The advisor saw the tanks coming in a
staggered column. ... "They're shooting at us," he yelled in panic
before he caught himself. The tanks were not shooting. ... The tankers
had orders to disregard the district headquarters. They drove past the
compound without firing a shot.
Easter Offensive, South Vietnam, 1972, Neil Sheehan
Introduction
The RAAC (Royal Australian Armoured Corps) is in decline and appears to have few friends among defence policy makers. The Federal Coalition Defence Policy (A Strong Australia, Rebuilding Australia's Defence, Oct 1992) proposed mothballing most of Australia's Leopard AS1 MBT and M-113A1 APC/LRV fleet as a cost saving measure. The Leopards are not to be replaced and M-113 expected to remain in service indefinitely. The rational offered for this decision was to agree with earlier government propositions in this regard, eg Dibb's Report, 87 White Paper, 1991 Force Structure Review, etc. This was essentially that the ADF (Australian Defence Force) is very unlikely to encounter enemy armour, its own armour could not readily deploy to probable areas of operations, and there are higher equipment priorities.
Decline of the RAAC
The present
Government is spreading the
acquisition of the modest number of LAV-25s over a longer time frame
than originally envisaged. RAAC (Royal Australian Armoured Corps)
training and skills, and troop strengths have consistently been down
graded in recent years. This situation is likely to see the RAAC fade
away with obsolescence by the turn of the century.
Obsolescent Equipment
Perhaps this process of disbanding the RAAC should be hastened. There is a minimum size beyond which a military capability is no longer viable. A half regiment of tanks and few APC/Calvary units are clearly beyond that point. The Leopard tanks are of 1960s vintage. They lack modern fire control and sensors, and new technology armour, eg, reactive armour, Chobham, etc. The APCs with their obsolete 30 Cal MG are grossly inadequate. The M-113s are some of the oldest pieces of major equipment in the entire ADF. Both the Leopards and M-113s lack fire suppression features and compartmentalisation of more modern vehicles. The M-113s have inadequate suspension and power plant, so that it has difficulty keeping up with the Leopards, which are not particularly fast tanks. During the Australian ODF (Operational Deployment force) deployment to Somalia in early 1993, it was "found that the M-113s didn't have the necessary road speed for rapid reaction tasks and convey escort over long distances" (Kuring, 1993).
Insignificant Size of force
The ADF can only field one or two troops of tanks and a squadron's worth of light armoured vehicles. It would be difficult to sustain such for anything but a short time because the lack of trained crews, maintenance facilities, logistic support and war reserve stocks. The small numbers of armoured vehicles that could be deployed might not be decisive against even light infantry. Without significant numbers and adequate support, they risk the fate of France's Group Mobile 100 in Indo-china in 1953. This was a column, including armour that was decimated by the Viet Ming (Fall, 1972). Another example of inappropriate use of armour is the Soviet Army attack at Pughman, Afghanistan in 1981. Lack of infantry support allowed the Mujahedin to 'roam the battlefield and force the armour to withdraw' (Matheny, ARMOR, Sept-Oct 1988, quoting Lynden). The proliferation of anti-armour and precision guided weapons complicates the deployment of armour.
Inadequate Support
There is a lack of strategic mobility for the Army. The 1st Armoured Regiment might do well at defending its base in Puckapunyal, Victoria, but could not be deployed in a timely manner elsewhere else in Australia, let alone overseas. Armoured units generally require four to five times the tonnage of supplies compared with non-armoured units. The ADF's logistics base is inadequate as it is, and it would be difficult to support armoured operations. Finally, at $1000 per hour, tank training is the more expensive than most other military activities.
Disbandment of the RAAC?
It would cost hundreds of millions of dollars to bring the armoured
force up to a minimum standard. However, this would extend the
effective life of the track vehicle fleet by only a few years and not
make the units any-more deployable. Replacement costs would be
prohibitive under the current budget structure. The ADF faces other
major equipment deficiencies, eg, replacement of the tactical air
transport and scout helicopter fleet. If the tanks are not to be
replaced, and not considered appropriate to current defence needs, why
maintain the capability at all? If the skills are not required in the
longer term why not save the save the recurrent costs now? The New
Zealand Army is disbanding its tiny armoured force. Perhaps Australia
should follow suite?
The Case for Armour
A conclusion that an armoured component is inappropriate for Australia's defence needs might be short sighted. Assessments about the track vehicle's utility for Australia's defence needs have often been base on narrow operational requirement for northern Australia. There are a range of other credible contingencies.
