Vietnam Re-examined

		Vietnam Re-examined

Introduction

The 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment arrived in South Vietnam through June of 1965, thirty years ago this year. The deployment of combat troops is remembered in controversial terms. Vietnam is considered either an internal conflict or a hopeless cause, and not worth the sacrifice made. The US lead intervention failed to prevent the communist victory in South Vietnam in April 1975. The war was a tragedy of enormous dimensions; over two million Vietnamese died, millions more become refugees, and over a million fled the country at the end of the war, including half a million 'boat people'. The war saw divided loyalties within families and communities and traditional social systems break down. Over 220 000 soldiers of the Army of the Republic of South Vietnam (ARVN) died in the war. Estimates of loses amongst National Liberation Front (Viet Cong) and Vietnamese Peoples' Army (North Vietnam) troops fighting in south range from 400 000 to over a million.

Influence on Defence Policy

Australia's participation in the war has had inordinate influence on defence policy. Successive Governments have avowed never to send troops to fight in Asian wars and held to a 'continental' defence doctrine. There has been consternation that peace keeping operation won't result in Australia becoming embroiled in local conflicts. This also meant that Australia's contribution to the Gulf War was circumspect. This insular policy reached its' nadir with the 1985 Dibbs Report. It has only begun to erode with military support to Cambodia, and last years Defence White Paper, and the articulation of a cooperative defence policy with Australia's international neighbours.

What is the Question?

Analyse of Australia's involvement in Vietnam is coloured by hindsight and the failure of the intervention. It reveals little to assert that the war was wrong and it should have been fought differently. Australian had little influence over the conduct of the war. None of the resent criticisms are original. All the options had their proponents at the time. For example, Barry Goldwater (1964 Republican Presidential candidate) sought an intensive air campaign, although he has since changed his mind; Maxwell Taylor (Ambassador to Vietnam, 1964) recommended the 'enclave strategy', and George Ball (Under Secretary of State 1961-66) argued for a political settlement, but change his opinion too. Robert McNamara is far from alone in changing his mind and that he had reservations about the war is hardly new. It is more useful to look at why Australia became involved, what was it's contribution and conduct during the war. This can offer important lessons for defence policy and foreign relations.

Australia's Objective

Australia willingly committed forces as part of its long term objective of keeping a benevolent power engaged in Asia-Pacific. The US would have been less committed to the region if Australia had declined to support South Vietnam. The US presence was a stabilising influence which mitigated against regional rivalries leading to conflict and served to contain Soviet expansionism. These were clearly vital Australian interests at the time of the commitment. Not intervening would have had its costs. America is an insular country and traditionally reluctant to engage in World affairs. If they had abandon Vietnam they might not have stopped pulling back until they got to Ohau. This was a remote but decidedly discomforting prospect. It was not unreasonable to show America some support.

Australia's Contribution

Australian aid to South Vietnam was modest. The maximum contribution was 8000 troops. This was about 1% of the US commitment of over half a million, which also maintained massive global deployments at the time. Australia's other commitments, eg, to the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve in Malaya were minor in comparison. Australia's force was considerably less than South Korea, which kept 50 000 soldiers in SVN. Over 500 Australia's died in Vietnam, but US lost almost 60 000 war dead. To put it in perspective, more service personal died in accidents in Australia in most years of the war than on active service.

America had been criticised for their guns and butter policy, ie, fighting both the 'war on poverty' and the one in Vietnam. Although, the Australian Government's approach to the war could be described as a 'butter, butter' policy. It was unwilling to raise even the most modest war tax. The US spent 3% of it's GNP at the height of the war. Australian expenditure was a fraction of this amount (less than 1/2 of 1%). Economic aid to SVN was meagre. Australia was not in a position to make further commitments because of the low level of defence spending through the 1950s to mid-60s had left the Defence Forces inadequately prepared. There were no modern strike aircraft and few helicopters. The initial battalion deployed to SVN was one of only two operationally capable infantry units, and arrived without adequate supplies of such basic items as rubber-soled boots and barbed wire.

Political Attitudes

There was little difference between the Liberal Government and the Labor Opposition in their attitude towards the War. The Labor Party shared the objective of encouraging US engagement in the Asia-Pacific region, and offered qualified support to the war. As previously stated, the Government's material contribution to the war was not significant. Labor had accepted sending advisers and American air raids, but voiced opposition at the commitment of combat troops. The Labor Party Leader at the time, Arthur Calwell wanted ceilings placed on any commitment, and that any force be balanced (which initially it was not). The Opposition expressed concern at both North Vietnamese aggressions as well as US reactions. They did not demand troop withdrawal because they wanted Australia to be considered a reliable international partner. Calwell's successor, Gough Whitlam was opposed to conscripts serving in Vietnam, but willing to consider regulars remaining under a UN mandate. Labor in the 1969 election campaign said it would withdraw troops from Vietnam by the end of the following year. That is, the end of 1971. The Liberal Government actually brought home the last combat troops by November 1971. This was twelve months before the election of the Whitlam Labor Government, by which time there only a few dozen non-combatant advisers remaining. The reality of Government would have had Labor act similarly to the Liberals had they been in Office during the war.

The Role of Australia's Forces

Australian forces played only a minor role in the war. The troops were deployed in a less critical area and where they would not be at risk of substantial casualties. They mostly operated in Phuoc Tuy Province, which was not a preferred infiltration route and where there were few enemy units. The heaviest fighting was born by American and South Vietnamese troops in the I Corps and the Cambodian Border area. The Australian Government also declined to assume responsibility for pacification within it's area of operation. Thereby, avoided becoming entangled in local politics. It's civil aid program was small compared to American and South Vietnamese efforts in the local area. Australian air and naval units were prohibited from participating in US offensive action against North Vietnam.

