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Introduction
Defence bureaucracy does many things that would be bemusing if they were not so
serious. To list just a few
curiosities from recent years:
-
Navy having more
musicians than mine warfare specialists.
-
1500 Lieutenant-Colonels
(enough
COs for 100 divisions!), but only
four under-strength regular infantry battalions .
-
More combat aircraft than pilots
(NATO standards are 2½ per aircraft).
-
Warships usually deploy toward the
north, but the new armaments complex is to be built near Geelong
on the south coast (But I suppose you can't trust Penguins).
-
Officers make up over 20% of the
ADF, compared with 14% in NZ, 16% in
USA
, 10% for the 2nd AIF and less than 2% in WWII Wehrmacht.
-
22 Department officials advising on
defence exports of a mere $40 million.
-
ADF will only sustain 200 troops on
peace keeping duties at any one time (out 60 000 full time personal).
-
Army helicopters that are
unserviceable and Navy helicopters too big to land on warships.
-
Reservist not having to pass
fitness standards to avoid compensation obligations, eg, if they are injured
jogging in their own time.
-
Inaugural RAN visit to
Vladivostok
to serve as a venue for a food fair. They
probably thought they were helping with trade promotion.
Although, a $500 million warship for a wine and cheese party just makes
the Navy look silly.
One might think that those charged with managing the $10 billion dollar
defence budget are either slothful or incompetent. This view would be disingenuous considering the many dedicated
professionals involved. Recent economic thinking offers another explanation. This suggests public bureaucracies like the Defence Department are
inherently inefficient. These
theories are about what is termed non-market, or government failure.
Understanding these ideas can provide insight into problems within the Defence
bureaucracy. This insight should
help guide reform of the Defence Department.
Fundamental Economics
Economics instructs that the most efficient allocation of resources comes from a
free market. That is where everyone
may buy and sell as they choose. Buyers
want to pay the least amount possible, and sellers seek the highest price on
offer. Buyers and sellers will trade where their marginal benefits exceed costs. This drives market prices to an equilibrium that maximise efficient
allocation of resources. Interference in the market results in a loss of
economic welfare. Loss in efficiency has to be balanced with desirable social
outcomes.
Economics also states there are circumstances where the market is not efficient. This is termed market failure. It
includes monopolies, which drive up prices for consumers; Lack of information,
so consumer or producers don't know what is an appropriate price; Cost for which
the producer and consumer are not accountable, eg, pollution cause by a factory;
And public necessities, which the market won't provide in sufficient qualities,
such as hospitals, schools, defence force, etc. These problems have been considered a reason for government to intervene
in the market. That is by raising
taxes, establishing services and enacting regulations.
Non-Market (government) Failure
More recent economic thought suggests that government, like the market, has its
imperfections too. It's structure
creates incentives to be in-efficient and waste resources. Therefore, consideration should be given to whether government will be
able to make-up for market failure. There may be better means than others for
government to met objectives. Solution might be little better than the problem,
and perhaps not worth the effort. Charles
Wolf*, a noted academic economist, offers a taxonomy of government failure. This
is counter-part to the traditional categories of market failure. It can be used
to examine government activities, including defence.
Wolf's Taxonomy of government failure
Redundant
& rising costs; Markets impose a relationship between production costs and output prices. This relationship is weak in non-market activity. Defence receives revenue by government taxation, not by selling it's
services. The buyer (taxpayer) and
producer (Defence Department) are only related in-directly through the political
process. Out-put prices or value of
defending ourself is difficult to determine, so it becomes equated to in-put
costs. The focus becomes on the components of the defence force. For example, if six submarines are good, eight must be better. This is
irrespective of the objectives of defence.
What do the consumers of defence (citizens of the country) want; To feel safe
and secure, project national will, or to do good things (eg, peace keeping)?
How much are they willing to pay to met these objectives, and how might
they be efficiently achieve? There
is a view that democratic processes is unable to derived any consensus on such
questions (Arrows impossibility theorem). There
can never be any conclusive answer, and objectives will sway to varying
opinions. This suggests that if
there is no clarity in what should be done, then rather than reduce economic
welfare you might as well do nothing at all (a key argument for smaller
government).
This contention may be relevant for getting
government out of things like electricity production, but would hardly do for a
vital matter like national defence. The founder of modern economics, Adam Smith,
said the first duty of a sovereign state is to protect the realm. However, it
does suggest that a more transparent public policy and citizen input about what
is wanted of defence might produce a better result. This is rather than the professional and elitist decision making process
at present. More accountability of
defence and an honest examination of its inadequacy should create a demand for
improved efficiency, and the desire to buy more or perhaps less defence.
Internalities and private
goals; Both commercial and non-market organisation must employ internal price
mechanisms. That is some means of
allocating resources. However for
non-market organisations the link to external realities is weaker. Where as private firms have focused objectives, ie, maximising profits,
public bodies can have multiple objective. For
Defence this includes repelling invasion, promoting technology, training, and
aid to civil powers. Some objectives are unstated or can not be publicly
acknowledge (least they aggravate potential antagonist). This multiplicity of
objectives makes it easier for public bodies to be diverted from their intended
purpose.
Without an out-put price or bench-mark there is no clarity about what is
important. Measurement of success
becomes ambiguous. Private firms can look to the profit or loses to see how they
are performing. Success for
organisations like Defence become whatever bureaucrats, or their political
overseers say it is. And they have a vested interest to say everything is fine
as it is. Equally, opposition politicians are motivated to criticise. Citizens
can not be sure otherwise until there is war, and not even then, because of the
secrecy that surrounds defence.
