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It is assumed that Australian's would resist
any foreign invasion. Our rouseabout contempt of authority, independent fervour and heroic ANZAC image would suggest nothing less. However this might be
assuming too much and acquiescence to an aggressor might not be
such a fanciful notion. History offers numerous examples where nations failed to
resist invaders.
What was to be known as Sydney Cove was the
home to the Eora people when the First Fleet arrived. They had two notable
leaders, Bennelong and Pemulwry. Bennelong was said to be friendly and
co-operative. Pemalwry was more suspicious. When the newcomers depleted local
fisheries and game, he commenced a decade long 'guerilla war'. He was finally
captured and beheaded, after having been betrayed by Bennelong. By which time
introduced diseases and depravation had reduce the Eora people by half.
Bennnelong's fate was no less tragic. He died of alcoholism, alienated from his
own people. Although it is Bennelong who is celebrated in contemporary time; a
prominent Federal electorate is named after him.
During the German occupation of the Channel
islands, local officials outlawed anti-German graffiti and the constabulary
detained the few Jews living on the Island; although they could not have imagine
their terrible fate. Local community leaders were knighted after the war because
of their prudent conduct. This is not an isolated case. Most European countries
capitulated to the Germans after limited resistance. For every Stalingrad and
Warsaw there were many other 'open cities'. By the middle of WWII the vaunted
French resistance was thought to number less than five thousand; most of whom
were communist. RAAF ground crews abandoned their posts after the initial
bombing of Darwin. There were heroic stands to be sure; such as the 39th Militia Battalion's stand on the Kokoda Trail. It just that such heroics are not
necessary the norm.
In hind sight, the Japan's defeat in the
Pacific War appears inevitable. However, in the initial stage's of the war the
IJN both out numbered and out classed the United States' Pacific fleet. Many of
the earlier encountered were close run things. It was only because of chance and
failure of the Japanese to follow up attacks which prevented them from crippling
the American fleet. They may have occupied the islands of the South Pacific, so
isolating Australia from America. The Allies' Germany First strategy placed
Australia's defence low down on priorities. Australia was to be recovered as the
Japanese were swept back later. Further, isolationist were not insignificant in
America. The loss of the American Pacific fleet may have compelled the US
withdrawal from the war. In any regard the Americans could not have commenced
offensive operations for at least two years. With the prospect of futile defence
and little hope of relief, would Australia's political leaders have resisted to
the last man and shilling. Particularly if the Japanese had offered some
accommodation, ie, Australia being permitted to trade in return for disavowing
any offensive action. It is easy to imagine someone like Billy Hughes rallying
the nation to resist. Equally the 'Little Digger' might have been turned over to
the Japanese.
This may be idle and chimerical speculation.
Although for Australia to face the prospect of a foreign invasion in the near
future there would
have to be momentous geo-political turmoil within the Asia-Pacific; akin to the
Pacific War, with the European powers engaged in a major war, and the Japanese
having taken Singapore. Australia's northern neighbours would have to be caught
up in political and social turmoil, such as civil strife, economic collapses and
open warfare. Such circumstances may emerge suddenly; Yugoslavia was peaceful
leading up to its dismemberment. Australia itself may be undergoing social and
economic dislocation. Aggressors will take advantage of the most inopportune
time.
Turmoil with the region would be profoundly
effect external trade, resulting in declining national income, unemployment, and
social upheaval. A surge in unemployment may place defence preparedness low on
domestic priorities. It is often suggested that merchant shipping could resort
strategic routing, as occurred in the Pacific War. Although, this may not be
viable. Trade is increasing between Australia and it's northern neighbours. And
to import there must be exports, particularly to pay for advance technological
weapons, such as air to air missiles. There would be no Lend-Lease as in WWII.
A major reason for having armed forces is to be
influence adverse circumstances and to reduce uncertainty. The prevailing
fortress Australia/denial doctrine negates such opportunity. Much is made of
having superior surveillance and intelligence capability so as to prevent
surprise. Although being forewarned is of little value if there is no resolution
to act. Optimism and undue caution color thinking. Without a willingness to take
risks, circumstances will take hold of events. Waiting until an enemy is nearing
the coastline may be too late.
The circumstances that give rise to a threat
will negate prescriptive planning. Assumptions about warning time, mobilisation
and assess to critical supplies may be invalidated. The county may resist, but
then again it might not. Having avoided conflict for so long the country may
simply avoid it one more time and hope for the best. Australia would be isolated
and alone in the World, after having failed to stand-by friends. What prospects
of a successful defence would there be? The 'Bennelong' option may not seem so
unappealing. Although such a prospect can be lessened by
having a forwardly focused defence policy. In the past this has gone under
various descriptions, eg, Imperial defence, forward defence, collective security
and most recently, regional engagement. The essence of which is to be able to
deploy military force throughout our region interest. And not to wait until it
is too late.
Originally
Published in Defender, Journal of the Australia Defence Association,
Autumn 1997
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