This situation allowed Australian forces a latitude of independence, and by that avoided political problems that had troubled Australian forces during both World Wars. Having their own logistics link via the coastal port of Vung Tau permitted greater self-reliance. Australia could control its own operations and casualty rates. Australian Commanders clearly understood that their role was more political than military. They very competently fulfilled this role by making a meaningful contributing to the war effort without exposing their forces to substantial loses. This is a major difference to the Americans, who were fighting to force an end to the war.

The troops were dedicated and performed well within the limitation of their circumstance, but their competence was not exceptional. They enjoy numerical supremacy and a preponderance of artillery and other supports compared with their opponents. Australian units were no more effective than US or Korea units in dealing with the NLF/NVA. If it assumed that everyone exaggerated body counts then kill ratios were similar. Australian Commanders lacked the operational agility of their US counterparts. The Australian Task Force did not achieve reasonable security within its area of responsibility, or seriously inhibited movement of the opposing forces, and the communist cadre remained entrenched. Australia's forces did succeed in ensuring their own security, which was their principal objective.

Australian forces were generally able to avoid critical situations so it is difficult to compare them with American and South Vietnamese troops, whom had more vehemence experiences. Australia's Army was essentially a light infantry force and this was reflected in the troops aptitude at patrolling, field craft and night operations. America's big mechanised Army was more able at devastate opposing units. The small Australian force was more thoroughly trained and able to include a greater proportion of experience soldiers and leaders than the US. Australia generally replaced it's forces by unit so that they were able maintain strong cohesion. The US Army kept units in the field with individual replacements, and inexcusably rotated field officers. This meant that Australia's forces could avoid the discipline and moral problems that plagued the mass conscript US Army. It is likely that an expanded Australian force exposed to heavier combat would have experienced similar problems to those faced by the US forces. Australian commanders were often scornful of their South Vietnamese allies and were unwilling to co-operate with the local militia (not helpful in coalition warfare). However, the best of the ARVN units were located in more critical areas. On numerous occasions South Vietnamese maintained their integrity despite heavy loses. More notably, the best units of Vietnamese Peoples' Army were better than any. Which is not surprising as they had thirty years of almost continual warfare behind them. It is a delusion that Australia would have superior soldiers without having devoted much effort to its' armed forces.

Outcome of the War

The outcome of the US lead intervention was to defer the fall of South Vietnam by a decade. During this period the strategic circumstances of south east Asia changed markedly. The developing countries of south east Asia were better prepared than had they been threatened earlier. Decolonisation trauma experienced by the countries of south east Asia had settled down, eg, the communist insurgents in the Malay peninsula and Thailand and "the Confrontation" between Malay Federation and Indonesia. By the end of the American intervention the Vietnamese economy and social structure was crippled, so could not sustain an aggressive stance. China had become engulfed in the cultural revolution. It had also fallen out completely with the Soviets, with whom they had fought a major border battle in 1969. President Nixon recognised China and visited in 1972. The US had also improved relations with the Soviets, which included negotiating the SALT I treaty. From the perspective of south east Asian countries, Chinese hegemony was no longer a risk, and the war was not necessarily a failure. The disappointment for the Americans is that they probably could have achieved a similar result with far less sacrifice. For the Vietnamese communist victory came at a terrible price.

Public Opinion

There was broad public consensus for the involvement. A major contention was conscription for foreign services, which was not unique to the Vietnam war. Although, call-up avoidance was minor (only 232 out 63 000 refusing). Public protest had little impact on Government policy. The Government decision to draw down involvement in early 1969 was before the moratorium marches. Public antagonism has been overstated. The public response was probably better than that experienced by repatriated Diggers from the Great War, many who did not arrive home until some time after the wars end and by which time any euphoria had been replaced with private bitterness. There had not been any final parade because unlike most previous wars soldiers had not served for the duration of hostilities, and there was no mass repatriation at the war's end. Most units had paraded in public as they returned home.

Myths and popular memory

All wars have their myths, but Australia's Vietnam experience has taken on more than its fair share. The Australian and American experience of Vietnam were distinctly different. However, it seems that Australia's popular memory is confused with that of America. Which is not surprising as so much of else their popular culture has been absorbed within Australia. Views of the war come more from American films and documentaries shown in Australia long after the war was concluded. There was not the domestic political turmoil that occurred in America, nor the same deep-seated opposition. It is surprising that protest was not more widespread or strident. It was mild compared with the anti-conscription movement during the Great War. Australian public attitudes could best be described as uninterested. It was not the lack of public support that necessitated the withdrawal but that the Americans would no longer be present.

The Vietnam war is considered different because of the failure to achieve victory and lack of public support. It is compared unfavourably with the experience of Second World War, which ended with total defeat of the Axis powers. However, most wars are pursued with limited means and not fought to conclusion. They are usually settled politically long before opponents have exhausted their ability to wage war. The growth of opposition is not uncommon for burdensome expeditionary wars. The Vietnam war was typical of most previous wars and probably of any future conflict.

Conclusions

Australia's military commitment to Vietnam was modest and contributed to the countries' strategic objects, ie, ensuring US engagement in the Asia-Pacific region at the height of the cold war. It was prudent for Australia to have participated in the War and perceptive to have disengage when it did. The contribution should not be exaggerated. It was neither praiseworthy nor villainous. The competency of the defence force was not seriously tested by the Vietnam experience. It gives no grounds for complacency about their prospects in any similar conflict. If the Vietnam war is going to affect public discussion on foreign policy and defence matters, it important that it be better understood.