Individuals
within public bureaucracies are more able to pursue personal agenda. They may
give emphasis to one objective over others. Personal concerns may direct
decisions, eg, staff positions preferred to field service, being more pleasant
and less inconvenient on family life. Pilots
assigned to fighter aircraft, which are more glamorous than stalwart tactical
transports. Public bureaucracies
become risk adverse, because they know they will be chastised for mistake, but
little rewarded for success. They
lack bench-marks against which to balance risk with opportunity, eg, whether to
adopt an unproven technology.
Derived Externalities; That is
unintended or unanticipated consequences of government activity. Public bodies create costs or benefit which they may not be accountable. Military base may despoil the environment. Although, they often serve to
protect natural areas by precluding other development, for which they receive
little credit (eg,
Jervis
Bay
and
Swan
Island). Bases may be move for their prized real estate (eg,
Garden
Island
dockyard) rather than enhancing defence preparedness. Bases provide job opportunities for local communities. The maritime patrol base in
South Australia
is remote any of its usual patrol areas, but it at least directs public expenditure
to some marginal electorates.
Distributional Consequences;
This is where there is adverse distributional outcomes. For public bodies this occurs in terms of privilege and power, rather
than income and wealth. It can be
seen in the dis‑proportionate number of officers and NCOs to junior ranks. Procurement contracts being directed to state enterprises to placate
public sector unions. For example, small arms order from the ADI, Lithgow, when
there are a number of precision engineering firms that could manufacture rifles
more efficiently. Military careers
can provide opportunities for some individuals that they might not otherwise
enjoy. Although, Defence's preoccupation with equal opportunity appears to
neglect its raison d'etre of 'killing the
Queens
enemies' (its Republican equivalent doesn't have the same style to it).
Thinking it through
Non-market analysis can guide to
rational decisions making. Imagine
if ships captains could buy shells and missiles where they pleased. An
entrepreneur might seek a share of the market by establishing an outlet at
Geelong
on the south cost. It could be
marketed as a one-stop-shop, with fuel and maintenance facilities near-by,
extensive inventory, and no delays due to cyclonic weather.
On the other hand, a competitor might setup a series of smaller outlets at
Darwin
,
Newcastle
, and Cooktown. They might not offer as wide a range of stock, but would be only a
short steaming distance away from training areas and likely wartime deployments. They could offer a rebate for each day weather prevented the loading of
munitions. Where would
a ship's captains shop? This is not suggesting a open market in 5' shells and SM1 missiles. It just if there were, the East Coast Armament complex would not be built
on the south coast.
Excellence and other Fads
Bureaucrats create detailed procedures to preclude errors and ensure
accountability. Such procedures can
become an end in themself and divorce from the organisations objectives. Adherents to ideals of excellence can distort resources allocation. Time and effort put into doing something perfectly usually means that
some other matters must be neglected. For example, returning incomplete invoices
where they might be clarified over the phone wastes time, or introducing
information technology without consider the full cost of additional training,
and disruption caused by change. Advanced
technology is not always best technology.
Markets & war
Markets and war are not alien to each other. In times past Regiments were run as business of their
colonels. Military commissions were brought and sold. Swiss pikemen hired themselves to warring monarchs, and changed sides if
they got a better offer. T.W.
Lawrence (of
Arabia
) sought to bribed a Turkish Commander to free a besieged British Force. He was
supported by Lord Kitchener but ostracised by his contemporaries.
These practices are not so remote as might be imagined. Consider the
following;
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Russian bomber squadron contracted
to the Royalist Forces in the recent
Yemen
civil war. At the end of the
war they collected their bonuses and went home.
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Former US Army Offices advising the
Croatian Army. They are not violating UN arms embargo provided they teach
leadership and management, but not tactics and doctrine. |
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South African soldiers finding
employment as advisers amongst the former Front Line States, even
replacing Cubans in
Angola. |
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British Army issuing redundancy
notices to soldiers on active service in former Yugoslavia
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A multi-polar world means that
capabilities are not as fixed as with an ideological divide. Assumptions about
friends and foes may not be valid. ADF
must adjust to international trends. They can not wait years to fill gaps in
capabilities. Pilot shortage could
be address by hiring on the international market.
Both the
US
and
Russia
, among many other air forces have a surplus of aircrews. The acquisition of AEW&C aircraft and mine warfare vessels should
have been done years ago. 2nd best
solutions are better than no solutions at all. Without such capability the
expensive fighter and warships are extremely handicapped. Combat formations are
under-strength but other positions are being made redundant. Couldn't clerks be
re-mustered into the infantry! This what would happen in face of war.
Or are too many of administration staff, stores people, etc unable to met
fitness standards. It is merely
fortunate there has been no war in recent times.
Values
This not to say Defence should be handed over to the bean-counters, or soldiers
paid piece-rate. Wars are
serious matters. Nurturing warriors
requires adherents to tradition, discipline, ethics and hardy living. It is
about killing, risking life and inevitably death of the countries youth
Australia
has lost over 100,000 war-dead since Federation. War by definition is not efficient. Winning requires mustering
overwhelming strength, hitting the enemy again and again until they stop. It is
about spending blood and treasure to preserve intangibles of liberty, harmony
and principle. Are these values only
recognised when they are threatened?
Conclusion
Defence should be producing warriors not wasting people and resources. Dedicated individuals are becoming prosaic administrators.
Political leaders bear the responsibility for making changes. They have the authority to take action. Non-market analyses can provide insight into what needs to be done.
When the
US
become engaged in WWII its armed forces underwent a massive expansion. One of the first things they did was to establish a commission to
recommend dismissal of over-age and incompetent peace-time officers. The
prospect of battle tends to focus the mind. Let's reform Defence now and not wait until adverse circumstances compel
change.
* Charles
Wolf, Markets or Government: Choosing Between Imperfect Alternatives
(1989), MIT Press
Cambridge
.
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