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Typical Australian army reserves units comprise
of personnel who on average have a little over two years part-time service
(which is actually an improvement over recent years). Most reserve officers are
graduates from university regiments or former full time NCOs. Graduates of the
Australian Defence Force Academy are rare within army reserves. However, a
reasonable proportion of commanders and NCOs have undertaken extended full time
service. Of late, a significant number have served in Bougainenville or East
Timor.
Compare this with one US National Guard tank
unit, as described in What to Make a National Guard tanker? by 1st
Lieutenant J. Sosidy (Armor, July-August 2000). A majority of senior officers
had prior active service experience, four were West Point graduates, and 90% of
one company were former active service personnel. Most of this unit’s members
were veterans of the Gulf War.
While this unit might be exceptional, the US
armed forces are some 1.4 million strong (even with the drawdown of 30% over the
past decade). This means that there is one uniformed person for every 225
citizens. This compares with Australia’s defence force of 50,000 or 1:400.
Thus, there is a greater proportion of former full time personnel in the US from
which to draw reservist.
As another comparison, the US armed forces have
the equivalent of one combat aircraft for every 37,000 citizens, compared with
1:110,000 for Australia. This means that the US trains at least 2 ½ times as
many aircrew out of the equivalent size population as does Australia. The number
is actually greater because the US has a higher proportion of large aircraft.
Consequently, they have a greater number of trained aircrew from which to draw
for reserve units. It should not be surprising that the US is able to delegate
air defence of continental USA to reservists. Following the recent terrorist
attacks in Washington and New York, most of the pilots assigned to patrol over
American cities were from the Air National Guard and naval aviator reservists.
Over recent years the Australian Defence Force
has considered a number of ways to strengthen its reserves. This included the
Ready Reserves, which sought to engage personnel for 12 months full-time
training and then part-time training for five years. This scheme was partially
successful in obtaining good quality recruits, but retention was as abysmal as
with the general reserves. This is not surprising as it placed a template of a
national service scheme onto a voluntary enlistment ethos. More recently, army
reserve recruits have been required to undertake six weeks initial full-time
training that is similar to those enlisting for full-time services. This is
similar to the system used in the US and NZ. However, the number of recruits
fell by half, presumably because fewer were inclined to take six weeks out of
regular employment and other commitments. Equally, a significant number of
reservists volunteered for 12~18 months full-time service so as supplement units
deployed to East Timor.
What can be learnt from this experience?
Firstly, reductions in full-time numbers have an impact on the quality of
reserves. For example, the conversion of air field defence unit, infantry and
other operational units to reserve status may have reduced the readiness of
reserves overall. Reserves should be a supplement, not a replacement.
High separation rate from full-time service
should be of less concern. An individual leaving after 5~6 years will retain
considerable potential as a reservist, whereas someone with 10~20 years service
offers minimal potential due to declining fitness, rigidity of learning and
other factors.
Moreover, the proportion of officer to other
ranks is 24% and growing (compared with 6% for the USMC). The proportion of NCO
and civil administrators is similarly bloated. The ADF should welcome a higher
separation rate of middle level officers. Perhaps education grants could be
offered to full time personnel willing to enlist in reserve units. At present
such support tend to be offered to those remaining in full time services as a
retention bonus. Civil job placement services could also be offered to those who
convert to reserve units.
Utilisation of former full-time personnel needs
to be more flexible. The Ready Reserve scheme concentrated personal during their
initial 12 months full-time service within a few selected units. This may have
contributed to its low retention. A significant number of former United States
Marines serve within the US National Guard. This is because the army offers a
wider range of reserve units that can fit in with civil career and lifestyle
changes.
Reservists are obviously willing to commit
themselves to extended full time service, but not necessarily during initial
training. These opportunities should enhance individuals’ competency and
thereby contribute to the readiness of reserve units.
Training must be focused in the time available.
For example, army cooks receive short initial training before being assigned to
operational units, and then over time they are given opportunities to attain
civil recognised competency. Infantry training has always emphasised developing
cumulative expertise, from basis weapons handling and field craft, to
mountaineering, unarmed combat, urban combat, advanced first aid, explosives
handlings, and cycle upon cycle of more intense training.
Equally, the technical competence required in
some fields is intense. Information technology, avionics and medical specialists
require considerable investment in time and money for training. There have been
suggestions of more flexibility so that such specialists can undertake full and
part time service throughout their career. For example, pilots seeking a higher
paying civil career might be willing to commit themselves to maintaining their
competencies in flying combat aircraft. Medical specialist may be willing to
return to periods of full time service to take up advanced educational or
management opportunities.
Finally, more creative use should be made of
the human resources reservists represent. For example, Australia brigades groups
only have 3,000 personnel and 2~3 manoeuvre units, compared with NATO formations
which have 6,500 and 4~5 units. Australian brigades should be able to suffice
with much smaller headquarters staffs that are supplemented with reservists
during major exercises.
Originally
Published in Defender, Journal of the Australia Defence Association,
Summer 2001
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