Constabulary Actions
Constabulary actions, as typified by peace keeping deployments, require reliable light armoured vehicles. The ODF took thirty-six of the venerable M-113s to Somalia. During the Namibian peace keeping operation Australian engineers utilised wheeled armoured personal carriers leased from the South African Defence Force. These vehicles. The vehicles were fitted with thermal heat imagery devices and were valued for their mine protection capability. Patrolling requires a little more protection than that offered by a Land Rover and Oz-Cam shirt. The Malaysian Army had to urgently acquire a number of Korean K200 APCs for use by its troops on peace keeping duties in the former Yugoslavia.
Low Intensity Warfare
Tanks are proven to be decisive and casualty saving weapons in low
intensity warfare. They can help ground forces secure and hold ground.
US Army exercises in urban combat have concluded that a rifle platoon
reinforced by two M1A1 tanks attacking a 5-10 strong enemy force
normally suffered 0-2 casualties compared with 10-25 when infantry and
tanks failed to co-operate (Betson, Armor July-August 1992). Even a few
armoured vehicles can give an advantage over those without. During the
US operation in in 1982, a solitary BTR-60 APC helped a Grenadan militia
platoon chase off a US Navy SEAL Team (Adkin, 1988).
It is notable that the Pakistani troops in Somalia who initially suffered greater casualties than other national contingent, had few armoured vehicles. They reportedly patrolled in 'pick up trucks'. After the notorious ambush on June 5th, which left 23 Pakistani troops dead the Pakistanis mostly retire to sandbagged compounds. Hardly the posture required of peace keepers. It was also reported 'that the UN command failed to have armoured troops ready to help the (US Army) Rangers' when they suffered nearly one hundred casualties, including 18 dead, on 3 October (US mission becomes a fiery debacle, The Age, 7 Oct, 1993).
Discriminating Fire
Armoured Fighting Vehicles can provide direct and discriminating fire. Witness the woeful efforts of Cobra Gunships over Mogadishu, or deaths and injury of civilians because of artillery and mortar fire in Croatia and Bosnia & Hercegovina, or the Israeli bombardment of southern Lebanon in mid-1993. It is claimed that Apache AH-64 gunship can target a particular window of a specific floor of a building. However, it is troops on the ground that are able to identify the enemy, and know where civilians are located. Only infantry supported by armour that can close and fix an enemy. They can accurately call for fire support, and if need be, clear an objective.
Swift conquest by combines arms usually results in fewer casualties; not
only for opposing combatants, but civilians as well when compared with
drawn out attrition battle. Reliance on artillery and air-strikes would
be more likely to breach the protocols to the Geneva Convention by which
Australia has obliged itself to avoid destruction to civilian
infrastructure.
Mechanised Engagements
There is always a chance in peace keeping operations for situations to
deteriorate, as in any military adventure. Consider the experience of
the Multinational force in Beirut in 1984. The presence of heavy units
can deter aggression, and at least help in any disengagement. Finally,
tanks and APCs are crucial for mechanised engagements. It conceivable
that a collective security task could involve such a confrontation, and
such could occur unexpectantly. Tanks of the North Vietnamese Army
surprised and routed ARVN (South Vietnamese) troops in the 1972 Easter
Offensive.
Armoured vehicles and their logistics support might be expensive, but no more so that comparable military technology or firepower. An F-111 cost over $16 000 per an hour of flying, and anti-tank missiles are many tens of thousands of dollars per round. The size of the gun on the half-billion dollar FFGs is only a 76mm. Training and equipping of a professional infanteer can be up to a hundred thousand dollars. The above items are cost effective for the missions they are required to perform, as are tanks.
In some reckonings a single tank can be equated to the firepower of a company of infantry. In the US Army only 4% of its personnel are in Armor/Cavalry, but they provide over 40% of the ground combat power. Although a tank without infantry support can be disabled by an inexpensive mine or a stout soldier with a grenade-launcher. Simple cost comparisons of equipment are quite meaningless. Consideration of what it cost to do various missions by different means is the appropriate comparison. An armoured component in most forces is generally found to be cost efficient.
Deplorability
The arguments that tanks are not appropriate to Australian conditions
are similar to the difficult General Messervy successfully overturned
this policy by proving that tanks could be transported to the front
without damaging the roads and bridges. He also drew on the Australian
experience in Papua with the inadequate M3 Stuarts Light Tanks. He went
on to defeat a superior Japanese Force at Meiktila in what the Japanese
Commander General Kimura called 'The Master Stroke' (Maule, 1961).
Present at the battle were two regiments of M-4 Sherman Medium Tanks
that had participated in a deep operation that unhinged the Japanese
defence. Australia also successfully deployed heavy Matilda Tanks in
rugged islands on the South West Pacific theatre.
