two other Signalmen were wounded.
During the attack the 110 Signal Squadron Radio Relay Detachment truck was in a dug out and took a lot of fire. Remarkably, shrapnel passed through the shelter door and back wall smashing both the windscreen and rear cabin window of the truck but somehow the multi-channel radio telephone systems and other comms gear were untouched. This multichannel radio telephone system in particular was vital to the survival of 1ATF at FSPB Coral.

AFTER CORAL
 After Coral, the Signalers came in for a lot of criticism, much of it uninformed and pretty malicious -particularly concerning the preparation of the perimeter during the first attack. What many critics do not take into account is the nature of signalers role.

The signalers of 104 Signal Squadron (547 Signal Troop, no Signal Squadron US Army detachments) personnel were caught without hardened fighting pits during the battle because they were tasked with installing communications for the deployed TF HQ and did not have time to prepare sleeping bays with overhead protection.

While the infantry and other units were digging in, the Sigs had to sandbag their gear including the line and power runs a well as doing all .their assigned signals roles. They hardly got a break during the period let alone time to prepare their own fighting positions. Communications are vital and without comms, the base would most likely have been overrun. Task Force SOPs changed because of Coral. In all future Ops, 104

Signal Squadron deployed with its equipment in Armored Command Vehicles and was fully functional on arrival and did not need to dig the gear in. The unit also deployed its own defense personnel to ensure its security and placed a lot more emphasis on digging in. The real lesson for Signals from Coral was to have your equipment mounted in amoured vehicles to improve readiness. After South Vietnam, 104 Signal Squadron retained ACVs for this .reason.

.A C0NTACT OF THEIR OWN
 As well as their communications duties, the Task Force Signal Squadron also had to pull their weight in providing general security to the IATF base perimeter at Nui Dat which began in late 1968.

104 Signal Squadron began providing complete sections for one and two day patrols outside the 1ATF base perimeter on a rotational basis. In June 1970, on the second afternoon of a patrol under the command of the Squadron Sergeant Major (SSM), a Sig patrol observed some VC about four kilometres east of Nui Dat.

The Sigs engaged the VC with small arms fire and called in artillery support. After blasting the VC group with artillery, a helicopter Light Fire Team began supporting the patrol and estimated that there were about 20 in the enemy party.

At one point during the contact, the 104 Signal Squadron patrol was engaged from three sides with small arms fire by the VC. The Sigs kept their heads and conducted a break contact in stages through several defensive positions while artillery fire was brought down on the enemy force. APC mounted infantry was dispatched to flush out the enemy force and assist the Signalers.

The patrol commander wrote somewhat proudly of the members of this patrol in his report, "by strict adherence to orders, sound control of fire and expeditious use of fire and movement" the patrol was able to extract itself from a situation where the "odds" were by no means in their favour. Also the patrol's VHF radio set enabled a swift response by Task Force fire support and QRF assets.

About 120 soldiers served in 103 Signal Squadron during its war tour followed by over 800 soldiers who served in 104 Signal Squadron during its five years on war service in South Vietnam. 104 Signal Squadron lost three members on active service during the period. At the 1ATF base at Nui Dat, the lATF Communications Centre (COMCEN), manned by Task Force Signals, played the key role in keeping Australian and Allied units in contact with each other.

More than 1,000 telephone and telegraph circuits fed into the COMCEN, including 70 microwave channels from bases outside Nui Dat. COMCEN was staffed by only 50 men, working two shifts to keep communications operating 24 hours a day, seven days a week. In the telegraph area, the soldiers handled over 700 messages on some days. Next door, the 200-line switchboard averaged 4,300 connections each day. In peak hours, two switchboard operators handled three calls every 10 seconds. Messages received in the COMCEN were registered, and prepared for dispatch by clerks. Depending on the priority of the message it was either delivered by special delivery or the more usual DR Regularly during the day, the SDS would visit the major units of the Task Force delivering and picking up messages, packets and other correspondence. The route covered about six miles and took the signalman DR one hour to complete the task. The COMCEN also controlled an ADS, which used helicopters and fixed wing aircraft to deliver correspondence to outlying units and bases.

Working behind the scenes in adverse conditions, maintaining and repairing the telephone lines plus electronic communication equipment, was a team of linesmen and technicians. In addition, clerks, drivers, cooks, storemen and other soldiers played a vital role keeping the Task Force signals unit fully operational.

The COMCEN was not the only means of communication between units, 103 and 104 Signal Squadrons had a Radio Troop as well. These men controlled manned radio (voice, telegraph and Morse code) links into and out of the Task Force and were found in all the major units of the l ATF and with the Liaison Officers (LO) attached to Allied units.

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