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There should have been comment on the human
factors and difficulties that are entailed in controlling fires in Maj Miller
and Cpt Averna's, Direct Fire Planning, (Nov/Dec. 93). As it is a two
part article and focused on prepared defence, my comments may be precipitous.
Complex and detailed fire plans will be not be
easy to implement. Smoke, noise and anxiety will distract and confuse soldiers
and leaders. The desire for self preservation will mitigate against complex fire
plans. Soldiers will instinctively engage those targets nearest to them and most
threatening. They will also tend to engage targets from left to right. It is
expecting a lot of crews to fire past an obvious target to engage one farther
away.
Complex and detailed fire plans will be not be
easy to implement. Smoke, noise and anxiety will distract and confuse soldiers
and leaders. The desire for self preservation will mitigate against complex fire
plans. Soldiers will instinctively engage those targets nearest to them and most
threatening. They will also tend to engage targets from left to right. It is
expecting a lot of crews to fire past an obvious target to engage one farther
away.
Soldiers may not remember which are their
targets. Target Reference Points, Engagement Areas, Quadrants, etc, can help
clarify a chaotic situation, but they should not be over emphasised. The plan
may not appear logical to the those concerned because it is has not been
possible to put them in the 'big picture' .
Avoiding overkill is important. Particularly as
there may not be an abundance of main gun and missile ammunition. Although
overkill is not as bad as 'underkill', or soldiers hesitating because they are
unsure which target they should engage.
The authors state that 'it is vital that
commanders not assume that the command fire ... will suffice to synchronise his
unit fire'. Although it is prior to an engagement that a commander can most
influence massing of fires.
Distribution and massing of fire can be best
achieved by the thoughtful placing and orientation of weapons, and the use of
battle drills and SOPs. For example, training solider to watch their arc, and to
engage left to right, with flanking weapons targeting the extremities and
working inward. Place weapons to the flank to engaging following enemy
formations.
This is not to say that there should not be
planning. Commanders must attempt to influence the distribution of fires.
However, they should not presume that they will be able to do much in the mist
of battle. Clear and simple commands will be more reliable.
The authors observe that setting Engagement
Priorities 'may not be effective in every situation' because it is difficult to
identify target types except at close range. As deficiencies of eye sight must
influence direct fire planning, so should the imperfection of human behaviour.
Armor, US Armor Association, March-April 1994,
Vol. CIII No. 2
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