During the US intervention in Vietnam the US Army was initially reluctant to send tanks to Vietnam because they believed that the terrain was unsuitable. It eventuated that even in the monsoon season the tanks could be used in at least half the country. In the latter years of the US intervention half of the US Army's combat units were armoured or mechanised. Australian Centurion tanks proved their worth in Vietnam. Gary McKay's book, In Good Company (1987) vividly illustrates the value of tanks in assaults on Viet Cong bunker systems (successfully with tanks on page 114-120, and resulting in significant casualties without tanks on page 160-164). Over the years the RAAC has shown that there are few areas within Australia that tanks and other armoured vehicles cannot be successfully deployed. Fast sea transport can move a significant armoured force to any Australian port within a week.
Timelines for Replacement
Tanks and Light Armoured Vehicles are a crucial part of a balanced defence force. A decision must be made about the deteriorating track vehicle fleet. Plans need to be made to replace the vehicles before the reach the end of their economic life, which is far less than the fifteen to twenty years envisage for the Leopards. The M-113s are already beyond it. The Federal Coalition in A Strong Australia argued that the M-113 replacement should be considered in a review on Army transport needs. This proposition ignores that armoured vehicles are for combat, not merely manoeuvre. The current Bush Ranger Project to equip some units with their own high mobility vehicles might enhance mobility, but not fighting strength. A commitment needs to be made for armoured personal carrier replacement as soon as possible. There also needs to provision for adequate logistical support and operational transport (eg, shipping, tank transporters, fuel trucks, etc).
Options for
Retrograding the M-113s would no longer cost effective, particular as it
should possible to acquire later models, with better suspension and
power plants, which are surplus to the 'cold war'. The LAV-25s can
substitute for tracked APC in many roles, particularly in constabulary
actions. Although, the planned acquisition of a hundred vehicles is
inadequate. This number should be doubled to re-equip most of the
regular cavalry formation and a couple of the Army Reserve
reconnaissance units, and provide a modest war reserve stock.
Regarding the tanks, there were rumours that about a hundred ex-Bundeswehr Leopard-A5s were sitting in Turkey (left there after the Gulf War) that could be 'had for song'. These tanks could have allowed the up-grade of the tank fleet sensor and sighting systems, and an increased reserve stock, but would not have been a long term solution. Within ten years a squadron's worth of modern MBTs at least would be needed to maintain something beyond a cadre tank force.
Alternatively, the US Armoured Gun System (AGS) will be available from 1997. This would avoid the weight and logistic liability of an MBT. Although, the AGS could not substitutes for tanks, and in many regards are little better than the current Leopards. The AGS would provide a reliable direct-fire/anti-tank vehicle within the Army's order of battle.
Conclusions
Many of the comment regarding armour can apply equally to the other arms
and services, eg, artillery, infantry, engineers, aviation, etc. Most of
the arms and services lack the equipment, skills and experience to
effectively contribute to combined arms operations. Rectifying the RAAC
in isolation will not help the situation. To quote US General Chaffee
the requirement is for 'A balanced team of combat arms and services
of equal importance and prestige'.
The absence of armour suggests to any enemy that there is a threshold of
warfare intensity that Australia is not willing or able to cross.
Without a viable and effective combined arms force Australia will have
to step back from international obligations and regional defence
commitments. Alternatively, there is the risk of substantial
casualties. Air and maritime forces can make substantive contribution,
but they have limitations in many contingencies. The effectiveness of
air and maritime forces can also be enhanced by the availability of
troops on the ground finding and spotting targets, clearing and securing
objectives, protecting forward facilities, etc. Without effective armour,
Australia's involvement may be limited to support and garrison duties.
This may not be considered an adequate sharing of the burden by
Australia's international partners, and it may tempt those who are not
so friendly.
References
Mjr Mark Adkin, Urgent Fury: The Battle for Grenada, Lexton Books, Massitutes, USA, 1988.
MG R.N. L. Hopkins, Australian Armour, AGPS, Canberra, 1978.
Bernard Fall, Street Without Joy, Schocken Books, NY, 1972.
WO2 Ian Kuring, Somalia -1993, Sabretache, The Journal and
Proceedings of The Military Historical Society of Australia, Garran,
ACT, Oct/Nov. 1993.
Federal Liberal/National Coalition Defence Policy, A Strong
Australia, Rebuilding Australia's Defence, Oct 1992
Henry Maule, Spearhead General, Transworld Publishers, London,
1961
Gary McKay, In Good Company, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1987.
Neil Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie - John Paul Vann and America in
Vietnam, Random House, NY, 1990
Armor, The Professional Development Bulletin of the (US Army) Armor Branch, Fort Knox, various editions.
Originally Published in Defender, Journal of the Australia Defence Association, Autumn 1994