War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the Twenty-first Century

Alvin and Heidi Toffler are the well-known authors of Future Shock (1970), in which they postulate that society was facing an unprecedented pace of change. They also wrote The Third Wave (1980), about the advent of an information-based society; agriculture and industrial being the previous two "waves’ of change. This later book attracted the attention of senior officers of the US Army’s Training and Doctrine Command, who were re-developing doctrine in the aftermath of the Vietnam War. These officers had concluded that transformation of society would also bring about change in the conduct of warfare.

The Toffler’s had previously described the revolutionary change in warfare in War, Wealth, and a New Era in History (World Monitor, may 1991). They argued that "Third Wave violence is an extension of the mind, not the fist." The authors point to the Gulf War as demonstration of the dramatic changes occurring in warfare. They assert that intangibles of initiative, skills, intelligence, communication and computing power count more than sheer numbers. They also argue that there needs to be significant change in the way wars are prevented, and that current diplomatic and international structures are inadequate.

War and Anti-War is presented in five parts; Conflict, Trajectory (history and trends), Exploration (emerging technologies), Knowledge (media, spies, etc.) Danger and Peace. These parts are broken into twenty-five chapters and about 200 labeled sections. With a sizable index it is easy to locate topics of interest. The book is not laden with jargon and footnotes, and regularly introduces short narratives and stories to illustrate arguments and aid comprehension.

The book offers some interesting observations on future wars and war-prevention. For example:

• Civilian technical innovation leading the military as opposed to the reverse in the past, which could exacerbate weapons technology proliferation;

• Losing of control by some governments of armed forces thus complicating conflict resolution (ie, with whom do you negotiate?);

• Private armies tendering for peacekeeping operations;

• Countries tapping into commercial satellites to spy on each other;

• Development of non-lethal and more discriminating weapons;

• Questioning the popular assumption that democracies won’t make war on each other; and

• The risk with special forces, eg, what happens to unemployed Spetsnaz.

That said, War and Anti-War offers few answers to the questions raised. The authors often resort to clichés, popular myths and selected evidence to advance their arguments. They focus extensively on technological development and barely touches on many social changes that also greatly impact on warfare, eg, changing status of women, cultural and media effusion and demographic trends. There is little discussion on the causes of war, as opposed to how they are fought. Issues of morale, ideology and psychology rate little mention. War and Anti-War is a slim work, so could cover little of such a broad subject. However, it falls short of its stated objective of offering a new way of thinking about war.

Some of the alleged new thinking is quite old. For example, the AirLand doctrine owes much to ‘Plan 1919’, German Hutier (infiltration) tactics of World War 1, and the horse warriors of Genghis Khan. Perhaps the idea of ‘First Wave’ civilization may have utilized ‘Third Wave’ concepts would confuse the author’s contention that warfare had dramatically changed.

Another dissatisfaction is the authors’ description of the US intervention in Vietnam as failure and the war against Iraq a triumph, all explained by ‘new thinking’ in the US military. These are contentious and broad-sweeping, if not fallacious assertions. This is acknowledged in by authors quoting a US Army officer that they ‘don’t do jungles or mountains’ ( P. 180), a reference as to why they might prevail against Iraq, but not against Bosnian Serbs. The book offers scant comment on geo-political factors, crucial elements in the different outcomes of both the Vietnam and Gulf war.

The book is topical. In discussion on the war in the former Yugoslavia, the authors suggests that emerging technology might have allowed individual mortar tubes to be identified and targeted. Maybe? The Coalition Forces in the Gulf War were rarely able to find mobile SCUD launches in western Iraq. Furthermore, whose mortar might they be, what if they are located in a school yard and would it be worth a costly missile to destroy a mortar tube that could be replaced for a fraction of the missile’s value.

For the present, the separate UN contingencies in Bosnia-Herzegovina have no unity of command and cannot communicate directly with each other, let alone with NATO strike aircraft. This was because they would not exchange radio frequencies, codes or establish common procedures. Some problems in warfare do not change. Perhaps this typifies ‘Second wave’ thinking which the authors contends hamstrings UN peacekeeping operations.

In a recent radio interview with Phillip Adams, Alvin Toffler suggests that if NATO were to respond to Serbian aggression, it would be better to bomb television transmitters in Belgrade, rather than individual gun emplacements. The author expands on this idea in the book by suggesting that the UN could have countered hate propaganda that permeated Yugoslavia leading up to its break up. However, could any government muster the political consensus for such action prior to an obvious threat?

Consider the current situation in which Greece is engulfed in Kriegsstimming (war mood) over Macedonia. Who would be willing to telecast a more balanced view point? With their eyes on domestic electoral concerns, the major Australian political parties would not. This suggests that an independent national broadcaster, like the ABC has a significant strategic value.

The book is thought provoking, but somewhat irritating in parts. There are better works on social and economic trend, eg, Paul Kennedy’s Preparing for the 21^st Century. Francis Fukuymara’s The End of history and the Last Man offers a framework to consider the causes of war. Gareth Evans’ Co-operating for Peace includes more concrete proposals for preventing war. Ralph Peters’ novels Red Army and War in 2020 are better explorations of warfare in the future. Standard works like John Keegan’s Face of Battle and recently published A History of Warfare, Richard Holmes’ Firing Line, and Colonel Trevor Dupey’s Numbers, Predictions and War all recognise the constants of warfare, which the Tofflers appear to ignore.

War and Anti-War is a useful combination of social trends and military affairs, and suitable for a general audience, particularly anyone concerned about preventing war in the Twenty-First Century.

Originally published in Defender, Winter 1994.

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